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ABSTRACT
This study is on the effects of United States (US) Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards number 133 (SFAS 133), Accounting for Derivatives Instruments and Hedging
Activities, which was introduced in 2001. The first area of investigation focuses on the
impact of SFAS 133 on income smoothing through the application of derivatives and
discretionary accruals. The second key aspect is how SFAS 133 influences the disclosure
of derivatives related information. Addressing these two issues together, provides an
integrated understanding of how accounting policy can affect both risk management and
risk disclosure choices.
The study comprises a detailed literature review of extant empirical and analytical studies.
It primarily extends the work of studies that initially looked at derivatives and
discretionary accruals as income smoothing substitutes, such as Barton (2001) and
Rajgopal and Pincus (2002). The theoretical framework developed during the literature
review, discusses the genesis and key features of SFAS 133, and the determinants of the
two key income smoothing choices of derivatives use and discretionary accruals. These
include capital markets, managerial risk and corporate governance determinants. In
addition, the theoretical framework outlines how SFAS 133 fair value recognition
requirements can influence disclosure of related information through the footnotes. It
presents the argument that the extent to which notes are complementary to recognition
and measurement requirements should outweigh the extent to which they may be
considered substitutes. It further describes the literature on disclosure incentives,
including capital markets, proprietary cost concerns, managerial talent, managerial risk
incentives based on compensation and litigation cost. This is as a precursor to the
univariate and multivariate empirical testing of 1999 to 2003 data from 253 US firms (i.e.
850 firm-year observations).
In conducting the empirical testing, I endeavour to address the problems of model
endogeneity that could arise due to derivatives use and discretionary accruals being
determined jointly. I also address the individual effects that arise due to the application of
panel data. A key empirical finding is that after adopting SFAS 133, corporate managers
increase discretionary accruals. However, there is no conclusive multivariate evidence of
SFAS 133 reducing derivatives use, as hypothesized. An additional finding is that there is
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a substitution relationship between derivatives use and discretionary accruals. However, I
also find that SFAS 133 adoption weakens the extent to which accruals influences
derivatives use, but not the other way round. This latter finding suggests a partial
substitution relationship exists after SFAS 133 and lends itself to a number of plausible
explanations. These include accruals being complements rather than substitutes to
derivatives use, after SFAS 133. SFAS 133 could trigger either increased earnings
volatility or the greater use of speculative derivatives. Either of these could then induce
the increased use of accruals in a manner that confounds the income smoothing
substitution relationship.
Despite the substitution relationship, the use of derivatives to smooth income is more akin
to economic reality, as derivatives use also influences cash flow and fundamental
economic volatility. Thus the finding that managers increase their use of accruals in
general, after SFAS 133, suggests that SFAS 133 adoption, results in choices that are less
beneficial to shareholders. I come to this conclusion based on the empirical evidence of
Huang, Deis, Zhang and Moffit (2009). Their study shows that for income smoothing
purposes, derivatives enhance shareholder value to a greater extent than the use of
accruals.
Further to the study of its impact on income smoothing, the empirical findings of SFAS
133 on derivatives related disclosure, build a collective picture of how different reporting
practices can be influenced by accounting policy. The study finds a significant positive
association between SFAS 133 and derivative information disclosure index, in all the
models. This suggests that the derivatives recognition and measurement requirements
have encouraged the provision of greater disclosures. The results also show a significant
positive association of capital markets incentives measured as the logarithm of trading
volume. However, there is no evidence of association of proprietary costs. The results
further show that auditor expertise and the level of derivatives use are positively
associated with observed derivatives disclosure levels. In the same vein, litigation risk and
discretionary accrual levels have a negative association.
In sum, this study shows that SFAS 133 adoption has potentially adverse consequences on
income smoothing choices, but at the same time it has positive consequences through its
encouraging disclosures that lower the information asymmetry on risk exposures.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The unique contribution of this ruling (i.e. SFAS 133), is its recognition of the cash flow
impact of hedging activities. This will have far reaching impact on financing and risk taking
behaviour of multinational firms –
Feay and Abdullah (2001)
1.1 Background and Statement of Problem
Across the world’s major capital markets there has been an ongoing demand for a significant
improvement in the general disclosure of financial instruments including derivatives contracts
and the particular disclosure of risk exposures and risk management strategies around these
instruments. This demand for greater financial instrument risk disclosure has been prominent
since the early 1990s and has occurred in various key jurisdictions including the US, United
Kingdom (UK) and Australia (Bezzeta and Bozzolan, 2006).
Due to the shortcomings of prevailing derivatives disclosure requirements, massive
derivatives risk exposures were hidden in a number of high profile cases such as Orange
County, Metagesellschaft, Procter and Gamble, Barings Bank and Long Term Capital
Management (LTCM). Therefore, reducing the opacity of risks related to corporate
derivatives application is a key objective for both accounting standard setting bodies and
capital markets regulatory authorities. The Basel Committee on banking supervision and the
International Organisation of Securities Commission (IOSCO) highlight1 the importance of
derivatives disclosures, noting that these can provide details about the impact of these
instruments on a company’s earnings profile. The objective of improving derivatives
disclosure, underpins the promulgation of a number of derivatives related accounting
standards.
In the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), financial instrument risk
disclosure requirements are specified through different Financial Accounting Standard Board
(FASB) statement numbers 52, 80, 105, 107, 119, 133 and 138. They are also specified
through the Security Exchange Commission (SEC) Financial Release (FR) 48, which
mandates the disclosure of specific quantitative and qualitative risk information categories.
Similarly, the existing set of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), promulgated
1 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Technical Committee of the International Organisation of the Securities
Commission (IOSCO) (1999) - Recommendations for Public Disclosure of Trading and Derivatives Activities of Banks and
Securities Firms
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by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), requires financial instruments risk
disclosure. This is achieved through IFRS7: Financial Instruments Disclosures and
International Accounting Standard statement number 39 (IAS 39): Financial Instruments
Recognition and Measurement.
The promulgation of SFAS 133, effective from June 15th 2000, was part of the ongoing
enhancement of derivatives disclosure. Similar to earlier derivatives related standards2 (see
2.6.1 for detailed description of SFAS 133); SFAS 133 had the objective of improving
derivatives related disclosure. Prior to SFAS 133, there was a trend of steady enhancement of
derivatives accounting and some of the elements that SFAS 133 adopted, were applied
inconsistently across instruments, or were reported off-balance-sheet. The key features of
SFAS 133 are a) recognition of fair value of all derivatives instruments in the primary
financial statements and b) the definition of hedge accounting approach to be applied across
all derivatives instruments. Hedge accounting is an approach that aims to minimise the impact
of derivatives gains and losses on reported net income. It does so by matching the accounting
of the hedging instrument and related hedge. Hedge accounting primarily impacts on whether
fair value gains or losses are recorded in the income statement or other comprehensive income
(OCI) statement, but it does not affect the recording of derivatives fair values on the balance
sheet.
However, on its introduction, SFAS 133 was widely viewed as a controversial accounting
standard due to its enforcement of derivatives fair value recording across all derivatives
contracts, expected incremental earnings volatility and also due to its highly complex hedge
accounting qualification criteria. A survey of the Association of Finance Professionals (2002)
finds that during the first year of its implementation, 70% of CFO respondents describe SFAS
133 as excessively burdensome. Given the backdrop that characterized its introduction, it is
illuminating to understand the actual consequences of the implementation of SFAS 133.
This study is on the impact of SFAS 133 on two key managerial decisions, namely income
smoothing and disclosure of derivatives related information through the footnotes. The two
key research questions covered are:
 What is the impact of SFAS 133 on income smoothing using derivatives and
discretionary accruals?
 What is the impact of SFAS 133 and related incentives on disclosure of derivatives
related information?
2 SFAS 119, 115,107,105, 80 and 52
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Figure 1.1 above illustrates the common factor between these two questions. Addressing these
two questions together provides an integrated understanding of how accounting policy can
affect risk management and risk disclosure choices. An integrated empirical investigation of
SFAS 133 is also expected to be useful to both the academic community and accounting
policy makers.
Furthermore, the questions addressed in this research inform different strands of extant
accounting and corporate finance literature. Hence, the study has a cross disciplinary
character as it covers the domains of risk management that fall under corporate finance, and
earnings management and disclosure that fall under external financial accounting theory.
Another reason for the focus on SFAS 133 and the United States (US) is due to the relatively
rich data history available related to the disclosure of derivatives use. SFAS 133 was
SFAS 133 (DERIVATIVES ACCOUNTING STANDARD)
Income smoothing
(derivatives use and
discretionary accruals)
Disclosure of derivatives
Perceived riskiness of reporting firm
Figure 1.1: Diagrammatic representation of two key research questions
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introduced with effect from the fiscal year starting after June 15th 2000, while the
international equivalent IAS 39 was effective from January 2005.
Despite being a nascent area of study, there is clearly a growing interest in SFAS 133 related
studies. In my literature review, I come across at least 8 empirical studies and 6 analytical
papers that focus on this subject. The reason why empirical studies on the impact of SFAS
133 on different managerial choices are in a nascent stage is likely to be due to the relatively
recent promulgation of the standard.
1.2 SFAS 133 and Income smoothing
Earnings management is a pervasive feature of corporate reporting. The widespread
application of earnings management is evidence that managers expect observed earnings to
matter to capital markets participants and/or to be beneficial to managers. Graham, Harvey
and Rajgopal (2005) found that a majority of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) believed
earnings to be the most important performance measure for outsiders. In a survey of 401
executives they found that 51% ranked earnings as the most important performance measure.
This is followed by only 12% of respondents ranking revenues, cash flow from operations or
free cash flow as most important. They also find that 96.9% of CFOs prefer a smooth earnings
path and that 78% of CFOs would sacrifice real economic value in order to ensure a smooth
earnings path. Income smoothing using accruals is a special form of earnings management.
An alternative way of smoothing earnings is the use of derivatives. Similar to earnings
management, the use of derivatives is widespread especially among larger firms. A 2003,
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), survey of the world’s 500 largest
corporations showed that 92% use derivatives to manage and hedge their risks more
effectively, 92% use derivatives to manage interest rate risk, 78% manage currency risk, 25%
manage commodity price risk and 12% equity price risk. A Bank of International Settlement
(BIS) study estimates that $597 trillion of notional derivatives were outstanding as at the end
of 2007. Lins, Servaes and Tamayo (2007) conduct an international survey of 354 companies
located in 39 countries. They find that 83% respondent companies indicated that they manage
foreign exchange risk exposure, 74% manage interest risk and 49% manage commodity risk
exposure. These findings all point to derivatives being an integral part of the financial
hedging or income smoothing arsenal applied by corporate treasurers.
Despite the different methods of income smoothing by managers, extant literature has tended
to focus separately on the determinants of derivatives use and earnings management.
However, recent papers have begun to review these two as joints determinants or substitutes.
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These include studies undertaken by Barton (2001), Rajgopal and Pincus (2002), Singh
(2004) and Zhang, Deis and Moffit (2009). Barton (2001), in his study of the joint decision
on derivatives use and discretionary accruals, recognises that there is a research gap for a
similar study data based on post-SFAS 133 data. His own study is based on pre-SFAS 133
data (i.e. 1994-1996). Furthermore, as Triki (2005) noted, there is a paucity of risk
management empirical papers that use post -2000 data. Even some papers that focus on SFAS
133 still apply pre-SFAS 133 data. For example, Supanvanij and Strauss (2006) review
executive compensation risk incentives on hedging and the impact of SFAS 133, uses 1994 to
2000 data. Hence there is a research opportunity in relation to how SFAS 133 influences
managerial choices such as income smoothing. SFAS 133 empirical studies are also
complementary to several analytical studies (Barnes, 2002; Nan, 2007; Shin, 2004; and Duffie
and DeMarzo, 1996) which postulate on the impact of SFAS 133 on the use of derivatives
(i.e. speculative or hedging). Furthermore, Triki (2005) advocates the use of post-2000 data so
as to test the stability of risk management determinants after the introduction of new
accounting standards.
1.2.1 Data- SFAS 133 and Income Smoothing
The study is based on 850 firm-year observations from 2533 firms, in the period
between1999-2003. This consists of derivatives users (681 firm-year observations, 218 firms)
and non derivatives users (169 firm-year observations, 69 firms). The derivatives data is hand
collected from annual reports (Form 10-K) that are downloaded from SEC’s Edgar database,
while the control variables are sourced from Execucomp and Compustat databases.
1.2.2 Method and Findings- SFAS 133 and Income Smoothing
The detailed hypothesis development is discussed in section 2.7. Below are the primary
hypotheses that I test:
 Hypothesis 2.1: SFAS 133 adoption leads to the reduced use of derivatives.
 Hypothesis 2.2a: SFAS 133adoption leads to the increased use of discretionary
accruals.
 Hypothesis 2.2b: Cash flow hedge accounting influences the level of discretionary
accruals.
3 253 firms ( 218 firms report derivatives use in some years, 69 firms do not report derivatives use in some years, while 34 firms
report derivatives use in some years and do not report derivatives use in some years i.e. 253=218+69-34)
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 Hypothesis 2.3a: Derivatives and discretionary accruals are substitutes for income
smoothing purposes.
 Hypothesis 2.3b: SFAS 133 adoption influences the substitution relationship.
There is very limited empirical evidence of a) the impact of SFAS 133 on the income
smoothing substitution relationship and b) the impact of cash flow hedge accounting on
discretionary accruals. The other stated hypotheses are mainly confirmatory of emerging
empirical evidence. However, it is still useful to test these, as the body of related empirical
evidence is still in embryonic stages and very few studies are actually based on post-SFAS
133 data.
I apply parametric and non parametric testing including; univariate analysis and multivariate
regression models. In the multivariate models, I mitigate the problems of endogeneity and
panel data individual effects, as these issues can result in flawed inference from the findings.
Endogeneity is primarily driven by the simultaneity of derivatives use and discretionary
accruals, as they are income smoothing substitutes. In addition to pooled Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression, I use two stage least squares (2SLS) models to cater for
endogeneity, and random effects panel regression models to cater for panel data related
individual effects. I also include censored regression (tobit) and logistic regression models to
assess the determinants of the decision to use derivatives.
A key empirical finding is that after adopting SFAS 133, corporate managers increase
discretionary accruals as means of income smoothing. However, there is no conclusive
evidence of SFAS 133 reducing derivatives use, as hypothesized. An additional finding is
that there is a substitution relationship between derivatives use and discretionary accruals. I
also find that SFAS 133 adoption weakens the extent to which accruals influence derivatives
use, but not the other way round. This latter finding suggests a partial substitution
relationship exists mainly after SFAS 133 and lends itself to a number of plausible
explanations. These include accruals being complements rather than substitutes to
derivatives use, after SFAS 133. SFAS 133 could trigger either increased earnings volatility
or the greater use of speculative derivatives. Either of these could then induce the increased
use of accruals in a manner that confounds the income smoothing substitution relationship.
Despite the substitution relationship, the use of derivatives to smooth income is more akin to
economic reality, as derivatives use also influence cash flow and fundamental economic
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volatility. Thus the finding that managers increase their use of accruals in general, after SFAS
133, suggests that SFAS 133 adoption results in choices that are less beneficial to
shareholders. I come to this conclusion based on the empirical evidence of Huang, Deis,
Zhang and Moffit (2009). Their study shows that for income smoothing purposes, derivatives
enhance shareholder value to a greater extent than the use of accruals. Hence I infer from the
results that the higher use of accruals after SFAS 133 is likely to be less to the benefit of
shareholders.
1.2.3 Contribution- SFAS 133 and Income Smoothing
By undertaking a study on the impact of SFAS 133 on income smoothing, there is scope to
extend the empirical evidence related to SFAS 133 on various fronts. First, there is scope for a
conceptual contribution through looking at two different determinants of income smoothing
that are potentially impacted on by the derivatives accounting policy. Hentschel and Kothari
(2001), note that derivatives use is just one aspect of the overall corporate risk management.
However, the literature on income smoothing tends to focus on single mechanisms of doing
so. For example, it has tended to separately focus on derivatives use and discretionary
accruals. Barton (2001), Rajgopal and Pincus (2002) and Singh (2004) depart from this trend,
through their study of derivatives use and earnings management as jointly determined risk
management choices. This study builds on their work. In addition it builds on the very few
risk management empirical studies that are actually based on post-SFAS 133 data. This study
achieves this by using 1999 to 2003 data and extends the work of Singh (2004) who considers
the impact of SFAS 133 on earnings management, earnings volatility and derivatives use but
only covered the 2000-2001 periods. I also am not aware of any empirical evidence on the
impact of SFAS 133 on the income smoothing substitution or on the impact of cash flow
hedge accounting on discretionary accruals. This study fills that gap.
Second, there is an opportunity for a methodological refinement. Bartram and Aretz (2009)
assert that the inconclusiveness of the literature on the determinants of derivatives use could
be due to flawed models, inappropriate proxies and inadequate resolution of endogeneity
related issues. There is scope to use better proxies, including proxies for discretionary
accruals and derivatives use, as well as proxies for their determinants. There is also scope to
include variables omitted from similar research. For example Barton (2001) does not include
corporate governance effects. Based on a comprehensive and integrated review of the
literature on determinants of derivatives and discretionary accrual use, I endeavour to build a
model based on a more complete and updated set of variables. This includes corporate
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governance, abnormal investments and a variable for the conditional impact of SFAS 133
cash flow hedge accounting requirements on discretionary accruals.
Regarding empirical modelling, I consider in detail the problems of endogeneity as prescribed
by Larcker and Rusticus (2008). I establish a logical test procedure to justify whether the
problem exists and how to resolve this. Furthermore unlike many studies, I pay attention to
individual effects that could arise due to the use of panel data. Singh (2004) and Supanvanij
and Strauss (2006) are the only two other derivatives related studies that I came across that
have at least tried to resolve the problem of individual firm effects.
Third, while this study focuses on SFAS 133, the findings on the related corporate reporting
and risk management consequences, has global relevance. Insights about these consequences
could be extended to firms in IFRS jurisdictions. This is because IAS 39’s derivatives
accounting requirements were heavily modelled on SFAS 133 (Hague, 2004). Besides, both
SFAS 133 and IAS 39 are the subject of regulatory scrutiny4 due to their complexity and in
2010, both US FASB and IFRS, hedge accounting requirements, will be updated. Hence this
study, with its insights on consequences, could help inform the design of future standards.
1.3 SFAS 133 and disclosure
Enhanced financial instrument risk disclosure can be achieved through recognition and
measurement in the balance sheet and income statement, and also through the disclosure of
corresponding risk exposure and risk management information, through the notes to the
accounts. The second key research question aims to understand how SFAS 133, which
necessitated the recognition of derivatives fair values on the balance sheet and income
statement, affected the disclosure of related derivatives information through the footnotes to
the accounts. The study is part of a broader investigation of the impact of SFAS 133.
Derivatives disclosure through the footnotes is an important subsection of overall risk
disclosure, as it can contribute to the anticipation, by external users, of future earnings, cash
flow and asset value trends. Such disclosure can also potentially inform users on
risks/exposure that are peculiar to the derivatives instrument category, including basis risk
and counterparty credit risk. Risk disclosure can help in the assessment of the risk profile,
estimation of market value and accuracy of security price forecasts (Helliar and Dunne, 2004;
and Linsley and Shrieves, 2001). By reducing information asymmetry and estimation risk,
risk reporting may decrease the firm’s risk premium demanded by the investors and decrease
the firm’s cost of capital (Linsley and Shrives, 2000).
4 G20 Leaders communiqué- 2nd April 2009, called for accounting standard setters to take action to reduce complexity of
financial instrument accounting. This gave impetus to IASB and FASB undertaking a fundamental overhaul of existing standards
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However, these disclosures remain inadequate; Campbell and Slack (2007) conducted a
survey on the perception of risk disclosure by analysts and they note the frustration with the
shallow and perfunctory nature of risk content that was raised by several analysts. They
include the below quote from a respondent analyst:
‘What I would like to see- and I’ve seen it absolutely nowhere- is you always have to drag
these statements out of the investor relations people and it is always like pulling teeth to get
them to say something. Simple things like do you hedge the following foreign exchange risk’
The view encapsulated in the above quote, is echoed in a sample survey of UK institutional
investors, which found a significant number agreed that directors needed to provide more
detailed risk disclosures rather than generalised statements of risk management policy
(Linsley and Shrieves, 2006).
In essence, risk information is often too brief, not sufficiently forward looking and inadequate
for decision making purposes (Abraham and Cox, 2007).
1.3.1 Data- SFAS 133 and Derivatives Related Footnote Disclosure
In this study, I use the same dataset applied in the first question of the impact of SFAS 133 on
income smoothing (see 1.2.1). The dependent variable is a self-constructed derivatives
disclosure index which captures the level of disclosure. The constituent factors to the index
inform about the reporting firm’s risk exposure and risk management effectiveness. The
control variables are proxies for other determinants of derivatives disclosure.
1.3.2 Method and Findings- SFAS 133 and Derivatives Related Footnote
Disclosure
Below are the primary hypotheses that I test:
Hypothesis 3.1: SFAS 133 leads to an increase in the level of disclosure of related derivatives
information provided by reporting managers.
Hypothesis 3.2a): Capital markets incentives influence disclosure of derivatives related
information through the footnotes
Hypothesis 3.2 b): Capital markets incentives are more significant after the adoption of SFAS
133
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Hypothesis 3.3a): Proprietary cost concerns influence the level of disclosure
Hypothesis 3.3 b): Proprietary cost concerns are lower after the adoption of SFAS 133
Similar to the first question, in the multivariate modelling, I take an approach that mitigates
the individual effects that arise due to panel data. The study finds a significant positive
association between SFAS 133 and disclosure in all the models. This would suggest that the
derivatives recognition and measurement requirements have encouraged the provision of
greater disclosures. The results also show a significant positive association of capital markets
incentives measured as the logarithm of trading volume. However, there is no evidence of
association of proprietary costs. The results also show a significant positive association of
capital markets incentives when these are measured by the logarithm of share trading volume.
However, there is no evidence of association of proprietary costs. The results further show
that auditor expertise and the level of derivatives use are positively associated with observed
derivatives disclosure levels. In the same vein, litigation risk and discretionary accrual levels
have a negative association.
1.3.3 Contribution- SFAS 133 and Derivatives Related Footnote Disclosure
A key contribution of this study is to evaluate whether improvement in recognition and
measurement through the main financial statements can encourage or deter the provision of
supplementary disclosure information. I propose a framework of how SFAS 133 can
influence disclosure. In particular the study aims to understand whether footnote disclosure is
a complement or substitute to recognised derivatives fair value gains and losses. The study
also evaluates the different determinants of disclosure and how these interact with SFAS 133.
The primary incentives investigated are capital markets and proprietary cost incentives as it is
possible based on the literature, to postulate how SFAS 133 can alter these particular
incentives. On the premise that current levels of risk disclosure in general and derivatives
related disclosure in particular are inadequate, this study can contribute to financial reporting
risk disclosure literature. It can also provide useful insights for accounting policy makers with
regards to whether more effort needs to be expended in developing and enforcing disclosures.
The empirical contribution of this study is at various levels. First, similar to Aggarwal and
Simkins (2004) and Chalmers and Godfrey (2004), this study includes the incentives for
derivatives disclosure. In this respect, it differs from many UK based studies that primarily
focus on the content analysis before and after a specific event (e.g. the introduction of FRS
13) as was the case with Dunne et al (2004). Second, this study unlike Aggarwal and Simkins
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(2004) and Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) focuses on the impact of a standard that deals with
recognition and measurement of derivatives, rather than only footnote disclosure, as was the
case with Aggarwal and Simkins (2004) and their focus on SFAS 107 in the US. Third, I
include a number of novel variables: these consist of a self constructed disclosure index, a
new proxy for managerial talent based on executive compensation and a proxy for proprietary
cost based on a combination of industry leadership and profit margin.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 2: Theoretical framework (SFAS 133 and Income smoothing choices): This is the
theoretical framework of the first question. This chapter provides a detailed description of the
literature on determinants on the two key income smoothing choices of derivatives use and
discretionary accruals. These include capital markets, managerial risk and corporate
governance determinants. It then provides details of the institutional background of SFAS 133
including its genesis and key features. Thereafter, the link between SFAS 133 and income
smoothing choices is established and hypotheses are proposed, based on related analytical and
empirical studies.
Chapter 3: Theoretical framework (SFAS 133 and disclosure): This is the theoretical
framework of the second question. This chapter outlines a framework of how SFAS 133 fair
value recognition requirements can influence disclosure of related information through the
footnotes. It further describes the literature on incentives influencing disclosure, including
capital markets, proprietary, managerial talent, compensation and litigation cost.
Chapter 4: Data, Research Design (SFAS 133 and Income smoothing choices). This chapter
describes the high level conceptual model, the sample selection, data sources, detailed
variable definition and empirical modelling approach, required to test the impact of SFAS 133
on income smoothing. This chapter highlights the approach taken towards resolving panel
data individual effects plus the problem of endogeneity and describes in detail the
multivariate testing protocol.
Chapter 5: Empirical findings: (SFAS 133 and Income smoothing choices). This chapter lays
out the univariate and multivariate findings of the impact of SFAS 133 on income smoothing.
This chapter includes the table of findings and an analysis of these findings, linked to the
theoretical framework developed in chapter 2.
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Chapter 6: Research Design (SFAS 133 and footnote disclosure of derivatives related
information) This chapter describes the high level conceptual model, the sample selection,
data sources, detailed variable definition and empirical modelling approach, required to test
the impact of SFAS 133 on derivatives related disclosure. A different set of control variables
are defined, including some of those that are used for the first primary research question as
described in chapter 4.
Chapter 7: Empirical findings: (SFAS 133 and footnote disclosure of derivatives related
information). This chapter lays out the univariate and multivariate findings of the impact of
SFAS 133 on disclosure. This chapter includes the table of findings and an analysis of these
findings, linked to the theoretical framework developed in chapter 3.
Chapter 8: Conclusion: This chapter highlights the principal conclusion from the empirical
findings, key contributions (conceptual, methodological and practice related), limitations of
research methods and findings, and areas for future research.
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PART 1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK- SFAS 133 AND
INCOME SMOOTHING
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2 INCOME SMOOTHING CHOICES
2.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the analysis of how SFAS 133 impacts on the income smoothing
choices of derivatives use and discretionary accruals. It also outlines the determinants of each
of these two key choices and thereafter shows the extent to which they have either
overlapping or differentiating determinants. It is on the basis of their impact on income
smoothing and overlapping determinants that some authors have considered derivatives use
and discretionary accruals to be substitutes (Barton, 2001). However, they are also used for
different purposes. For example, of these two choices, only derivatives can be used to manage
cash flow volatility5. On the other hand, speculative derivatives use will require accruals to be
used as complements rather than substitutes. Figure 2.1 below is a schematic representation of
the interaction of the primary income smoothing variables and SFAS 133.
Figure 2.1 Integrated Theoretical Framework
5 Reported earnings are a function of accruals and cash flow. By influencing cash flow, derivatives influence earnings. Hence
derivatives can influence both cash flow and earnings volatility.
SFAS 133 (DERIVATIVES ACCOUNTING STANDARD)
FIRM
PERFORMANCE
SMOOTHING
Reduce cash flow volatility
Derivatives Use
(Income smoothing
substitute)
Discretionary accruals
(Income smoothing
substitute )
FIRM
PERFORMANCE
SMOOTHING
Reduce earnings volatility
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This chapter is structured as follows,
 A literature review of derivatives use and determinants ( sections 2.2 and 2.3)
 Earnings management and its determinants (section 2.4)
 Hedging derivatives and earnings management as joint determinants (section 2.5)
 SFAS 133 background (section 2.6)
 Hypothesis development on the impact of SFAS 133 and income smoothing (section
2.7)
2.2 Derivatives use and corporate risk management
2.2.1 Definition of risk and risk management
Before evaluating derivatives use for corporate risk management, it is appropriate to define
risk. The definition of risk can be drawn from different academic disciplines including
financial economics, insurance, strategy and sociology. Across these disciplines different
notions of risk are put forward; these include a) the view of risk as exposure to loss or adverse
events b) risk as uncertainty or volatility of outcomes and c) risk as exposure to favourable
opportunities or upside events. In finance literature risk management tends to follow the
notion of minimising volatility of firm performance as well as exposure to adverse events and
losses (Miller, 1992).
Hedging using derivatives is one choice among several alternatives to reducing firm financial
performance volatility and is mainly applied to manage market risk exposures. Market risk
exposure is defined as the exposure that can arise due to the unexpected volatility of external,
key macroeconomic risk factors such as currency exchange rate, interest rate, commodities
and equity prices (Choi and Meek, 2008). Market risk exposure is a subset of the broader
spectrum of exposures that firms face. The non-market risk exposures fall outside the scope
of this study.
In addition to hedging with derivatives, there are other mechanisms to manage enterprise wide
risk exposures. These could include the use of earnings management techniques, operational
hedges including strategic measures such as production location, corporate conglomeration
and broadening of product lines (Crouhy, Galai and Roberts, 2000). In addition, financial
hedging of the firm’s credit risk can be implemented through insurance contracts e.g. credit
default swaps or through risk transfer mechanisms such as collateralisation and securitisation
(Crouhy, Galai and Mark, 2001).
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Derivatives and Risk Management
Financial hedging with derivatives reduces the impact of macroeconomic external risk factors
on firm performance and correspondingly reduces firm performance (earnings, cash flow and
balance sheet) volatility. A 1995 Wharton survey of 2000 US firms, had 350 respondents. Of
these, 49% claimed to use derivatives to manage cash flow volatility while 42% use
derivatives to manage earnings. A derivatives instrument can be defined by its three
attributes; it has one or more underlying risk factors or assets, requires no minimum initial net
investment and the terms of its settlement are either by cash or by delivery of an asset that can
be converted to cash or a derivatives contract (Trombley, 2003 and Culp, 2003).
Options, forwards/futures and swaps are the basic ‘vanilla’ derivatives instruments and there
exist many complex variations of these instruments, sometimes referred to as exotic
derivatives instruments. They also include structured derivatives instruments and hybrid
instruments with embedded derivatives. Derivatives may be embedded in a financial
instrument in combination with a host contract. A host contract is the part of the combined
contract other than the embedded derivatives (the contract in which the derivatives is
embedded). The combination of a host contract and an embedded derivative6 is known as a
hybrid contract. Some of these instruments are exchange traded and others are over the
counter.
2.3 Determinants of derivatives use for risk management
Corporate risk management literature highlights a) maximising shareholder wealth and b)
maximising utility of managerial wealth portfolio as the two principal objectives of
managerial risk management using derivatives.
2.3.1 Shareholder value focused incentives
A key building block of corporate finance theory is the Modigliani and Miller’s (MM) (1958
and 1963) capital structure theory. One of the key assumptions of MM also espoused in the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964), is the existence of perfect
capital markets where market participants are not subject to any transaction, taxes and
information costs and firms do not incur bankruptcy costs due to holding debt. A further
premise of CAPM is that capital markets participants are able to fully diversify their
portfolios.
6
Examples of embedded derivatives
 A commodity indexed note in which the principal or interest payments are based on the commodity price
 Debt with an option for repayment in fixed amount of foreign currency
 Synthetic CDO (i.e. purchase treasury bonds and enter credit derivatives contracts). This allows firms to mimic the
risk profile of cash CDOs
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A corollary of the above conditions is that how firms finance themselves ought not to have
any bearing on shareholder value. The implication is that managers are only able to enhance
shareholder value through their operating and investing decisions. An extension of the above
line of reasoning is the hedging irrelevance proposition. Hedging irrelevance also arises
because investors, who are only rewarded for bearing systematic risk as they hold diversified
portfolios, ought to be able to hedge any firm specific risk in their portfolio.
However, capital markets do have frictions and it is on this basis that firm hedging can
increase firm value. Capital markets participants face information costs, taxes and transaction
costs. Information costs arise due to the information asymmetry between managers and
investors on firm specific risk exposures. Concurrently, the earnings and/or cash flow
volatility of firms, can lead to market frictions including:
 Firm performance volatility leads to an increase in the perceived riskiness of
reporting firms. This in turn leads to an increase in the expected costs of financial
distress (i.e. bankruptcy costs);
 Sub-optimal investment decisions due to a) concerns about having to access costly
external finance (i.e. contracting costs) due to inadequate or volatile internally
generated cash flows and b) agency costs of debt and equity
 An increase in expected tax liabilities due to convex tax schedules (i.e. tax costs)
 An increase in the perceived riskiness and thereafter the cost of capital (i.e.
information costs)
An elaboration on how these factors interact with the hedging choice is provided, in sections
(2.3.1.1, 2.3.1.2, 2.3.1.3 and 2.3.1.4) below. This discussion is at the heart of illustrating how
hedging increases shareholder value. In effect, hedging increases shareholder value by
mitigating the impact of earning and/or cash flow volatility on information, bankruptcy and
contracting costs.
2.3.1.1 Impact on the expected costs of financial distress
The expected costs of financial distress comprises of direct and indirect components. Direct
financial distress costs include costs incurred to deal with default, bankruptcy, reorganisation
or liquidation. It comprises the fees paid to lawyers, accountants and liquidators. On the other
hand, indirect costs of financial distress arise from the reduced incentives of the firm’s
stakeholders (i.e. employees, suppliers, customers and creditors) to contract with firms that
are perceived to be in financial distress and the costs of resulting underinvestment (Grinblatt
and Titman, 2001). Expected costs of financial distress are a function of the probability of
financial distress and the costs incurred in the event of distress. The probability of financial
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distress increases when 1) fixed claims coverage7 declines (as leverage increases) and 2)
earnings, asset and cash flow volatility increase.
By reducing the volatility of earnings and cash flow, hedging correspondingly reduces the
probability of financial distress. Reducing the probability of financial distress reduces the
expected costs of financial distress and increases the expected future available free cash
flows. This correspondingly results in higher firm value.
Empirical evidence
There is supporting empirical evidence on the positive relationship between hedging and
enhanced firm value due to reduced financial distress costs (Fok, Carroll and Chiou, 1997).
Graham and Rogers (2002) document a positive relationship between derivatives use and debt
capacity due to the reduced financial distress. They find that hedging increases debt ratio
(debt/total assets) by 3% and increases firm value by 1.1% due to the incremental tax shield.
Using a dataset of UK firms, Judge (2006) finds financial distress to be the most significant
explanatory variable behind the hedging decision. He finds this to be more often the case for
UK firms than for US firms. He explains that this could be due to the relatively more liberal
US bankruptcy code and thus UK firms face higher bankruptcy costs and have higher
incentives to hedge.
2.3.1.2 Tax convexity: Impact on expected tax liabilities
The tax function is the depiction of the relationship between income of a firm and its expected
tax liability. A convex tax function has the characteristic of the expected tax liability
increasing at an increasing rate in relation to income increases. Stulz (1996) identifies that a
convex tax liability function can occur when
 There is a progressive tax regime where the firm’s average tax rate rises as its pre-tax
income rises.
 There are constraints to the use of the ‘carry forward tax loss ’. If a firm has negative
income, it will incur tax losses. However, if there are statutory restrictions to applying
the tax loss, it cannot then be applied to lower the taxable income in future periods
(with higher income generated)
 Similarly if the tax relief for losses is lower than the tax rate, then the effective tax
payable function will be convex
7 A measure of a firm's ability to meet its fixed-charge obligations: the ratio of ( net earnings before taxes plus interest charges
paid plus long-term lease payments) to (interest charges paid plus long-term lease payments).
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A convex tax function implies that volatility of the pre-tax income will increase the expected
tax liability. Barnes (2003) cites an illustrating example showing how volatility of earnings
impacts on expected tax in the situation of a prevailing progressive tax regime
‘Consider a company that has in any year a pre-corporate tax profit that is with equal
probability either a 100 million loss or a 200 million profit. For example one year could see a
loss of 100 million and the following year a profit of 200 million. That is, it’s expected pre-
tax profit for the two years is (50 %* -100m)+ (50 %* 200m) = 50 m. Suppose the company
operates under an onerous tax where profits are taxed at 40 per cent but relief for losses is
only given at 20 per cent. The expected corporate tax bill is thus (50 %* 20%*-100) +
(50%*40%*200) = 30m and expected post tax profit= 50m-30m= 20m.
Suppose we allow the organisation to hedge in such a way that it locks in it expected pre-tax
profit (i.e. after hedging), the company’s pre-tax result will be 50m. In this case the expected
profit will be 50m with certainty and the expected tax will be 40%*50m=20m. The expected
post tax profit will be 30m.’
The above example shows that stable earnings result in lower tax liabilities across multiple
periods. On this basis, when a convex tax schedule is in place, hedging can reduce the
expected tax liability, by reducing the volatility of firm performance (Stulz, 1985).
Empirical evidence
There is limited empirical evidence on the link between tax convexity and hedging. Nance,
Smith and Smithson (1993) using a dummy variable for tax progressivity, find supporting
evidence of hedging lowering the tax liability. On the other hand, Graham and Rogers (2002)
using the tax loss carry forward amount as a proxy, do not find statistically significant
evidence of the hedging impact on tax liability.
2.3.1.3 Information asymmetry and the cost of external financing
An increase in the earnings, cash flow and asset value volatility increases the information
asymmetry between managers and external investors but also among investors (DaDalt, Gay
and Nam, 2001). In contrast to non-volatile firm performance, higher volatility increases cost
of capital (Froot, Scharfstein &Stein, 1993). Smoother earnings and cash flows make it easier
for users of financial reporting information to make judgments about the persistence of future
cash flows and earnings, and the prediction of future earnings. Easier to predict future
earnings are likely to lead to an increase in analyst coverage and greater participation of
institutional investors. Lower estimation risk reduces analyst reputational risk. In turn, greater
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analyst coverage leads to greater scrutiny and lower information asymmetry between
managers and shareholders (Barton, 2001) and this reduces the risk premium associated with
external financing. This reinforces the effect of smooth earnings generally reducing the
perceived riskiness of the firm and cost of capital.
Empirical evidence
There is empirical evidence that firms with smoother earnings are more highly valued by the
market (Myers and Skinner, 1998; Barth, Elliot and Finn, 1999). DaDalt, Gay and Nam
(2001) also find supporting empirical evidence on the relationship between hedging and
reduced information asymmetry. Using the dispersion of analyst forecast and realised
earnings as a proxy for the level of information asymmetry, the authors find that for firms that
use currency derivatives, analyst forecasts have significantly greater accuracy and lower
levels of dispersion. Lin, Pantzalis and Park (2009) in a study of the impact on the post
acquisition performance of acquiring firms, find that derivatives users outperform non users.
They infer that this is consistent with derivatives use lowering information asymmetry related
agency problems.
2.3.1.4 Sub-optimal investment
Sub-optimal investment arises due to:
 Agency costs; and
 Managerial reluctance to seek costly external financing.
Agency costs
Agency costs can arise when managers act in the interests of shareholders but to the detriment
of bondholders. This could arise when the likelihood of financial distress increases due to
high leverage. In such situations, managers avoid low risk projects yielding cash flows that
can only be used to offset bondholder claims without benefiting impact on shareholders’
residual claims (Myers, 1977).
Agency costs can also arise when the appropriation of bondholder wealth occurs or wealth
transfer from bondholders to equity holders. This can for example occur when managers
invest in excessively risky projects. Such a choice can potentially lead to an upside for the
shareholders but without any corresponding upside gains for bondholders despite the increase
in risk to the bondholder claims. Hence, there is effectively a reduction in the bondholder risk
adjusted return. The shift towards disproportionately risk assets purely in the short term
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interest of shareholders8 is also described as the ‘asset substitution problem’. A consequence
of bondholders anticipating the asset substitution is that they will demand higher yields and
stronger covenant protection for any debt capital provided. In effect this raises the cost of
external capital and reduces firm value. Asset substitution and its consequences can be
alleviated by hedging with derivatives. Morellec and Smith (2007) show that shareholders
typically benefit from negotiating the issuance of debt and hedging strategy simultaneously,
since lenders will provide funds at a lower cost.
In effect, due to agency costs associated with firms having both equity and high levels of debt,
if firms have high probability of financial distress, managers will likely be biased towards
high risk projects and avoid low risk/low return projects that they deem to be non beneficial to
shareholders. This combination contributes to the described sub-optimal investment, and
raises the cost of external capital. On the other hand, hedging with derivatives can alleviate
the adverse impact.
Costly external finance and underinvestment
There is yet another explanation linking investment choices, financing and risk management.
Pecking order theory of capital structure asserts that costly external finance leads to
managerial caution and a corresponding preference by managers for internally generated
finance for investment purposes (Myers and Majluf, 1984). In conditions of cash flow
volatility, managers will be cautious about investing, due to concerns about the anticipated
level of internal funding. By reducing cash flow volatility, derivatives reduce both the need as
well as the cost of external finance if accessed.
Empirical evidence
There is supporting empirical evidence of a positive relationship between the use of
derivatives and increased investment levels (Gay and Nam, 1998; Geczy, Minton and
Schrand, 1997; Lel, 2004). Minton and Schrand (1998) provide evidence that hedging cash
flow volatility reduces the reliance on external financing and this in turn reduces under
investment. Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) also show that the cost of underinvestment
will be greater for firms with growth options, because such firms tend to have a greater
number of positive NPV projects and thus such firms are inclined to hedge. Judge (2006) in a
study of UK firms, affirms the finding of Froot et al (1993)
8 The asset substitution phenomenon is consistent with the view that shareholders are equivalent to holders of call options on the
firm’s assets as described by Merton (1974).
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Summary: Derivatives use and shareholder value
The above sections have described how hedging derivatives can increase shareholder value.
This is principally due to that alleviation of market imperfections (i.e. information, tax and
bankruptcy costs) that are associated with earnings or cash flow volatility. The contention that
hedging influences shareholder value has been backed by several studies; Allayanis and
Weston (2001) and Nain (2004) provide empirical evidence that hedging increases firm value
by 4.8% and 5% respectively.
2.3.2 Speculative use of derivatives
In addition to risk management, derivatives instruments can also be used by firms for
speculative purposes. A number of high profile derivatives use failures made visible the
practice of speculative derivatives use. An example is Procter and Gamble’s (P&G)
derivatives related losses in 1994. Whereas the derivatives instrument applied seemed to be
used for the purposes of hedging the interest rate risk of a floating rate bond that it had issued,
a closer examination of the nature of derivatives reveals that the management was essentially
taking bets9 on the flattening/steepening of the yield curve (Feay and Abdullah, 2001).
Another example is Metallgesellschaft that experienced liquidity problems and a realised loss
of $1.3 billion due to speculation on US Oil futures (Neuberger, 1998).
As discussed earlier (section 2.3.1), risk management literature mainly discusses the impact of
derivatives use on shareholder value in the context of it alleviating the market imperfections
(i.e. information, bankruptcy, tax and contracting costs) arising due to earnings or cash flow
volatility. However, Adams and Fernando (2006) explore whether there is another source of
shareholder value due to an inherent risk premium built into the pricing of derivatives
contracts that gives rise to positive cash flows if a firm holds speculative derivatives
contracts. Using quarterly observations of outstanding gold derivatives positions for a sample
of 92 North American firms, from 1989 to 1999, they find an associated positive cash flow
from the use of speculative derivatives contracts. This finding is evidence of a positive
realised risk premium and indicates that managers can add value by the speculative use of
derivatives. However, similar to Brown et al (2001), Adams et al (2006) do not find
supporting evidence that selective hedging (i.e. partial hedging or using derivatives to time
the market) increases firm value.
9 P&G forecasted that deutsche mark swaps would stay between 4.05% and 6.1% and that US and German interest rates would
not increase significantly. Interest and currency rates moved opposite to P&G’s forecast forcing them to borrow at 1412 basis
points above commercial paper rate (Chance, 1998 and Feay and Abdullah, 2001)
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Hence even for studies, such as Allayanis and Weston (2001) and Nain (2004) that have
shown a positive association exists between derivatives use and firm value, one cannot rule
the positive impact on shareholder value is due to the positive realised risk premium
associated with derivatives use. This differs from the notion of shareholder value-
enhancement only arising due to the alleviation of market frictions that in turn increases
expected cash flows (i.e. reduce tax liabilities and underinvestment) or reduces cost of capital
(i.e. reduced perceived risk of reporting firms). Backing the notion of frequent speculative
derivatives use is the survey evidence by Geczy, Minton and Schrand (2007). They show that
54% of US firms of derivatives users did so speculatively at least once while 7% did so
frequently. Lins, Servaes and Tamayo (2007) found that 50% of respondents to a global
survey claimed that they sometimes use derivatives speculatively.
However, determining speculative derivatives use is a key empirical challenge in this study
because the focus is on firms that are expected to mainly use derivatives for risk management
purposes (i.e. non financial institutions).
2.3.3 Managerial risk incentives and derivatives use
In contrast to pursuing shareholder value maximisation, managers can use derivatives for risk
management driven by the objective of maximising managerial wealth. One reason for such
managerial behaviour is the inherent divergence in managers’ and shareholders’ risk
preferences. This in turn arises from managers’ holding relatively undiversified portfolios and
having their human capital and sources of monetary wealth being concentrated in their
employer firms. The concentration of managerial wealth portfolio in their employer firms,
contrasts with the portfolios of external shareholders, who are able to diversify their
investment portfolios across multiple firms and thus to eliminate any firm specific,
idiosyncratic risk. As a result, managers, as agents, tend to be more risk averse than the
shareholders (principals), whom they represent (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Managerial risk
aversion may be manifested in managers’ sub-optimal risk management and/or investment
choices (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Managers could impose agency costs, for example, by
engaging in excessive or full cover hedging (i.e. beyond the level that maximises risk neutral
shareholder value) with the cost of excessive hedging eroding firm value.
One mode of mitigating such agency conflict is through the design of executive compensation
contracts. Executive compensation components can be designed to a) alter risk preferences
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through the pay-to-performance10 sensitivities and b) facilitate the capacity of managers to
unwind and thereafter diversify their wealth outside their employer firms. Core, Guay and
Larcker (2002) delineate the components of executive compensation. Executives are provided
variable compensation and incentives through 1) flow compensation, which is the total of the
executive annual salary, bonus, new stock and stock options grants, and other compensation
and 2) changes in the value of the executive portfolio of stock and options (exercisable and
un-exercisable options). Alternatively, executive compensation can be categorised into cash
based components (base salary, bonuses) and stock based components (stock options, long
term incentive plans (LTIP), and restricted stock), (Gao and Shrieves, 2002). There has been
a proliferation of managerial stock options and stock based compensation, driven by the goal
of creating a pay-to-performance sensitivity and aligning shareholder and manager risk
preferences. Stock based compensation including stock and stock options represents about
50% of the total compensation received by CEOs from 1996 onwards and the median
exposure of CEO wealth to firm stock price tripled between 1980 and 1994 and doubled
between 1994 and 2000 (Hall and Liebman, 2000).
2.3.3.1 Pay-to-performance sensitivity and managerial risk incentives
Pay-to-performance sensitivity can be characterised as being either linear or convex
depending on the sensitivity of the value of the compensation to movements of either stock
price or stock price volatility. A linear function depicts a constant change in value of
compensation/managerial wealth for every unit change in stock price. In other words, it
reflects a constant slope for the function of executive compensation value and stock price. On
the other hand, a convex function depicts an increasing change in value of managerial wealth
for every unit increase in the volatility of stock price. In other words, it reflects an increasing
slope for the function of executive compensation value and stock price volatility. The linearity
and convexity of the managerial wealth distribution function creates a linkage between
managerial risk aversion, risk management choices and the directional movement and
volatility of a firm’s stock price (Core, Guay, and Larcker, 2002; Holmstrom, 1979). These
elements are discussed further below.
2.3.3.2 Convex and linear pay-to- performance sensitivities
Convexity
The value of stock option value has a convex relationship with underlying stock price and
volatility. Figure 2.2 below depicts the nature of a convex pay-to-performance function. A
convex pay-to-performance function results in managerial wealth increasing, at an increasing
10 Pay-to-performance sensitivity can be defined as the variation in executive compensation value resulting from the variation in
either firm performance level or volatility. A pay-to-performance alignment has been advocated by various scholars and
corporate governance practitioners to ensure that managerial wealth portfolios can mimic the shareholder portfolios and
thereafter foster a congruence of risk preferences (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Smith and Stulz, 1985).
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rate, when the stock volatility or stock price increases. At the same time, it shields the
managerial wealth portfolio from any reduction in firm value/stock price. This is because, as
visible in the graph in Figure 2.2, decreases in firm price have a decreasing impact on
managerial wealth. Hence volatility increases the overall expected wealth of managers as
upswings in stock price have an increasingly larger impact on firm value while downswings
have a decreasing impact on firm value. Compensation contracts with convex characteristics
provide greater incentives for managerial risk seeking preference.
Linearity
A linear pay-to-performance relationship can result from the granting of stock compensation
(LTIP and restricted stock). A linear pay-to-performance function, as shown in Figure 2.3
below, will only lead to an increase in managerial wealth when the stock price increases and it
will lead to a corresponding reduction in managerial wealth when the stock price decreases.
The incentive effective will depend on the slope or delta (sensitivity of shareholder wealth to
stock price) of the linear function. The greater the slope value, the greater will be the wealth
fluctuation when stock prices change. Hence an increase in delta will increase managerial risk
aversion because volatility of stock price/firm value creates a larger managerial wealth
fluctuation. Consistent with these arguments, linearity may result in greater managerial risk
aversion (Smith and Stulz, 1985).
Managerial
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Figure 2.2: Convex pay-to- performance function
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Figure 2.3: Linear pay-to-performance function (Wealth’$’000 and Stock Price-$)
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The impact of risk aversion resulting from the linear pay-to-performance sensitivity can be
measured by the slope or delta (sensitivity of managerial wealth to a $ change in stock price).
An increase in delta should lead to increased managerial risk aversion.
Empirical evidence
Since stock options introduce convex pay-to- performance sensitivity, the proportion of stock
options in managerial wealth/ compensation may be a suitable proxy for the convexity and
reduced risk aversion. Indeed, several empirical papers (Gao and Shrieves, 2002 and Barton,
2001), have modelled risk incentives using proportion of stock options. However, theoretical
arguments by Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004) and empirical evidence from Knopf, Nam
and Thornton (2002), show that granting more stock or option based compensation does not
always result in a consistent alteration in the managerial risk preference (e.g. more stock
options will not necessarily result in less risk averse or more risk seeking managers).
Carpenter (2000) finds that the observed risk preference depends on the class of utility
functions that govern a manager’s behaviour. If a manager has a constant relative risk
aversion utility function (CRRA), as the asset value (wealth in the firm) grows or if the
evaluation date is far away, the manager will moderate asset risk. Managers are assumed to
target a fixed volatility level for their personal portfolio of options and outside wealth. Giving
a manager more stock options increases the volatility of his/her personal portfolio. To
mitigate the increase in volatility of personal portfolio, the manager will aim to reduce the
volatility of the underlying asset portfolio (or firm asset value). Similarly, Ross (2004)
questions the conventional wisdom that the presence of stock options automatically alters the
risk preference of managers. Ross (2004) develops a theoretical model that examines risk
taking behaviour when the fee schedule (executive compensation) for the agent (manager) is a
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call option and when the fee schedule is equivalent to a short put option or bond position. He
also models the alteration of respective utility functions. Ross’ (2004) principal conclusion is
no contract exists, which will make all managers who seek to maximise expected utility to be
less risk averse. For example, he asserts that call options and put options have different
incentive effects. Put options make individuals less risk averse, while call options do not.
Furthermore, Supanvanij et al (2006) argue that managerial risk incentives and hedging
choices can be determined by whether executive options are in-, out- or at- the money. In
other words, whether or not, they have a positive intrinsic value due to the exercise price
being lower than the trading price of the underlying shares. If options are out-of-the- money
(i.e. stock price is much lower than exercise price), then volatility is desirable as it increases
the likelihood of managerial wealth increase and mangers become risk seeking and
concurrently hedge less. On the other hand when options are at-the- money (i.e. stock price is
close to option exercise price) or in-the- money (i.e. stock price is higher than the exercise
price), then managers are likely to be anxious about firm performance volatility as it could
result in their option portfolio being out-of-the- money. Hence, they become more risk averse
and are likely to hedge more or engage in smoothing firm performance.
The line of reasoning, highlighting the variation of risk preferences despite the granting of
options to managers, strengthens the argument against simplistically taking proportion of
options as proxy for reduced risk. Based on reasoning similar to Knopf (2002), rather than
taking proportion of stock options, Guay (1999) proposes the use of vega and delta11 as
appropriate measures of managerial risk preferences. These sensitivities can act in opposing
directions in shaping managers’ risk preferences. Increased sensitivity to stock price levels
(i.e. higher delta) may create risk aversion, while increased sensitivity to volatility (i.e. higher
vega) may encourage risk seeking. Recent empirical papers have used vega and delta to
measure risk seeking incentives (Supanvanij et al, 2006; Rogers, 2002; Core and Guay 2002;
Knopf, Nam and Thornton 2002). Supanvanij et al (2006) and Rogers (2002), find a
significant association of the vega and delta measures and level of hedging. A further
discussion of the measurement of vega and delta risk incentive is included in the research
design in 4.6.1.
11
Delta = the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% change in stock price
Vega = the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% change in stock volatility
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2.3.3.3 Diversification of Managerial wealth
Managers may moderate the impact of compensation based risk incentives if they can
diversify their wealth portfolios. The capacity of managers to diversify their wealth moderates
their risk exposure caused by the concentration of their wealth and human capital in their
employer firms. Diversification can be achieved through the hedging of personal income or
through the granting of cash compensation. These two aspects are explained further below
Managerial personal hedging
Bettis, Bizjak and Lemmon, (2001), show that managers can unwind some of the risk of their
undiversified portfolio. Managers can use zero cost collars12 and equity swaps to hedge the
risk associated with their personal holdings. The studies show that the mean number of shares
hedged is 36% of total holdings and that this can effectively reduce the risk associated with
their personal holdings by 25%. Bettis et al (2001) made use of a private database (Primark
Data Company, a firm contracted by the SEC to collect information on insider trading) and
this database is not accessible for the purposes of this research.
Cash Compensation
The greater the cash compensation that can be invested outside the firm, the more likely it
will be that the CEO holds a diversified wealth portfolio and hence the lower her risk
aversion. The current period cash compensation may be a suitable proxy for risk aversion as it
represents the proportion of compensation demanded by managers, which is not sensitive to
stock price volatility (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2005).
2.3.3.4 Summary: managerial risk incentives and derivatives use
As discussed above, managerial hedging choices can be driven by the goal of optimising
managerial wealth rather than shareholder value. In the above sections, I have reviewed the
linkage between executive compensation, managerial risk preferences and risk management
choices. The form of compensation can influence risk preferences and it is on this basis that
compensation can offset agency costs as it can align manager risk preferences to that of
shareholders. This in turn can influence their inclination to use derivatives for risk
management purposes. The literature shows that stock options introduce risk seeking
tendencies and this can offset the relative risk aversion that arises from managers holding
12 A zero cost collar involves the purchase of a put option funded by the proceeds received from the sale of a call option on the
stock of the company. An equity swap is an exchange of the returns on the firm’s stock for the cash flows on an asset such as an
index fund or risk free security. A zero cost collar option limits the downside and upside of the manager’s holding of the stock
(long position) and hence makes the manager less sensitive to volatility. The increase in payoff function value is limited to lower
and upper bound exercise price.
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relatively undiversified portfolios. On the other hand, stock based compensation (LTIP, shares
granted) has a linear pay-to-performance function and this creates or maintains the risk
aversion and likelihood of managers using derivatives. For example risk averse managers may
engage in full cover hedging in situations where it would be to the interest of shareholders to
partially hedge an exposure. The literature also shows that granting cash compensation or zero
collar options to managers can offset their risk aversion as these enables them to hold more
diversified portfolios.
2.3.4 Other determinants of derivatives use
In the above sections, I have described managerial incentives for derivatives use based on
shareholder value maximisation and managerial wealth concerns. I now evaluate other factors
that determine corporate derivatives use below including corporate governance mechanisms
and firm specific structural factors.
2.3.4.1 Corporate governance mechanisms
Similar to executive compensation, other corporate governance features can affect the risk
management choice, as they are part of the market solution to shareholder-management
agency conflicts (Triki, 2005). Strong corporate governance enables the enhanced oversight
of managerial activities, and effective monitoring and penalising capabilities. Strengthening
corporate governance is one of the mechanisms for reducing managerial agency costs. Firm
specific corporate governance mechanisms and the prevailing country corporate governance
regime can have an impact on the hedging activities. The different corporate governance
mechanisms that may influence managerial risk choices include a) board characteristics such
as independence and c) significant outsider ownership.
Board independence
Board independence is influenced by the proportion of non executive, independent directors
(also described as outside directors). Directors have a key role in ensuring that companies
have strong internal control systems to manage and control the risks faced by the company.
The Higgs report (2003) asserts that a director is considered independent in character and
judgement when there are no relationships with the company or its management or any other
circumstances that could affect or be perceived to affect the director’s judgement. Srinivasan
(2004) similarly defines outside directors as board members who have no relationship with
the company other than their role as directors. Other directors are classified as insiders and
affiliated (or grey) directors. Insiders are executives of the company while affiliated directors
are those with some link to the firm and hence potential conflicts of interest. Conflicts of
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interest can include consulting arrangements, family relationship, and interlocking board
memberships.
Board independence leads to greater monitoring of managerial actions, including the use of
derivatives (Whidbee and Wohar, 1999). Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that directors are
effective monitors, when they are acting in the interest of shareholders. These authors contend
that outside directors have greater incentives to act in the interest of shareholders, relative to
inside directors who tend to be aligned with managerial motives. They have the incentive to
do so in order to protect their own reputation and thereby the value of their human capital.
Lel (2006) finds that firms with weak governance are more likely to partake in speculative use
of derivatives because in such firms the board is unable to identify when managers use
derivatives for speculative purposes rather than to manage risk. On the other hand, firms that
have strong corporate governance mainly use derivatives for risk management purposes
aimed at maximising shareholder value (Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo, 2007). Borokhovich,
Brunarski, Crutchley and Simkins (2004) provide supporting empirical evidence that a more
independent board, measured by the proportion of outside directors, is likely to effectively
support financial hedging by the firm. Similarly, Huang, Zhang, Deis and Moffit (2009) found
that poor corporate governance discourages prudent risk management using derivatives.
However, Buckley and Van Der Nat (2003) express scepticism about the abilities of non-
executive, independent directors. They conducted a survey using a small sample of UK
quoted companies and found that two thirds of the directors confessed to an inadequate
knowledge of derivatives. The board members may be independent, have the right incentives
and willingness to act in shareholder interest, yet may lack the capacity to effectively do so.
Indeed, Dionne and Triki (2005) provide evidence showing that the financial education of the
directors sitting on the board and on the audit committee is a determinant of hedging. This
implies that independence and competence of the Board of Directors must be viewed together
as a determinant of hedging.
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Separation of CEO from board chairman
The presence of a dual CEO ( holding both positions) gives rise to conflict of interest as the
CEO evaluates his/her own performance and sets the firm’s agenda. Such weak governance
could result in risk management choices that are not targeted at value maximisation
(Allayanis, Lel and Miller, 2003). Managers can pursue risk management to serve their own,
rather than shareholders interests.
Outsider ownership concentration
Firms with a high outsider ownership concentration or non managerial block-holders are less
likely to suffer from agency conflicts. For such firms, there is likely to be lower levels of
information asymmetry as large shareholders have resources and incentives to strictly monitor
managerial activities. This in turn is likely to result in risk management actions e.g. hedging,
which are based mainly on shareholder value maximisation as opposed to protecting
managerial risk aversion (Allayanis, Lel and Miller, 2003).
2.3.4.2 Operational hedging
Operational hedging can include a) the diversification of operations b) set up of foreign
subsidiaries c) borrowing in a foreign currency to match export revenues and d) the issue of
fixed rate debt in order to stabilise interest rate payments. Operational hedging such as
hedging of input costs and/or revenues can stabilise costs and pricing policy and the
realisation of this benefit cannot be replicated by capital markets participants.
Operational hedging is a possible substitute for financial hedging. Petersen and Thiagarajan
(2000), show that firms with greater flexibility in their operating costs are less likely to
engage in financial hedging activities, as they are bound to prefer to apply operational hedges.
Kim, Mathur and Nam (2006) find that non-operationally hedged firms use more financial
hedging relative to operationally hedged firms. This is indicative of a substitution
relationship.
However, there is also evidence that operational hedging has a complementary relationship
with financial hedging. While financial hedging is used to mitigate transaction exposure13,
13
There are three main types of currency risk exposure, namely transaction exposure, economic/operating exposure and
translation exposure. Economic/Operating exposure refers to the long term impact of changes in foreign currency exchange rates
on a firm’s business. It affects the demand and supply dynamics, long term competitiveness, pricing strategy and pass through of
a firm’s foreign based operations. Economic currency exposure tends to be long term in nature.
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operational hedging is used to mitigate economic exposure (long term and permanent risk
exposures). As described by Pantzalis, Simkins and Laux (2001), operating exposure arises
from unexpected changes in the exchange rate on the firm’s input costs (e.g. raw material
prices) and output prices (e.g. product prices). Operating exposure is typically managed using
operational hedges for example, by having production location in foreign locations (i.e.
operational hedge). Bartram, Brown and Minton (2009) find that in addition to derivatives
use, corporations rely heavily on input cost pass-through, operational hedging and foreign
currency debt, as means of managing financial risk exposures.
2.3.4.3 Firm size
Culp and Miller (2002) found that derivatives were mainly used by large rather than small
firms. They found that 65% of companies with market value greater than $250 million use
derivatives as opposed to only 13% of firms with market value equal to or less than $50
million. Large firms are more likely to use derivatives as they are more able to afford the
costs of skill, technology and process in running a treasury department. Large firms tend to
have more complex business models and underlying risk exposures. Larger firms are more
likely to face risk exposure magnitudes that make a derivatives hedging strategy to be more
viable (Judge, 2006). Indeed, Mian (1996) proposes that it is uneconomical to hedge
exposures of less than $10 million.
2.3.5 Summary of derivatives literature
The above sections have shown the key determinants of derivatives use including shareholder
value maximisation, managerial risk preferences, corporate governance and firm specific
structural features. The impact of derivatives on firm value arises due to alleviation of market
frictions created by earnings or cash flow volatility. I have also briefly discussed how the risk
premium in derivatives prices creates an opportunity for companies to profit from speculative
derivatives use. Another key derivatives use determinant is the form of compensation as this
can influence the agency conflicts that arise due to managers holding undiversified portfolios
relative to shareholders. Finally, I have reviewed how corporate governance and other factors
On the other hand transaction exposure pertains to the risks associated with either short term consummated or anticipated foreign
currency transactions. For example in relation to imports, exports and foreign debt interest payments. As Pantzalis, Simkins and
Laux (2001) assert, transaction exposure is the effect of unexpected changes in the nominal exchange rate on cash flows
associated with monetary assets and liabilities (i.e. contractually fixed cash flows). Transaction exposure is short term and can be
hedged with currency derivatives. Finally, translation or accounting currency exposure is the volatility, attributable to
fluctuations in exchange rate, of earnings from a foreign held subsidiary that needs to be consolidated in a reporting firm’s results
and this is managed using a combination of operational and financial hedging.
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such as firm size and operational hedging influence derivatives use. The following section
reviews earnings management as the other income smoothing choice.
2.4 Earnings management and discretionary accruals
2.4.1 Introduction
Section 2.3 outlines the determinants of derivatives use as an income smoothing decision. The
discussion will now focus on the second key income smoothing choice of discretionary
accruals. Earnings management via discretionary accruals is widespread and tends to have the
negative connotations of managers’ intent to mislead users of financial reports. This is
evident in the characterisation of earnings management as a ‘numbers game’ by former
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) chairman Arthur Levitt and the commitment
thereafter to attack this practice. Earnings management can impose costs14 on the reputation
of managers. Srinivasan (2004) found that company directors experience significant labour
market penalties, evidenced by turnover, when earnings restatements occur.
However, the widespread phenomenon of earnings management is evidence that managers
expect observed earnings to matter to capital markets participants and/or to be beneficial to
managers. Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) found that a majority of Chief Financial
Officers (CFOs) believed earnings to be the most important performance measure for
outsiders. In a survey of 401 executives, they found that 51% ranked earnings as the most
important performance measure. This is followed by only 12% ranking revenues, cash flow
from operations, or free cash flow as most important. They also found that 96.9% of CFOs
prefer a smooth earnings path and that 78% of CFOs would sacrifice real economic value in
order to ensure a smooth earnings path. To illuminate on the widespread earnings
management, the following sections provide a definition of earnings management and reviews
managerial motives for engaging in earnings management.
14
The expected cost of engaging in earnings management includes tainted reputation should allegations of earnings
management emerge in the future and be proved. Apart from the direct cost of engaging in earnings management, managers risk
the loss of reputation, credibility, job security and future income, should the capital markets participants ascertain that
opportunistic earnings management has occurred in an organization (Dechow and Schrand, 2004). Karpoff, Lee and Martin
(2006) provide evidence showing the costs of engaging in earnings management. Based on the examination of 585 firms that
were targeted for enforcement action for financial misrepresentation between the 1978-2002 periods, they estimate that the
reputational penalty is up to 7.5 times in magnitude of legal penalties imposes. They define reputational penalty as the expected
loss in the present value of future cash flows due to lower sales and higher contracting and financing costs. The legal costs are on
average of $23.5 million per firm. They find that for every dollar of inflated market value, the firm loses the dollar plus an
additional $3.08. $0.36 is lost due to legal penalties and $2.71 due to lost reputation.
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2.4.2 Earnings management definition
Earnings management is defined by Healy and Wahlen (1998) as ‘occurring when managers
use judgement in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports
to either mislead some stakeholders about underlying economic performance of the company,
or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported numbers’. Schipper (1989)
defines earnings management as ‘the purposeful intervention in the external financial
reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain as opposed to say, merely
facilitating the neutral operation of the process’. These definitions have connotations of
earnings management as an opportunistic activity. However, as discussed in section 2.4.3
below, earnings management occurs for informational purposes as well.
Earnings management may occur through the use of discretionary accruals (Dechow, Sloan
and Sweeney, 1995). It can also occur through
 the timing of mandatory accounting changes;
 voluntary accounting changes (Ayers, 1994; Stolowy and Breton, 2000),
 real economic transactions that influence cash flow and thereafter earnings, and
 off-balance-sheet financing (Gul, Leung and Srinidhi, 2003).
2.4.2.1 Earnings management through real actions
Reported earnings are made up of cash flows and accrued revenue and costs (i.e. accruals).
The manipulation of either cash flows or accruals can be used as a lever for influencing
observed earnings. Managers can alter cash flows through their operating, investing or
financing decisions. Managers can, for example, cut research and development, advertising
and employee training expenditures or offer product discounts in order to boost revenues
during a particular reporting period at the expense of higher revenues at a future period.
Managers can increase production, so as to spread overall production costs and reduce the per
unit product cost, reduce the reported period cost of goods and increase profitability. In fact,
Parfot (2000) views operational earnings management as good and necessary, and an integral
part of legitimate business practice.
Unlike on discretionary accruals, the empirical evidence on earnings management using real
economic actions is scarce. There is survey evidence that managers are sometimes willing to
give up real economic value in order to manage earnings (Graham et al, 2005). Kedia and
Philippon (2008) study a sample of firms forced by the SEC to restate previously overstated
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reported earnings. These authors find that firms over-invested in physical and human capital
during periods of earnings manipulation so as to lower their reported earnings. These firms,
then under-invested after enforcement action so as to reverse the earlier impacts. The focus of
this study is on discretionary accruals. Operational and investment decisions as income
smoothing choices are treated as control variable.
2.4.2.2 Earnings management using discretionary accruals
In this thesis, discretionary accruals, abnormal accruals and earnings management using
accruals are used interchangeably. Accrual accounting, as opposed to cash flow accounting, is
a central accounting concept based on the principle of matching economic gains and costs in a
particular period rather than matching the corresponding cash inflows and outflows (Beaver,
1998; Dechow and Skinner, 2000). Accrual accounting aims to record the financial effects on
an entity of transactions and other events and circumstances that have cash consequences for
the entity in the periods in which those transactions, events and circumstances occur (Beaver,
1998). This is as opposed to the period in which any associated cash is received or paid by the
entity. The principal goal of accrual is to help investors assess the entity’s performance during
a period through the use of basic accounting principles such as revenue recognition and
matching. Accrual accounting is justified on the basis that it provides a better indicator or
higher predictive ability of a firm’s future cash flow generation than the use of current cash
flow (Dechow, 1994). Accrual accounting uses accrual, deferral and allocation procedures
whose goal is to match revenues, expenses, gains and losses to periods to reflect an entity’s
performance during a period instead of merely listing its cash receipts and outlays (Dechow
and Skinner, 2000). Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), based on accrual
accounting, provides management with some latitude to exercise judgement with regard to a
wide range of economic transactions and to report on their underlying economic reality.
Hence, accrual accounting by its very nature involves estimation, discretion and judgement
(Beaver, 1998).
Accruals can be decomposed into discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. Beaver
(1998) notes that opportunities for discretion arise because of uncertainty related to the basis
of management’s accounting estimates and also because of the asymmetry of information
between managers and shareholders. While the total accruals figure is observable from the
financial statements and the principles relating to a range of accounting estimates is accessible
in the notes to the accounts, the basis of managerial judgement relating to all possible
accounting transactions is not fully transparent and accessible to outsiders. Hence, there is
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information asymmetry between managers and shareholders on the underlying justification of
the estimation criteria.
Accrual management affects the timing of recognition of earnings. The overstatement of
reported earnings during a particular period is likely to result in the understatement of
earnings during a future period. This is described as the mean reverting character of
discretionary accruals. For example if a commercial bank originates a portfolio of loans and
makes a provision for loan losses of 3% during a reporting period, but the economic
characteristics of its customers will likely lead to losses of 5%, then while the banks may
minimize its expense in the immediate term by under-provisioning, it will have to understate
its future profits when the actual loan losses are realized.
The discussion in section 2.3.1 has outlined how hedging derivatives enhances shareholder
value by reducing the expected tax liabilities, expected costs of financial distress, tendency to
under-invest and lowering information risk. The same arguments, with the exception of the
under-investment to conserve cash, can be readily extended to the reasons for applying
discretionary accruals (Park, 2004). Nevertheless, unlike discretionary accruals, hedging with
derivatives also lowers cash flow volatility. The fact that discretionary accruals do not
influence firm cash flows makes it less clear as to how they influence firm value, even with
the premise that discretionary accruals and hedging derivatives are substitutes. As a precursor
to the review of related incentives, it is useful to discuss how discretionary accruals influence
the stock price.
2.4.3 Discretionary accruals and stock price
Earnings management using accruals is expected to be beneficial to shareholders (Graham et
al, 2005). How do earnings management using accruals impact on a reporting firm’s stock
price? There have been arguments (Barnes, 2001) that investors can see through non-cash
related discretionary accruals and, therefore, earnings management ought not to be value
relevant. Backing this argument, Hand (1992), as an example, contends that investors are able
to see through tax minimising LIFO (Last in First Out) inventory valuations that result in
earnings declines and that they do not price these declines into stock prices.
However, the relationship between earnings management and stock pricing is not as clear cut
as implied in the expectation that investors should see through any distortions through
earnings. To begin with, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence in the financial press showing
that investors react to earning announcements in a fashion that reveals an element of surprise
against expectations impacts on stock price. The accounting scandals in the early 2000s
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involving Enron and WorldCom would also indicate that investors were fooled by the earning
management practices. Backing this observation, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) find
that firms subject to an SEC investigation for earnings management experienced a 9% stock
price decline when establishment of earnings management is first announced. This is
indicative that investors had not adjusted for earnings management in their pricing of the
stock prior to the investigation.
Overall, the literature shows that discretionary accruals can be used for either short term,
opportunistic15 purposes or for long term informational and shareholder value enhancing
objectives. The common denominator is that either of these objectives aims to influence stock
price. Discretionary accruals can be used to temporarily fool investors on a firm’s prospects
and this can lead to the short term increases of stock price. Managers, due to opportunistic
motives, can capitalise on the time window that investors are fooled and try and inflate the
stock price. However, in the long run, investors are able to determine whether the observed
earnings are associated with realisable future cash flows. At the same time, accruals can be
used to smooth earnings while conveying private information on underlying economic reality.
This is explained further below.
2.4.3.1 How do accruals influence stock price: Information risk
By smoothing earnings, accruals can influence long term share value in a similar fashion to
derivatives. This is achieved by reducing the expected tax liabilities; expected costs of
financial distress and lowering information risk (see section 2.3.1). In addition, accruals
applied by management, can affect share price in the long run depending on whether they
improve or lower the earnings quality (i.e. the extent to which earnings convey information
related to likely future operating performance).
Linked to lowering information risk16 and enhancing earnings quality17, is the accrual
informational enhancement hypothesis. Guay, Kothari and Watts (1996) describe the
information enhancing earnings management as ‘earnings management through which
15 Jensen (2005) contends that managers engage in opportunistic earnings management to sustain their overvalued stock. The
case of Enron and the lengths to which its management went to manipulate earnings so as to maintain stock price supports
Jensen’s assertion.
16
Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper (2005) define information risk as the likelihood that firm specific information
pertinent to investor pricing decisions is of poor quality. They posit that the information risk of observed earnings has an impact
on asset pricing. This is because as outsiders to the firm, investors do not have full knowledge of management choices in relation
to accruals and are, therefore, constrained in readily judging the earnings quality.
17 Earnings quality is defined as the extent to which the observed earnings depict the underlying economic reality or reflects the
operating performance. In empirical studies, earnings quality is defined by persistence of earnings or the extent to which current
period earnings are associated with future period earnings and thus can be characterised as predictive.
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managers strive to accurately reflect the impact of current economic events in the current
earnings report’. The information enhancement hypothesis posits that managers take actions
to reduce fluctuations around some level considered normal for the firm in order to generate
more informative earnings i.e. earnings that credibly signal managerial quality and long term
performance trends of the firm (i.e. persistence of firm performance). Essentially, accruals can
be used to convey private information and to enhance the prediction of future cash flows,
earnings and dividends (Jiraporn, Miller, Yoon and Kim, 2008). As an example, accruals can
convey the extent to which receivables will be uncollectable in the future. Having said this,
the predictive value of accruals is likely to depend on firm specific attributes such as whether
it is in a mature or high growth industry. Accruals are likely to better enable future earnings
prediction in mature industries. However, earnings have limited predictive value in high
growth industries because the embedded growth options are not recognised in the financial
reports. In such industries, current earnings may reflect current operating performance but
will be a poor proxy for future performance and this could negate the information value of
accruals.
As discussed in section 2.3.1 related to derivatives, smoother earnings make it easier for users
of financial reporting information to make judgements about the persistence of future cash
flows and earnings. At the same time, smooth, predictable earnings likely lead to an increase
in analyst coverage18 and the participation of institutional investors. This is because, all things
being equal, the capacity to predict future earnings is higher for analysts when earnings are
smoother. This will incentivise greater coverage by analysts as they face reduced estimation
and reputational risk. Myers et al (1998) and Barth et al (1999) find evidence that all else held
constant, firms with smoother earnings are more highly valued by the market. They reason
that this is because smooth earnings equate to lower perceived risk of the firm and reduce the
firm’s cost of external capital.
Impact of information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors on share price
Income smoothing can lower the information asymmetry between managers and investors. In
addition, it can also lower the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed
investors. This in turn can influence the risk premium of a firm’s share price. Easley and
O’Hara (2004) further develop the line of reasoning on how information risk affects firm
value. Based on a multi-asset rational expectations model, they postulate that greater earnings
volatility results in a bigger informational advantage for informed investors over uninformed
investors. This translates into the systemic loss for uninformed investors who may have to
trade their stock for liquidity purposes. Therefore, whenever there is information asymmetry
18 However, Yu (2008) provides seemingly contradictory evidence that shows that greater analyst coverage is associated with
low level of accruals. This is likely to be due to accruals in his study being largely opportunistic rather than informational.
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between informed (i.e. holding and trading on private information on firm’s prospects) and
uninformed investors, the uninformed investors will require a higher risk premium. Therefore,
uninformed shareholders who typically engage in liquidity trading will benefit from smooth
earnings as this lowers the information risk, reduces the risk premium and increases stock
price. Goel and Thakor (2003), apply an analytical model to show that the expected loss for
uninformed investors is higher when earnings volatility is higher. As a result, they postulate
that uninformed investors will avoid firms with high earnings volatility.
2.4.3.2 Opportunistic versus informational accrual use: empirical evidence
In a study that looked at both opportunistic and information accruals, Badertscher, Collins and
Lys (2007)19 test whether either of the two has predictive value of future cash flows. They
find that unlike informational accruals, opportunistic accruals do not have predictive value on
future cash flows.
Opportunistic accruals evidence: Sloan (1996) provides evidence of opportunistic accruals.
The author reports that future stock returns are negative for firms whose current earnings
include large accrual components and positive for firms with low accrual components. An
interpretation of these findings is that investors do not immediately fully see through earnings
management, reflected in abnormal accruals. Consequently, firms that use income-increasing
accruals in particular periods will show stock price declines in subsequent periods because
investors were unable to see through the earnings management at inception. Sloan concludes
that market participants overestimate the persistence of low quality current earnings and
underestimate the persistence of high quality current period earnings. Extending the work of
Sloan (1996), Chan, Chan and Jegadeesh (2006) argue that abnormal accruals should not
necessarily be construed as evidence of managerial manipulation. The authors then
endeavour to formulate alternative explanations for the link between large abnormal accruals
and poor future stock returns. They contend that accruals could in fact simply be conveying
information on the fundamental economic reality of reporting firms and that this ought to
19
Badertscher, Collins and Lys (2007) overcome the difficulties faced in most empirical studies of differentiating opportunistic
from informational motives in the application of accruals. Using a sample of firms that have restated their earnings, they are not
constrained by having to use proxies such as the modified Jones accruals estimate that are subject to mis-classification error. As
the first step, it is straightforward to deduce the discretionary accruals as the difference between original (managed) earnings and
restated (unmanaged) earnings. To determine the opportunistic discretionary accruals, they evaluate the original earnings against
both the analyst earnings estimate and the restated earnings. If based on restatement earnings (RE), income increasing accruals
are deemed to have occurred and the original earnings (OE) exceed analyst earnings (AE) estimate, then the original earnings are
considered to be opportunistic (i.e. OE>AE>RE). On the other hand if income decreasing accruals have occurred and OE >AE
then OE is considered opportunistic (i.e. RE> OE>AE). Discretionary accruals that are not classified as opportunistic are then
assumed to be informational.
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have a corresponding bearing on their valuation. However, in their empirical testing they
reaffirm the findings of Sloan (1996), finding significant evidence that abnormal accruals
occur largely due to opportunistic reasons. Specifically they find that a large increase in
accruals is a leading indicator of deterioration in the financial condition of the company.
Informational accruals evidence: On the other hand, Subramanyan (1996) find evidence
showing discretionary accruals have informational content and improve the quality of
earnings. Subramanyam (1996), apply the Jones (1991) model to differentiate between
discretionary and non discretionary accruals. Using a sample of 21,135 firm-years comprising
2,808 firms during the 1973-1993 periods, his study provides empirical evidence that on
average the use discretionary accruals does increase the stock price. The author finds
empirical evidence of pervasive income smoothing that improves the persistence and
predictability of earnings amongst the sample firms. He finds that current period discretionary
accruals help to predict future cash flows, earnings and dividends. Similarly, Louis (2003)
found that discretionary accruals tend to occur in conjunction with stock splits and the author
sees this as evidence of managers signalling20 favourable performance. Finally, Jiraporn,
Miller, Yoon and Kim (2008) find that firms where earnings management has occurred to a
large extent, these accrual levels tend to be positively associated with firm value. They
interpret this as evidence that accruals are not opportunistic and could in fact be occurring for
long term shareholder benefit.
2.4.4 Earnings management incentives
As discussed above discretionary accruals influence stock price and the pursuit of stock price
increases can be done either for short term self serving purposes or for long term shareholder
benefit. This leads to the discussion of underlying incentives of managers to influence
reported earnings level and volatility, using discretionary accruals. This study focuses on
accruals for income smoothing (i.e. reducing earnings volatility). However, as Goel and
Thakor (2003) note, income smoothing accruals are simply a special case of earnings
management.
20 This is consistent with the view that managers mainly undertake stock splits when they are optimistic about the future
prospects of their firms.
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Accruals can be used to influencing earnings level via directional21 earnings management.
Healy and Palepu (2000) identify a range of earnings management motives including
 capital markets or shareholder value maximisation motives,
 contractual motives including executive compensation and fulfilling debt covenant
stipulations
Below I discuss the motives that will influence both income smoothing and directional
earnings management discretionary accruals.
2.4.4.1 Capital markets Incentive: Contextual Settings
Dechow (2004) describes the empirical evidence in relation to application of discretionary
accruals across multiple capital markets related contexts with the view of influencing the
stock price. These include:
 Seasoned equity offerings (SEO);
 Initial public offerings (IPO);
 Mergers and management buyouts; and
 Dividends distribution.
SEO/IPO
Similar to SEO, there is empirical evidence showing that there tends to be underperformance
after an IPO following a period of excess returns driven by abnormally high accruals in the
pre-IPO period (Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998b). However, the probability of fooling
investors is higher with IPOs as the expected benefits of managing earnings (i.e. short term
stock price increases before investors realize that discretionary accruals have distorted firm
performance) outweigh the costs.
Mergers and management buyouts
In relation to mergers and management buyouts, both the acquirer and target firms have
incentives to manage earnings to alter their stock prices. Management buyout firms are likely
21
Three main directional earnings performance benchmarks21 have been proposed in the literature. These are
 loss avoidance (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997b)
 previous years’ or seasonally lagged earnings and
 analysts’ consensus estimates (Payne, Robb, and Payne, 1997; and Burgstahler and Eames, 1998).
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) provide evidence of a hierarchy of priorities among the three proposed earnings
benchmarks. They assert that it is important for firms to initially avoid losses; once profitability is attained it is important to
demonstrate growth in quarterly earnings and thereafter it is important to focus on meeting analyst earnings forecasts.
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to aim to minimize the purchase price. Hence they are likely to engage in income decreasing
accruals. On the other hand targets are likely to want to increase their share price. There is
empirical evidence supporting this expectation. Erickson and Wang (1999) found evidence
consistent with income increasing earnings management in share swap mergers between 1985
and 1990. Easterwood (1998) found evidence that takeover targets use discretionary accruals
during months preceding and following a takeover attempt. Perry and Williams (1994)
provide evidence of pre-buyout income decreasing accruals. Wu (1997) find that earnings
changes are significantly smaller than industry median changes for buyout companies in the
year preceding the buyout. Christie and Zimmerman (1994) showed that targets more
frequently used income increasing accounting methods much more than do non-targets.
Dividend distribution
Reported earnings tend to provide a dividend threshold. Daniel, Denis and Naveen (2007 find
that dividends only exceed earnings in less than 7% of reported cases. Thus they postulate that
managers have incentives to manage earnings upwards so as to be able to maintain dividend
levels. They also find that dividend paying firms tend to manage earnings upwards when their
earnings would fall short of expected dividends levels. They find that the tendency to manage
earnings is more evident in firms with higher levels of debt as debt covenants tend to place
more restrictions on dividend distribution. They also find that higher earnings management
occurs in high payout firms.
2.4.5 Contractual motives
This section explains how executive compensation contracts and debt covenants, influence the
use of accruals. The executive compensation design can contribute to or mitigate
opportunistic managerial choices. Similar to derivatives risk management literature (Core and
Guay, 2002; Supanvanij et al, 2006; Rogers, 2002) discussed in section 2.3.3, earnings
management literature assesses the impact of stock based compensation. In addition, the
earnings management literature provides evidence that focuses on the bonus component of
compensation. These are linked to opportunistic objectives described in section 2.4.3.2.
2.4.5.1 Executive compensation contract motives
Stock based compensation
Stock based compensation is a significant component of executive compensation. This has
occurred on the grounds of creating shareholder and manager alignment and the past decade
has correspondingly experienced a significant increase in incentive based executive
compensation (stock based and option based executive compensation). Median exposure to
CEO wealth to firm stock price tripled between 1980 and 1994 and doubled between 1994
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and 2000 (Hall and Liebman, 2000). By 2001, equity based compensation accounted for
approximately two thirds of the pay of the median firm. Murphy (1999) and Core and Guay
(2002) report that by the 1990s changes in the value of executive stock and stock options were
as much as fifty times as large as the annual changes in cash compensation.
There is a growing body of empirical evidence showing the interrelationship between stock
based compensation and earnings management choices. Gao and Shrieves (2002) conduct a
study on earnings discretionary accruals. In contrast to the authors who study how the bonus
component affects earnings management choice, Gao and Shrieves (2002) adopt a
sophisticated approach that factors the joint rather than individual impact of each
compensation component, more akin to the approach taken by Core and Guay (2002) and
Rogers (2002) when studying the impact of executive compensation on derivatives choice.
Gao and Shrieves (2002) frame the compensation driven incentives to undertake earnings
management based on a set of stylized facts including:
 The impact of accruals on share price and the potential wealth realizations across
multiple time horizons.
 The linearity and non-linearity of each component of compensations:
Linearity and non linearity of compensation
The linearity and non linearity was described in section 2.3.3 in the assessment of executive
compensation on the choice of derivatives. These components capture the sensitivity of
managers to volatility of firm performance and sensitivity to level of firm performance
depending on the structure of their compensation. These sensitivities influence the decision on
whether or not to engage in earnings management using discretionary accruals.
Empirical evidence
Gao and Shrieves (2002) find that the proportion of stock options is positively related to
earnings management intensity. They find that the delta effect can influence managerial
incentives towards earnings management depending on whether management’s goal is to
maximise current period wealth or to maximise their wealth on a multi-period basis. Should
management aim to maximise the current period wealth, income increasing discretionary
accruals will be tend to be used. Consequently, managers will tend to overstate earnings when
the option component is relatively large, and when the sensitivity of the option value to stock
price is relatively high i.e. when the options are in-the- money (Gao and Shrieves, 2002).
On the other hand, if the manager’s objective is to maximise his/her wealth on a multi-period
basis, the key consideration will be the mean reverting impact of discretionary accruals on
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observable earnings. Whilst considering the impact of accruals on the share price and stock
option value, management holds a valuable timing option with regards to when they choose to
engage in either income increasing or income decreasing discretionary accruals. This simply
implies that the manager can choose which period to report higher earnings than justified by
underlying firm economic performance, and when to reverse this with a view to maximising
the cumulative wealth through the current and future periods. However, the main constraint of
a multi-period based framework of discretionary accruals is the cost of loss of reputation by a
manager engaging in period-to-period management earnings management (Gao and Shrieves,
2002). The cost of earnings management comes to the fore if management is suspected or
established. For example, if an enforcement action or regulatory investigation by the SEC
occurs.
Gao and Shrieves (2002) also analyse the restricted stock component. Restricted shares have a
linear payoff function in relation to the stock price. They find that due to the linearity of the
payoff, the marginal impact of discretionary accruals on restricted stock is much lower than it
is for stock options. This is because stock options have both linear and convex, non linear pay
off functions. A non linear pay off function leads to the increase (decrease) of stock price at
an increasing (decreasing rate) when there are positive (negative) earnings surprises. Hence
restricted stock compensation provides less incentive for earnings management behaviour
than stock option compensation. At the same time LTIPs are usually based on three to five
year moving average of firm’s performance. Due to the mean reverting impact of
discretionary accruals on earnings, 5 year moving average earnings is likely to be more stable
and stripped off the exogenous discretionary accrual impact on share price, when compared to
one-year earnings. On this basis, LTIP reduces the incentive to engage in earnings
management practices that aim to maximise managerial wealth. Gao and Shrieves’ (2002)
empirical findings do not support either positive or negative effects of long-term incentive
plans or restricted stock compensation earnings.
The assertion that stock based compensation influences earnings management is consistent
with the insider capital markets objectives shown by Beneish and Vargus (2002). Insiders
have incentives to increase earnings in order to artificially inflate stock prices in the short run
around the time that they intend to sell their shares. These actions reflect opportunistic
earnings management objectives by managers. In supplying empirical evidence, Beneish and
Vargus (2002) analyse accruals, insider sales and subsequent earnings and they find very high
accruals are contemporaneously associated with sales of shares by insiders. They also find
that low earnings and stock returns follow the periods of high accruals that are accompanied
by insider sales. In other words, the accruals that occur around the time of an insider selling
their shares tend not to be persistent in future periods and as argued earlier one can conclude
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that these accruals do not reflect underlying economic reality of the firms’ activities but are a
reflection of an attempt to influence the short time share price.
Other Empirical Studies
In other stock option based empirical studies, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) find that CEOs
opportunistically manage investor expectations during the interval around scheduled option
award dates. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), find that the use of discretionary accruals is
more pronounced in firms where the CEOs’ total compensation is more closely tied to the
value of stock and stock holdings. In addition, they find that during years of high accruals,
CEOs exercise unusually large amounts of options, and that CEOs and other insiders sell
large quantities of shares. Cheng and Warfield (2005), using 1993-2000 US data, find that
managers with high equity incentives are less likely to report large positive earnings. They
instead tend to meet or just beat analyst forecast. Their motivation tends to be to engage in
earnings management practices that increase the value of their future shares. This finding is
consistent with the view by Teoh et al (1998) that large accruals tend to have an adverse
impact on future share prices.
Furthermore, Denis, Hanouna and Sarin (2006), provide indirect evidence of the impact of
stock based compensation. They find that there is a significant positive association between
opportunistic management choices, evidenced by securities fraud allegations, and stock option
incentives. Burns and Kedia (2006) find that earnings restatements are more common at firms
where CEOs hold large option portfolios. Bergstresser, Desai and Rauh (2006) find that firms
make more aggressive assumptions about returns on defined benefit pension plans during
periods in which executives are exercising options. The use of aggressive returns and other
pension calculation assumptions can be used as a way of smoothing pension expenses
recognised in the income statement.
In the same vein, Burns and Kedia (2008) study a sample of firms that announce restatements
to determine whether managers realise gains by exercising options. In this study they control
for managers seeking to diversify their holdings as the reason for exercising their options.
They find significant evidence of higher exercising of options in firms that are more likely to
have made deliberate, aggressive accounting choices. For these firms, options are 20-60%
higher in comparison to industry and size matched non restating firms.
Overall the varied empirical evidence supports the notion that the structure and composition
of the executive compensation package including stock based compensation, influences
earnings management.
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2.4.5.2 Bonus
Unlike the stock based compensation that could induce income smoothing accruals, the bonus
component of managerial compensations tends to mainly influence directional earnings
management. Earlier earnings management studies (Healy, 1985; Sloan, 1993; Gaver, Gaver
and Austin, 1995; Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan, 1995; Balsam, 1998; and Guidry, Leone
and Rock, 1999) tended to focus mainly on the effect of the bonus component and not stock
based component of compensation22.
Figure 2.4 below illustrates a pay-to-performance relationship of a bonus plan.
Figure 2.4: Cash (Including Bonus) Pay-to-performance Relationship
Healy (1985) postulates that different incentives could cause either income increasing or
income decreasing accruals depending on the attained firm performance. He asserts that if
firms attain performance between the lower and upper bound of bonus eligibility performance
targets, then managers are likely to engage in income increasing accruals. Alternatively the
incentive can be to maximise future period bonuses should the performance fall well below or
above the designated eligible performance zone (Balsam, 1998). If the performance is above
the upper bound, then managers have an incentive to decrease earnings so as to fall within the
bonus eligibility zone. If the performance is below target managers have incentives to
22 The subsequent shift of emphasis towards stock based compensation in empirical studies could be due to the diminished
importance of bonus as a compensation form and incentive due to the increase in stock based compensation as an alternative
compensation aimed at achieving pay-to-performance alignment
Income increasing
Incentive zone
Accounting based performance
Salary and Bonus
Salary
Lower bound Upper Bound
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decrease earnings so as to create a reserve that can be used to increase future earnings and
future bonuses. This latter scenario is predicated on the likelihood of an overstatement of
future income should there be an understatement during current period.
Empirical evidence
Healy (1985) provides supporting empirical evidence of his postulation, based on 1527
company year observations between 1930 and 1980. However, Gaver, Gaver and Austin
(1985) using 1980 to 1990 data, find evidence of income decreasing accruals when
performance is above the upper bound but contrary to Healy (1985) they find that companies
engage in income increasing accruals when below the lower bound. The latter finding is
consistent with the view that companies engage in earnings management to smooth the time
series of earnings. Similarly, Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) find evidence of income
decreasing accruals when firms exceed upper bounds but no evidence of income decreasing
accruals when they fall below lower bounds. However, these bounds are often unobservable.
2.4.5.3 Debt Covenant
Accounting data can be used to monitor and regulate contractual relations amongst the firm’s
stakeholders, including bondholders (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). For example, lending
covenants require that certain performance objectives be met or can impose limits on the
allowed investment, financing and dividend distribution (Beneish, 2001). The assumption is
that debt covenants provide incentives for managers to increase earnings so as to either reduce
the restrictiveness of accounting based constraints in debt agreements or to avoid the costs of
covenants violations (Beneish, 2001).
Empirical evidence
There is mixed empirical evidence on economic consequences of earnings management
influenced by debt covenants. Some evidence supports the argument that managers take
income increasing discretionary accruals so as to delay the onset of default (Sweeney, 1994;
Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Dichev and Skinner (2000) find that there is a significantly
greater proportions of firms above the covenant’s violation threshold than below. This
suggests that managers take earnings management actions consistent with avoiding covenant
default.
But there is also evidence that does not support this argument (Beneish and Press (1993),
DeAngelo and Skinner (1994)). De Angelo et al, looked at a sample of distressed companies,
defined as firms with at least three annual losses and reduced cash dividends over a six year
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time span. They did not find any significant difference in the accrual levels between firms
with binding covenants and those without. They also found that companies with binding
constrains had more negative accruals but they attribute these to inventory write-off that they
deem to be economically necessary rather than a discretionary accounting decision (Dechow
and Schrand, 2004). Jaggi and Lee (2002) offered evidence that potentially reconciles the
conflicting results. They find that companies that are unable to obtain waivers of debt
covenants and thus are forced to renegotiate and restructure their debt tend to have income
decreasing accruals so as to avoid having to fulfil covenant requirements, but observed
income increasing accruals for firms that are able to obtain debt waivers.
2.4.6 Other determinants of earnings management
Other than the capital markets and contractually based motives, discretionary accruals can be
influenced by the prevailing firm specific, country corporate governance and regulatory
regimes.
2.4.6.1 Corporate governance
While the introduction of pay-to-performance sensitivity into the executive compensation
design aims to reduce agency conflicts, the literature and empirical evidence shows that the
compensation package can exacerbate managerial self interest. On the other hand, Cornett,
Marcus and Tehranian (2008) find that corporate governance mechanisms provide
countervailing factors to those provided by the incentive compensation package, provide
greater oversight of the financial reporting process and serve to prevent earnings management
of an opportunistic nature. Hence, firms with poor corporate governance and severe agency
costs would be expected to have higher levels of opportunistic and lower levels of
informational earnings management. In contrast, firms with strong corporate governance
would be expected to mainly apply informational earnings management (Jiraporn, Miller,
Yoon and Kim, 2008), if at all.
Section 2.3.4.1 describes how corporate governance influences the decision to use derivatives.
Similarly, there are various components to corporate governance covered in earnings
management literature including Board attributes, the audit function and the form of
ownership (e.g. level of institutional investors). I discuss these further below, mainly with a
focus on earnings management related empirical evidence.
Board of Directors attributes
Board Composition and Independence: Boards dominated by outsiders are presumed to be
more independent than those comprised mainly of insiders. Outside directors bring a greater
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breadth of experience to the table (Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian, 2008). Klein (2006)
similarly argues that independent directors are best able to fulfil the oversight function. By
being financially independent of management, independent directors have the ability to
withstand pressure from the firm to manipulate earnings. In addition as pointed out by Fama
and Jensen (1983), outside directors have strong incentives23 to develop reputations as experts
in decision control and monitoring ability.
Financial literacy of Board: McDaniel, Martin and Maines (2002) showed in an experimental
setting that financial experts evaluate financial statements in a different fashion from those
who are simply financially literate. Financial literates are more likely to focus on issues being
discussed in the financial press and on large non recurring items while financial experts focus
on less trendy issues and on recurring earnings.
Board audit committee: The audit committee’s primary function is to oversee the financial
reporting process of the firm. This is done through regular meetings with the firm’s outside
auditors and internal financial manager to review the corporation’s financial statements, audit
process, and internal accounting controls (Klein, 2006). Some regulatory proposals, such as
the Blue Ribbon Committee envisage the audit committee as the ultimate monitor and
propose several best practices to ensure that these committees effectively fulfil the oversight
functions. The expectation is that audit committees ought to engage equally with management
and the external auditors and that they ought to keep track of management judgements,
accounting estimates, audit adjustments, disagreements between management and the external
auditor and the transactions between the firm and employees of the firm. However, Klein
(2006) highlights that while the audit committee is expected to fulfil an oversight function;
legitimate differences of opinion could exist between managers and external auditors.
Auditors tend to have a bias towards conservatism due to client litigation risk (DeFond and
Subramanyan, 1998). The audit committee nevertheless plays a direct role in monitoring
earnings management. Executive committee may play an indirect role in monitoring earnings
management. Its function is to monitor firm performance. McMullen (1996) indicated that
companies with audit committees had lower instances of shareholder litigation alleging
management fraud and fewer earning restatements.
There are different strands of supporting empirical evidence on the role of board structure and
earnings management. DaDalt, Davidson and Xie (2001) show that the composition of the
board and audit committee is related to the likelihood that a firm engages in earnings
management. They find that firms tend to have lower levels of discretionary accruals, when
23 Srinivasan (2004) found that outside directors experience significant labour market penalties, evidenced by large turnovers,
when earnings restatements occur.
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their boards and audit committees comprise of members who hold financial expertise. Dadalt,
Davidson and Xie (2001) find that the presence of corporate executives and investment
bankers reduces the earnings management levels. Klein (2006) finds that earnings
management is positively related to whether the CEO sits on the board’s compensation
committee. He also finds that earnings management is negatively related to the CEO’s
shareholdings and to whether a large outside shareholder sits on the board’s audit committee.
His findings are indicative that boards that are structured to be independent of the CEO are
more effective in monitoring the corporate financial accounting process. Klein (1998, 2000)
provides evidence that a board where the CEO sits on its nominating committee or executive
compensation committee is less independent of the CEO. Klein (2006) finds a non linear
negative relation between audit committee independence and earnings manipulation. A
significant relation is found only when the audit committee has less than a majority of
independent directors
Board Size: DaDalt et al (2001) assert that a larger24 board may be able to draw from a
broader range of experience and thus may be better at detecting and preventing earnings
management.
Frequency of Board Meetings: A board that meets more often is better equipped to detect and
prevent earnings management. Vafeas (1999) shows that boards that meet more often during
period of turmoil and in general tend to show improved financial performance and this is
assumed to be a proxy for lower earnings management.
Chairman/CEO duality: The CEO/Chairman duality concentrates power in the CEO’s
position, permits the CEO to control information that is available to the rest of the board and
effectively allows for greater opportunities for earnings management (Jensen, 1993 and
Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian, 2006). Hence the separation of role of Chairman and CEO
bestows greater independence and strengthens the oversight function.
Audit Function
The auditors’ primary role and responsibility is to attest that managers have reported financial
results that are consistent with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Dechow
and Schrand (2004) describe the non conclusive evidence available on the effectiveness of
audit in detecting earnings management. Early studies found a positive association between
24 Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) assert that small boards tend to be more effective than large boards in the fulfilling the
oversight function. Large boards are more easily controlled by the CEO as their emphasis is on ‘politeness and courtesy’ and not
rocking the boat. A smaller board might face less bureaucratic obstacles that impede its effectiveness (DaDalt et al, 2001)
However, there is contrasting, albeit indirect evidence of board size on earnings management. Dalton, Daily, Johnson and
Ellstrand (1999) conducted a meta analysis of 131 different study samples and find a positive relationship between board size and
financial performance, and took this to be evidence that larger boards are more effective in their oversight.
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modified audit opinions and high abnormal accruals. Krishnan (2003) found an association
between auditors with expertise in an industry and discretionary accruals. Lower levels of
discretionary accruals tend to be observed for firms with such specialist auditors. Myers,
Myers and Omer (2003) documented that auditor’s tenure with the company being audited
improves earnings quality. However, Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2001), found no
evidence on whether auditors issue more qualified opinions for high accrual companies.
Ownership
Large institutional investors have the opportunity, resources and ability to monitor, discipline
and influence managers. This puts pressure on managers to focus on optimising firm
performance and to steer clear of opportunistic, self serving behaviour. There is limited
evidence of effectiveness of institutional investors as monitors of earnings quality. However,
there is evidence that institutional investors are more sophisticated than individual investors in
disentangling non persistent earnings components. Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky
(2000) show that the cumulative abnormal return over a 60 day window following an earnings
announcement is more pronounced with individual investors than it is for institutional
investors. The interpretation of these findings could be that either companies with higher
levels of institutional ownership tend to issue higher quality of earnings, or that institutional
investors are more difficult to fool using earnings management practices. Bushee (1998)
provides other supporting evidence showing that companies with higher levels of institutional
ownership do not cut research and development expenditure, as do companies with low levels
of institutional ownership, during periods of low earnings. In other words there are constraints
to use the full arsenal of earnings management devices in companies with high levels of
institutional ownership. However, there have been studies that show that the transient nature
of some institutional investors or their short term holding orientation, can lead to situations
where they pressure managers to engage in short term attempts at inflating stock price
(Graham et al, 2005).
2.4.6.2 Country Specific Corporate Governance
Section 2.4.6.1 analyses the impact of firm level corporate governance features on earnings
management and this section extends the analysis to country level corporate governance
mechanisms. At a country level, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) provide evidence showing
that earnings management scores are lower in countries with large stock markets, dispersed
ownership, strong investor rights and strong legal enforcements. Fonseca and Gonzalez
(2008) in a study of determinants of income smoothing by loan loss provisions across banks
around the world, find that there is less bank smoothing with stronger investor protection,
restrictions on bank activities, and official and private supervision.
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An example of country specific corporate governance is that arising from the Sarbanes Oxley
(SOX) legislation in the US. SOX, was enacted in 2002 in response to a number of high
profile accounting related failures such as Enron and WorldCom. The legislation aimed to
improve the corporate governance regime and internal control environment25, and
consequently to improve the overall financial reporting quality (SEC 2003 and Leech, 2003).
On corporate governance, the Act addresses board composition and responsibilities, auditor
independence, auditor review of internal controls and CEO and CFO certification of financial
statements. The improvement in disclosure involve reporting off-balance-sheet transactions
and contractual obligations, communicating information that has a material impact in a timely
fashion and assessing the adequacy of internal controls (Akhigbe, Martin and Newman,
2008).
The imposition of SOX illustrates the underpinning expectation that strong corporate
governance oversight can mitigate opportunistic earnings management. The regulatory and
legal regime can by imposing stringent penalties can also increase the direct costs of engaging
in earnings management. Carter, Lynch and Zechman (2005) find that post Sarbanes Oxley,
there was a reduction in the level of discretionary accruals. To further confirm whether the
legislation achieved its purpose, Li, Pincus and Rego (2004) conducted an event study to
assess the anticipated impact, by investors, on earnings quality. Their results are consistent
with investors expecting the Act to have a net beneficial effect of improving the accuracy and
reliability of financial reports by constraining earnings management and enhancing corporate
governance.
2.4.6.3 Regulatory motives
These motives pertain to regulated several industries such as utilities, banking and insurance.
These companies face regulatory monitoring that is based on accounting numbers. For
example, banks and insurance companies have capital adequacy and minimum reserve
requirements while utilities are rate regulated and are permitted to earn only a normal return
on their invested assets. On this basis, regulations create incentives to manage the income
statement and balance sheet variables that are of interest to the regulators (Healy et al, 1998).
Fonesca and Gonzalez (2008) describe the capital management hypothesis as one of the
motivations for managing earnings. This hypothesis posits that banks that violate capital
requirements incur both out-of-pocket and opportunity costs. Under-capitalised banks have to
25 Section 404 requires companies to include an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control over financial reporting
and an auditors’ attestation of the assessment in their annual reports. Section 302 requires a report on any changes in the internal
control
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submit costly capital restoration plans to regulators and in addition they could be subject to
restrictions on dividend distribution, management fees as well as on investment choices such
as branch expansion and new service offerings. The incentives to manage earnings could also
exist for well capitalized banks, as capital adequacy provides a source of competitive
advantage as it enables a higher likelihood of regulatory approval for expansion objectives as
well as incurring lower Deposit insurance premiums (Dechow and Schrand, 2004). There is
strong evidence (Ahmed, Takeda and Thomas, 1999; Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo,
1996) supporting the view that financial institutions manage earnings to meet or beat
regulatory capital requirements. Most of the evidence focuses on the management of loan loss
reserves or insurance reserves in financial institutions as these particular measures are readily
observable and hence subject to an ex post valuation of whether the created reserves during a
particular period were too low or too high.
Fonesca and Gonzalez (2008) also describe the risk management hypothesis. This hypothesis
posits that earnings management could be justified as a means of avoiding pro-cyclical
provisioning. Banks could increase their loan loss provisions during buoyant, high growth
phases of the economic cycle as a buffer to drawn upon during distressed market periods.
Correspondingly reduce the provisioning level during distressed markets. In effect earnings
management could occur as a countercyclical measure. However, there is no empirical
evidence supporting the use of earnings management for countercyclical purposes. On the
contrary, the available empirical evidence does show pro-cyclical earnings management is
what occurs. Specifically, Bikker and Metzemaker (2006) found there to be a negative
association between GDP and earnings growth.
2.4.7 Earnings management literature summary
The main conclusions from the literature review are that discretionary accruals are a special
case of earnings management. They can be used for both income smoothing and directional
earnings management. Earnings management can be done for either opportunistic or
informational reasons. More specifically, capital markets, compensation based and other
contractual based motives, such as avoidance of debt covenant violations, influence earnings
management. A strong corporate governance environment will deter opportunistic earnings
management, but it could also encourage informational earnings management. This implies
that the impact on the level of accruals could be ambiguous as it is contingent on whether
these are opportunistic or informational. Similarly, the prevailing country level regulatory
requirements influence earnings management.
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2.5 Derivatives hedging and discretionary accruals as a joint decision
2.5.1 Derivatives and discretionary accruals as earning smoothing substitutes
As discussed above, both hedging derivatives and discretionary accruals have capacity to
smooth earnings. The literature review related to derivatives for financial hedging and
earnings management shows that they are in part influenced by the same set of managerial
incentives. It is on this basis that different authors (Barton, 2001; Rajgopal and Pincus 2002;
Singh, 2004 and Zhang et al, 2009) conducted empirical studies to establish whether either of
these two choices available to managers seeking to smooth earnings, are in fact substitutes26.
The assumption being that as discussed in sections 2.3.1 and 2.4.3, derivatives used for
hedging and earnings management through discretionary accruals can enhance shareholder
value. This is by making earnings informative and reducing the:
 perceived riskiness, cost of capital and expected cost of financial distress;
 information disadvantages between informed and uninformed investors;
 reducing underinvestment; and
 expected future tax liabilities.
Hence, these two choices also can assuage managerial concerns regarding the volatility of
their stock holdings in the employer firms.
Empirical evidence on substitution
In contrast to the relatively established strands of literature (see sections 2.3 and 2.4) that
separately study derivatives based risk management and earnings management, empirical
evidence on their joint use has only begun to emerge. Using 304 firms over the 1994-1996
periods, Barton (2001) finds that there is a substitution relationship between discretionary
accruals and derivatives. Using a simultaneous equation model, he finds that increased
derivatives use is associated with reduced discretionary accruals and vice versa. He finds that
firms with larger derivatives portfolios tend to have lower levels of discretionary accruals and
they also show that non-users of derivatives are more likely to violate GAAP by aggressively
managing accruals. Barton (2001) recognises that there is a research gap for a similar study
data based on post-SFAS 133 data.
Rajgopal and Pincus (2001), focusing on the interaction of discretionary accrual choices in
managing earnings volatility in oil and gas producing firms that also face oil exploration risk,
also find that derivatives and discretionary accruals are used as substitutes. Zhang, Huang,
26 The effective use of derivatives as hedging instruments lowers earnings volatility and, at an aggregate level, reduces the need
to manage earnings using discretionary accruals and this yields the substitution relationship.
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Deis and Moffit (2009), studying the relationship between discretionary accruals, hedging and
firm value, find significant evidence of a substitution relationship between discretionary
accruals and the use of derivatives.
See Table 2.3 (for detailed review of studies)
However, Huang, Zhang, Deis and Moffit (2009) find that discretionary accruals have lower
impact on firm value relative to the use of derivatives and hence managers will prefer
derivatives when seeking to smooth income for long term shareholder benefit. Huang et al
(2009), show that accruals are preferred to derivatives use when managers are being
opportunistic and seeking privative benefit. The assertion of opportunistic use of accruals is
consistent with the evidence of Sloan (1996) showing that managerial self interest, manifest in
pursuit of short term oriented, transitory stock price inflation, leads to the higher use of
discretionary accruals. Huang et al’s (2009) study suggests that accruals are not really
substitutes, as they principally are used in firms with weak corporate governance and with
opportunistic intent. However, these claims are inconsistent with a significant body of
literature that suggests that accruals also have informational purposes and positively impact
long term shareholder value (Subramayan, 1996 and Jiraporn et al, 2008). In fact, Jiraporn et
al (2008) find that there are lower levels of accruals in firms with high agency costs (e.g.
through weak prevailing corporate governance structures). The findings of Jiraporn et al
(2008) contradict the conclusions of Huang et al (2009).
Post-SFAS 133 studies on substitution
Singh’s (2004) investigation of the effects of SFAS 133 on earnings management, earnings
volatility and derivatives use, was a necessary extension of the work of Barton (2001) that
relied on pre-SFAS 133 data (i.e. 1994-1996). Unlike Barton (2001), Singh (2004) finds
evidence of a partial substitution relationship where derivatives use is associated with
earnings management, but finds no evidence that earnings management similarly influences
the use of derivatives. The few post-SFAS 133 studies reveal an opportunity for studies that
are based on post-year 2000 data.
See Table 2.3, for further details of empirical studies
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2.5.2 Factors that could offset substitution relationship
Despite the assumption of substitution relationship between hedging derivatives and
discretionary accruals, there are several factors that could restrict the substitution relationship
including:
 Objective of managing cash flow rather than earnings volatility;
 Directional earnings management;
 Costs and stringent implement requirements of derivatives use; and
 Complementary relationship
Objective of managing cash flow rather than earnings volatility: Derivatives affect both cash
flow and earnings volatilities. But discretionary accruals only affect earnings volatility but not
cash flow volatility. In situations where the manager’s intention is to primarily manage cash-
flow volatility, derivatives and discretionary accruals cease to be substitutes. Discretionary
accruals only influence earnings and not cash flow. If seeking to cash flow volatility,
companies are likely to use derivatives rather than discretionary accruals.
Directional earnings management: As discussed in section 2.4.4, discretionary accruals can
be used to meet earnings targets as opposed to smoothing income. For example to avoid
violation of debt covenants, maintain dividends, meet bonus targets or analyst forecasts.
However, directional earnings management does not occur for derivatives. Hence when the
goal is directional earnings management, discretionary accruals should be more likely to be
used.
Costs of derivatives use: As Rajgopal and Pincus (2002) and Lin, Servaes and Tamayo (2007)
point out, another constraint to the interchangeable use of derivatives and earnings
management, is that it is more costly to implement the use of derivatives. The use of
derivatives imposes direct and indirect costs. For example, there are significant direct costs of
running an effective treasury or risk management function. To use derivatives effectively,
organizations have to establish and source personnel with expertise in derivatives use for risk
management purposes as well as to establish supporting technological platforms and
processes to enable the selection, pricing and accounting of derivatives instruments. The high
profile derivatives failures, such as Procter and Gamble and Orange County, were in part a
consequence of the shortfall of risk management skills that resulted in ineffective hedges. In
addition, there is basis risk (i.e. the economic cost of ineffective hedges) associated
specifically with derivatives use (Singh, 2004).
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Complementary relationship: Rather than being substitutes, it is plausible that accruals could
complement derivatives use. This could, for example, occur when firms use derivatives for
speculative purposes. This could lead to increased earnings volatility and a corresponding
need to use accruals to offset the increased earnings volatility.
2.5.3 Summary of Income Smoothing choices
The above conceptual analysis of the purpose and determinants of derivatives use and
discretionary accruals shows that there is an overlap in how they influence shareholder value
and managerial risk incentives. It also shows that there are situations where these two choices
cannot be substitutes. This is consistent with Singh (2004) who assumes that they are partial
substitutes.
With an understanding of income smoothing choices, it is appropriate at this stage to develop
the linkage to derivatives accounting policy, SFAS 133. Dechow and Schrand (2004) asserted
that earnings management requires both incentive and opportunity. The earlier sections have
analysed the incentives for income smoothing. The focus of the subsequent sections of the
theoretical framework is on how SFAS 133 provides both incentive and opportunities for
income smoothing choices. This includes a description of the key features of SFAS 133 and
shows how these could incentivise income smoothing.
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2.6 SFAS 133 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
This section outlines the institutional background to SFAS 133 describing its features and
factors underpinning its promulgation. It, proceeds to develop detailed hypotheses on the
impact of SFAS 133 on derivatives use and accrual use. The hypotheses are based on the
theoretical framework, described in detail below, of the interaction between SFAS 133 and
earnings smoothing.
2.6.1 Chronology of US derivatives accounting standards
Table 2.1 outlines the main features and implementation dates of the standards preceding
SFAS 133. It is useful as it shows the evolution of derivatives accounting standards, the trend
of piecemeal enhancements and makes visible the novelty of SFAS 133. In promulgating
SFAS 133, FASB identified shortcomings that plagued the predecessor standards including:
 Lack of transparency. Derivatives that did not require a cash outlay (e.g. forward
contract, interest rate swaps and currency swaps) were not reported in the primary
financial statements (i.e. balance sheet and income statement)
 Inconsistent guidance. There were inconsistencies in application across instruments
due to inconsistencies in literature (e.g. between SFAS 52 and SFAS 80). SFAS 80
permitted hedge accounting (defined further below) on a portfolio basis whereas
SFAS 52 allows it on a transaction basis.
 Incomplete guidance: SFAS 52 and 80 provided guidance for foreign currency
derivatives and non foreign currency futures. There were Emerging Issues Task
Force (EITF) guidance27 related to foreign currency options but there was no
guidance for interest rate swaps (Herz, 1990). The application across other
instruments without authoritative literature was by analogy. Thus, there was a
situation where some derivatives were marked to market in income statement and
balance sheet (e.g. speculative derivatives); others were accounted for on either
historical cost basis or fair value depending on how the underlying hedge was
accounted for.
Improvement28, under SFAS 133, occurred across several dimensions
 Location. Greater prominence and transparency by inclusion in the balance sheet and
income statement
27 EITF provides guidance on application and emerging accounting issues. Its guidance is complementary though subordinate in
authority to FASB guidance
28 Paragraph 238 of SFAS 133 states: ‘SFAS 133 increases the visibility, comparability, and understandability of the risks
associated with derivatives by requiring that all derivatives be reported as assets or liabilities and measured at fair value.’
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 Enhanced information content. The application of fair value for all derivatives
instruments conveys relevant information and improves the consistency and
comparability of derivatives instrument accounting.
 Greater consistency. Providing guidance across all derivatives instruments, rather
than the situation where only some derivatives had authoritative guidance (e.g.
foreign currency futures).
Table 2.1 SFAS 133 and predecessor derivatives accounting standards
Year FASB statement Accounting and disclosure requirements
1981 SFAS 52 ‘Foreign Currency Translation’. SFAS 52 classifies foreign
currency forward currency contracts into a) hedging forward
contracts and b) speculative forward contracts. It allows hedge
accounting for hedging forward contracts on a transaction basis
(i.e. instrument level).
1984 SFAS 80 ‘Accounting for Futures Contracts’ established standards for
exchange traded futures (other than currency futures). Allowed
hedge accounting on a portfolio basis
1990 EITF 90-17 ‘Hedging foreign currency risks with purchased options’-
Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) guidance complements
FASB guidance
1990 SFAS 105 ‘Disclosure of Information about Financial Instruments with
Off-balance Sheet Risk and Financial Instruments with
Concentrations of Credit Risk’ required companies to disclose
a) contractual amounts, nature and terms b) amount of probable
accounting loss due to default by contracting parties c)
concentrations of credit risk of financial instruments including
derivatives. It did not require fair value disclosures
1991 EITF91-1 ‘Hedging Intercompany foreign currency risks’
1991 EITF 91-4 ‘Hedging foreign currency risks with complex options and
similar transactions’
1992 SFAS 107 ‘Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments’
required companies to disclose the fair market value of unsettled
financial instruments including derivatives in the notes. The
disclosure of carrying values was recommended but not
required. Did not require fair value disclosures in the primary
financial statements. Historical costs are shown on balance
sheet.
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1995 SFAS 119 ‘Disclosure about Derivatives Financial Instruments and Fair
value of Financial Instruments’ -required disclosures about the
purposes of derivatives financial instruments and about how the
derivatives are reported in financial statements. For derivatives
used to hedge risks associated with anticipated transactions,
required disclosure about the nature of the anticipated
transactions and the amounts of deferred hedging gains and
losses. Required disclosure in the footnotes of fair values and
carrying values (clearly indicating asset or liability position).
Essentially expanded 105 and 107 disclosure requirements to all
derivatives instruments.
1999 133 a) All derivatives recorded on the balance sheet at fair value b)
income statement impact depends on activity, with a distinction
between speculative hedges, fair value hedges, foreign currency
hedges c) hedged item’s carrying value is adjusted for changes
in fair value attributable to hedged risk
1999 137 Delayed effective date of SFAS 133 to beginning after June 15th
2000
2000 138 Made certain technical changes in the way SFAS 133 is to be
applied to specific types of hedges
Adapted from Trombley (2003), Park (2004) and Aggarwal and Simkins (2004).
Subsequent to SFAS 133, there have been several updating pronouncements (e.g. SFAS 161,
137 and 138), but SFAS 133 remains the authoritative derivatives accounting standard.
Key elements of SFAS 133
As Table 2.1 shows, there has been a trend of steady enhancement of derivatives accounting
and some of the elements that SFAS 133 adopted, already existed but were applied
inconsistently across instruments or were reported off-balance-sheet. The key features of
SFAS 133 are a) recognition of fair value of all derivatives instruments in the primary
financial statements and b) the definition of hedge accounting to be applied across all
derivatives instruments. Hedge accounting primarily impacts on whether fair value gains or
losses are recorded in the income or other comprehensive income statement. Hedge
accounting does not affect the recording on the balance sheet. Below is an elaboration of these
main features
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2.6.2 Fair value recognition in balance sheet and income statement
Prior to SFAS 133, only derivatives used for speculative purposes were recorded at fair value
on the balance sheet and income statement. SFAS 119 only required fair value disclosure of
risk management derivatives through the notes. SFAS 133 goes a step further than its
predecessors (SFAS 119, 107, 80) as it requires the recognition and measurement of all
derivatives instruments on a fair value basis through the balance sheet, with gains or losses
incurred during an accounting period being immediately posted to either the income statement
or comprehensive income statement.
Fair value definition
The IASB defines fair value as the amount for which an asset can be exchanged or a liability
settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction. Under the US
GAAP define fair value as the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer
a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date. Fair
value inputs include direct market quotes for traded, highly liquid financial instruments (e.g.
exchange traded derivatives). For less liquid financial instruments, fair value can be
determined by the use of indirect market proxies, adjusted for factors specific to the asset or
liability such as condition and location and activity level of the market. In the absence of
observable market inputs, fair value can be determined by management estimates using
unobservable inputs. Market exchange price as fair value is predicated on the market price
being an objective indicator of the true economic value of assets and liabilities (Hague, 2004).
Rationale for fair value measurement
Fair value accounting results in an updated assessment of the economic condition and value of
financial instruments held and at the same time makes the volatility of these values visible
(Hague, 2007). This is especially important for instruments with insignificant costs at
inception such as derivatives. There are various benefits associated with the recognition of
derivatives fair values. Hague (2007) identifies some of the key benefits of fair value, relative
to the alternative historical cost measurement basis, including:
 Enhanced visibility of derivatives gains and losses;
 The provision of an early warning system on likely losses;
 Incorporating the updated risk factors that influence derivatives values;
 Information on the asset and liability management and/or risk management
effectiveness;
 Information on risk exposures; and
 Reflecting the economic volatility of underlying assets.
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Recognition of derivatives fair value through the balance sheet and income statement thus
aids the assessment of risk exposure and risk management effectiveness by capital markets
participants.
In addition to the above, Beck and Liu (2007) assert that unlike the case with fair value
accounting, a historical cost regime can provide managers with the option to realize gains
when asset values increase, but at the same time allow them to conceal losses when asset
values drop, as they can simply report such assets at historical cost. They see this situation as
being equivalent to granting managers a favourable call option29 on a firm’s assets. This can
lead to morally hazardous30 behaviour where managers undertake speculative projects
knowing that they have the option of minimising their reported losses through historical cost
reporting regime. This in turn increases the probability and severity of significant,
unanticipated losses. In effect, the alternative historical cost measurement basis leaves firm
outsiders vulnerable to unanticipated losses in the absence of an early warning system.
Most empirical studies have focused on the value relevance (i.e. significant association with
stock price) of the fair value disclosure of a broad array of financial instruments rather than
only derivatives. These studies tend to show value relevance for financial instruments where
fair values are reliable and complete e.g. investment securities. However, there is conflicting
evidence for some other financial instruments such as loans (Nelson, 1996). Instruments that
do not have liquid markets such as loans are prone to higher degrees of measurement error
and therefore market values are a less reliable indicator of economic worth.
Regarding derivatives instruments, Ahmed, Kilic and Lobo (2006) conducted studies on the
impact of recognition and measurement of their fair values for a sample of US banks. They
use separate samples of pre-SFAS 133 (146 banks) and post-SFAS 133 data (82 banks that
were a sub-sample of the pre-SFAS 133 data). The pre-SFAS 133 was from 1995-2000 and
post-SFAS 133 from 2001-2004. In these samples, they distinguish between recognised and
disclosed amounts. They find that SFAS 133 recognition and measurement requirements have
significant incremental impact on firm value. On this basis, they infer that SFAS 133
improved the quality of derivatives accounting information. Similarly, Zhou (2009), looking
at US bank hold companies from 1995 to 2005, finds that the inclusion of derivatives fair
value gains or losses in the income statement, as required under SFAS 133, increases the
29 Described as a call option, as historical cost only allows managers to realise upside but not get penalised for downside of poor
project selection. Hence, the payoff mimics a call option. Gains trading in the banking sector is an example of the
aforementioned morally hazardous behaviour. Gains trading occurs when banks purchase financial instruments , designate them
in the banking book and have them being accounted for at amortised historical cost on the assumption that they will be held to
maturity. Gains trading occurs when such instruments are then traded when markets are favourable yet kept at historical cost in
depressed markets.
30 Moral hazard occurs when managers undertake disproportionately risky choices, precisely due to risk protection measures
being in place
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information content of the core earnings. This judgement is based on the persistence of
reported earnings.
Fair value recognition and measurement requirements also provide risk relevant information.
Hodder, Hopkins and Wahlen (2006) provide empirical evidence showing that fair value
measurement conveys information on the risk of reporting firms. Their study, conducted
using data of 202 commercial banks spanning the 1996-2004 period, showed that if reported
income was adjusted31 to include a) fair value amounts reported in other comprehensive
income (OCI) and b) fair value items that are only disclosed in the notes, then a strong
association between the adjusted full fair value income and the observed stock prices exists.
The adjusted full fair value income has incremental volatility and this conveys elements of
risk not captured by net income volatility. Full fair value income volatility has a closer
association to capital markets pricing than does current reported income volatility.
2.6.3 Hedge accounting recognition and measurement
On the adoption of full fair value treatment for derivatives through the balance sheet and
income statement, concerns were raised32 that recognition and measurement inconsistencies
(i.e. accounting mismatches), between the hedging instrument and hedged items, could trigger
artificial earnings volatility. A mixed measurement approach33 and accounting mismatches
can for example arise when a derivatives instrument (e.g. a cross currency swap) is accounted
for on a fair value basis but the hedge (e.g. a held-to-maturity bond) is accounted for on a
historical cost basis.
To address the concerns of artificial’ earning volatility, the accounting standard setters allow
hedge accounting. Hedge accounting requires a similar accounting approach of both the
hedging derivatives instruments and the hedge (i.e. source of risk exposure). The ‘hedge to
hedge instrument’ matching principle under hedge accounting is effectively an exceptional
accounting treatment to the general requirement to apply full fair value, and recognise gains
and losses through the income statement, regardless of how the hedge is being accounted for
(Hague, 2004). The main hedge accounting approaches are:
 Fair value hedge accounting;
 Cash Flow hedge accounting; and
31 Currently there is a disaggregation in the recording of gains and losses between OCI and net income. Therefore to recreate a
full fair value picture, adjustments have to be made to reported income. A full fair value income statement would only be
achieved if a) all items were accounted for on a fair value basis and b) their gains and losses were only recognised, through the
current income statement.
32 These concerns were especially pronounced from the financial services industry with claims that a mixed attribute accounting
will distort the reflection of their asset and liability management practices.
33 Mixed measurement accounting refers to the use of multiple measurement bases (historical cost and fair value) across different
asset and liability categories. This is problematic for assets and liabilities with similar economic characteristics or items that need
to be matched (e.g. a hedge and hedging instrument).
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 Net investment hedge accounting.
The main difference in the hedge accounting options is in the timing and location of
recognised derivatives value gains and losses. Recognition of gains and losses could occur in
the current period income statement or it could be deferred through the comprehensive equity
statement (OCI). However, there are no differences in the balance sheet recognition of fair
value amounts under the hedge accounting options (i.e. all derivatives fair values are recorded
on balance sheet). I describe the hedge accounting options in more detail below:
2.6.3.1 Fair value hedge accounting
Hedge accounting aims to resolve accounting mismatches and fair value hedge accounting
adjusts the accounting treatment of the hedged item to that of the derivatives instrument.
Given that the derivatives is accounted for on a fair value basis with gains and losses
recognised through the income statement, the hedged item is adjusted to conform to the
derivatives accounting approach. Hence, the gains and losses of the hedging instrument and
hedged exposure are recognised in the income statement during the current period.
Fair value hedge accounting is applied to hedge fixed rate assets, fixed rate liabilities and
unrecognized firm commitments. A firm commitment is a binding agreement for the
exchange of a specified quantity of resources at a specified price on a specified future date or
dates. An example of a fair value hedge is the use of an interest swap to hedge the value of a
fixed rate bond (i.e. the principal risk or variation is in the value of the bond, which rises/falls
with fall/rise of interest rate).
2.6.3.2 Cash flow hedge accounting
An additional reason for allowing hedge accounting was to enable managers to better reflect
the management of risks associated with future transactions, given that future transactions are
not reflected in current period income statement or balance sheet. Hence when management
enters into derivatives transactions with the objective of managing future transactions, it is
desirable to match the derivatives to the future transactions by deferring the recognition of
gains/losses of the derivatives instrument (Hague, 2004). Cash flow hedge accounting is
applied to forecast transactions (e.g. sales, purchases) and future interest rate payments.
The accounting treatment works in the opposite direction of fair value hedge accounting only
as far as income statement treatment is concerned. Cash flow hedge accounting effectively
adjusts the accounting treatment of the derivatives to that of the hedged item, while fair value
hedge accounting works the other way round. It requires the deferral of derivatives gains and
losses through the accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) statement or statement
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of equity and only transferred to the income statement at a future date. The idea of cash flow
hedge accounting is to match the gains and losses of the derivatives to the gains or losses of
the hedged item. The subsequent transfer from AOCI to income statement occurs either when
the hedge is ineffective or when the derivatives instrument is realised (Ramirez, 2007). The
movement from AOCI to the income statement in accounting parlance is referred to as
‘recycling’ of gains and losses.
Under cash flow hedge accounting the hedging instrument and underlying exposure valuation
adjustments are not recognised periodically through the income statement but rather
recognised through comprehensive equity income statement in the balance sheet until the
point of realisation of the anticipated cash outflow or inflow. Hence the fluctuations in
derivatives value do not get reflected in reported earnings but instead the adjustments in
hedging derivatives value and the underlying exposure are only recognised in the income
statement and thus reflected in earnings only at the point of realisation.
An example of a cash flow hedge is if an airline manufacturer such as EADS has orders for
the Airbus carriers from different airlines, located in different countries, due in 3 years time. It
is appropriate to hedge the anticipated foreign currency revenue receipts, given that the carrier
construction costs are incurred using local currency (i.e. the Euro), lest the profitability may
be adversely affected should the Euro appreciate significantly relative to the revenue
currency. Another example would be the use of an interest swap to primarily hedge interest
rate payments of a floating rate bond (i.e. the principal risk is in the variation of interest
payments).
In sum, cash flow hedge accounting through its deferral requirements, reduces the earnings
volatility that would arise from the fair value recognition of derivatives.
2.6.3.3 Net investment hedging
This refers to the hedging of investments in subsidiaries in foreign countries, where the
subsidiaries’ functional currency (i.e. the currency which an entity reports its performance in
the financial statements) differs the domestic parent company’s functional currency. Net
investment hedging is the approach to hedging foreign currency translation risk exposures of
foreign subsidiaries.
Net investment hedging requires the reporting of the derivatives instrument in the same
manner as the foreign currency translation adjustments. The changes in a derivatives that
hedges a net investment in a foreign operation are reported in the Foreign Cumulative
Translation Adjustment (FCTA) account, in the comprehensive equity statement, to
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correspond with translation adjustment. However, if the derivatives gain or loss is greater than
the translation adjustment, then such changes are recorded in current earnings. In addition, if
the functional currency is the domestic currency (i.e. USD), then the gain or loss of
derivatives in foreign investments are recorded in current earnings, under re-measurement
gains or losses (Trombley, 2003). Effectively net investment hedging only allows the
matching of the hedging instrument to the hedge, if the functional currency is the foreign
currency. It is similar to cash flow hedge accounting in that changes are posted to the
comprehensive equity account but it differs as it does not allow recycling. Table 2.2
summarises the impact of the different hedge accounting options on the primary financial
statements.
Table 2.2 outlines and clarifies the posting of hedge accounting balances, gains and losses to
respective balance sheet and income statement accounts.
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Table 2.2 Hedge accounting: Impact on primary financial statements
34 Only amounts that are less than or equal to the translation gain/loss of foreign investment are recorded in comprehensive
income statement. Otherwise it is recorded in income statement
Gain/loss recognised
in income statement
Gains /losses
recognised in
comprehensive income
statement
Mark to market in
balance sheet
No designated hedging relationship
(Speculative derivatives and
unqualified hedges) X X
Fair value hedge accounting
Fair value hedge instrument (e.g.
interest rate swap) X X
Fair value Hedged item (e.g. fixed
rate bond) X X
Cash flow hedge accounting X
Effective portion of derivatives
instrument X
Ineffective portion of derivatives
instrument (i.e. ineffective hedge) X
Forecasted transaction (e.g. sales)
Effective portion on realisation
(e.g. order delivery for forecasted
export sales) X
Ineffective portion X
Net Investment in a foreign
subsidiary X
Foreign currency portion of
transaction gain/loss X
Ineligible portion34 X
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2.6.3.4 Consequences of SFAS 133 requirements
SFAS 133 has several consequences including:
 Imposing significant interpretation and implementation costs;
 Sub-optimal instrument selection; and
 Increasing earnings volatility.
Implementation complexity
Choosing the appropriate derivatives accounting method and complying with the hedge
accounting requirement is an onerous requirement for financial statement preparers (Ramirez,
2007).To qualify for hedge accounting, firms need to fulfil stringent criteria to demonstrate
anticipated hedge effectiveness (i.e. effectively minimising exposure volatility). A hedge is
deemed effective if, at its inception and throughout the life of the hedge, the enterprise can
expect the changes in the reported value or cash flows of the hedged item to be almost fully
offset by the changes in the fair value or cash flows of the hedging instrument, and the actual
results are within 80 to 125% of such value. Otherwise, the hedge is deemed ineffective and
firms have to immediately recognise all the derivatives gains and losses incurred too date.
There are onerous prospective (prior to qualifying for hedge accounting) and retrospective
tests (applied during the period of application of hedge accounting). These tests could include
regression analysis of the exposure on derivatives value and a simulation of values. These
tests are onerous as they are prospective in nature, and are skill and cost intensive (Ramirez,
2007).
The multi-layered complexity arising from hedge accounting also leaves investors with the
burden of deciphering the managerial intent underpinning each derivatives accounting choice
as the accounting depends on the nature of the underlying risk exposure, under hedge
accounting rules. Furthermore, allowing multiple variations in accounting for derivatives (i.e.
cash flow hedge accounting, full fair value) reduces comparability and leaves room for
inconsistent35 derivatives accounting.
Sub-optimal instrument selection
The onerous requirements on hedge accounting have had the unintended consequence of
accounting policy effectively dictating risk management choices in certain instances. The
design of the complex hedge accounting eligibility tests is based on the presupposition that
35 For example, an interest swap’s accounting will depend on the hedge. If it is a fair value hedge, all gains and losses go through
income statement. If it is a cash flow hedge they are deferred through OCI.
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hedge accounting would likely be the favoured accounting option for derivatives users, as it
minimises the accounting mismatches. The stringent hedge accounting requirements
inherently make it difficult for certain risk management derivatives instruments to qualify for
hedge accounting. Options and non linear contracts in particular often fail to meet requisite
hedge effectiveness tests and only qualify for hedge accounting to the extent that they have
changes in intrinsic value but not time value.
The famous derivatives loss incurred by Procter and Gamble provides a good case study of
sub optimal instrument selection. The management opted to use exotic interest rate swap
instruments, rather than option instruments, to hedge interest rate exposure. The rationale for
their choice was that option instruments had greater difficulty in qualifying for hedge
accounting (Gastineau et al, 2001). This case is also discussed in section 2.3.2 covering the
speculative use of derivatives.
SFAS 133 and earnings volatility
As described in the analysis of derivatives accounting rules (Trombley, 2003 and Park, 2004),
relative to the preceding period, the adoption of SFAS 133 is likely to increase earnings
volatility due to a) unqualified hedges b) interim hedge ineffectiveness and c) discontinued
hedges. I further elaborate on these below:
a) Unqualified hedges. The ineligibility for hedge accounting of certain derivatives
instruments used for risk management purposes results in unqualified hedges and
hedge accounting ineligible derivatives instruments. Therefore the general application
of fair value measurement for all derivatives causes earnings volatility when the
corresponding hedge (e.g. bond being held-to-maturity) is accounted for on a
historical cost basis. That is when there is an accounting mismatch between the hedge
and hedging instrument.
b) Interim hedge ineffectiveness of hedging instruments. Hedge ineffectiveness could
result in interim volatility of derivatives instruments used for risk management
purposes and accounted for on hedge accounting basis. Interim volatility could for
example arise due to
 Exclusion of the time value parameters for option instruments when determining
eligibility for hedge effectiveness. The value of an option consists of intrinsic
value plus a time value element while forward contract prices consist of spot
price plus a forward discount or premium. Companies can choose to exclude the
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time value component for either options or forward contracts, and most
companies do so in order to meet the hedge effectiveness tests. However, should
a derivatives be eligible for hedge accounting (i.e. gains and losses are recognised
on realisation or unwinding of the position), the excluded time value of either
options or forward contracts will nevertheless be recognised in the income
statement on a periodic basis and this will result in earnings volatility.
 Basis risk: This can occur when managers initiate hedges, where there is a
significant mismatch between the changes in value of the derivatives instrument
and the changes in value of the underlying exposure. Ineffective hedges also
arise due to application of cross-hedging strategies (i.e. the use of derivatives that
have an underlying commodity, currency or index that is different from the
hedged item). The hedge ineffectiveness could result from notional/principal
differences, for example a debt of $1million could be the underlying hedge for an
interest rate swap of $1.5million. Basis risk, in this example, could arise from
maturity or re-pricing date differences between the hedging instrument (i.e.
interest rate swap) and hedged exposure (i.e. debt). It could also arise from
creditworthiness differences, for example, a company may hedge a high yield
BB-rated debt using an A-rated derivatives (Hague, 2004). Finally they could
arise due to quantity, location or delivery differences for commodity exposures.
For example Brazilian coffee beans exposure hedged with an instrument based on
Colombian coffee prices (Hague, 2004).
 Valuation error: For example when derivatives are valued based on internal
models to determine fair value of derivatives. This could occur for complex,
illiquid derivatives instruments that are not exchange traded. Enron provides an
illustrative case study of the opportunistic application of fair value principles
when managers relied on internal models to determine derivatives fair values. It
could also happen for embedded derivatives.
c) Discontinued and de-designated hedges: Discontinued hedges occur when a
derivatives instrument is designated as a cash flow hedge accounting but thereafter
the anticipated future transaction is terminated. In this situation the deferred gains or
losses are posted back to the income statement from the AOCI. De-designation of
derivatives is the revocation of hedge accounting eligibility during the holding period.
It can occur when a derivatives is found to be ineffective, for example, if its value
falls outside the 80 to 125% permissible range of hedge effectiveness, compared to
the hedge, then a reversal of derivatives gains and losses that had been recorded in the
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other comprehensive income statement needs to occur. This process is described as
recycling of hedge accounting and tends to mainly apply to cash flow hedges. The
problem with recycled hedge accounting adjustments, is that they effectively
represent gains and losses relating to earlier reporting periods, and hence their
inclusion can be create unforeseen and significant fluctuations in reported earning
numbers.
The incremental earnings volatility due to SFAS 133 can in turn influence managerial
incentives to smooth earnings using alternative means such as accruals, especially as
managers tend to be averse to earnings volatility and prefer reporting smooth earnings trends
(Graham et al, 2005).
Empirical evidence on the impact of SFAS 133 on earnings volatility
There is mixed empirical evidence on how SFAS 133 influences earnings volatility. Richie,
Glegg and Gleason (2005) conducted a study on whether hedging (with derivatives and with
operations hedges) would affect earnings volatility after implementing SFAS 133. They found
that SFAS 133 does increase earnings volatility. Li and Stammerjoan (2004) find similar
supporting evidence.
However, Zhang (2009) and Park (2004) find that earnings volatility remains unchanged after
SFAS 133. In addition, Li and Stammerjoan (2004) note the limitation of evidence pointing to
the increase in earnings volatility due to SFAS 133. They point out that earning volatility
changes could be attributed to factors other than this specific accounting standard, such as the
prevailing volatile macroeconomic environment.
See Table 2.3 for further details of empirical studies
2.7 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT: SFAS 133 AND INCOME
SMOOTHING
Synthesizing the different strands of literature on derivatives use, earnings management and
SFAS 133 effects, I review the impact of SFAS 133 on derivatives and discretionary accrual
use.
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2.7.1 Impact of SFAS 133 on derivatives use
As described in earlier sections 2.6.3.4, SFAS 133 imposes significant compliance costs and
is likely to induce incremental earnings volatility. The question arises whether this then has an
impact on derivatives use. There are different and inconclusive perspectives put forward in
the literature on the impact of SFAS 133 on derivatives use for either speculative or risk
management purposes, as discussed below.
SFAS 133 and derivatives use
Barnes (2002) argues that earnings volatility that arises from derivatives accounting can lead
to managers choosing not to hedge. Firms with hedgeable projects could avoid hedging as a
means of differentiating themselves from speculative derivatives users. The thrust of Barnes
(2002) reasoning is that artificial volatility due to accounting is misleading to investors due to
the information asymmetry that exists between shareholders and managers in relation to the
projects that are hedgeable or not within the firm. Due to this information asymmetry, an
adverse selection problem arises as investors are unable to distinguish between firms that are
using derivatives for hedging from those that are using derivatives speculatively.
As a result investors will pool all firms that use derivatives and price the risk of the average
volatility of hedging and speculating firms. Thus they will end up pricing non-existent risks
for firms that are actually hedging and under-pricing the risk of firms that are using
derivatives for speculative purposes. With the anticipation that investors are pooling together
speculative and risk management derivatives and consequently over-pricing the risk of and
undervaluing hedging firms, managers with hedgeable projects may opt not to hedge as a
signal, so as to differentiate themselves from speculative derivatives users. On the other hand
speculators, will aim to opportunistically capitalise on the lower price of risk (i.e. the pooled
price of risk is lower than warranted by the risk of speculative firms), which will lead to
morally hazardous behaviour because speculative firms will tend to use derivatives more
extensively despite not having hedgeable projects.
Following Barnes reasoning, Shin (2004), using a formal model demonstrates that managers
aim to minimise interim volatility (i.e. earnings volatility prior to termination of a derivatives
contract) as opposed to terminal volatility (earnings volatility at point of termination of a
derivatives contract). Cash flow hedge accounting is the most effective way of minimising
interim volatility when compared to full fair value accounting. This is because it results in the
deferral of gains and losses. Hence, if compelled to use fair value accounting, firms that
already have a derivatives program and aim to minimise interim volatility will likely reduce
the use of derivatives. Nan (2007) comes to the same conclusion that prudent risk
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management activities will decline due to SFAS 133. However, Nan’s (2007) analytical
models also show that hedge accounting qualification restriction will likely result in higher
levels of speculative derivatives use.
Duffie and DeMarzo (1995), using analytical models, assess the impact of derivatives
accounting on derivatives use, based on managerial risk aversion. They argue that managers
are concerned with the accounting consequences of their hedging decisions and these
consequences influence their choice of hedging instrument and whether they hedge at all. The
use of hedging derivatives accompanied by the recognition in the income statement, through
fair value accounting, will introduce interim earnings volatility that will be undesirable to
managers who are risk averse. Hence, the interaction of SFAS 133 managers hedging decision
may end up being dictated by the underlying managerial risk aversion.
In contrast to Barnes (2002) and Shin (2004), Pirchegger’s (2006) analytical model is
premised on interim volatility being desirable. The author argues that fair value accounting as
required by SFAS 133, simply results in multi-period volatility because the derivatives
valuation is adjusted in one period while the underlying exposure valuation is adjusted in
another period. The analytical model proves that the period to period disclosure of volatility is
optimal for investor perception of risk as it is effectively a risk sharing process (smaller
chunks of volatility across different time periods) and is desirable from the shareholder
perspective as opposed to concentrating the volatility to the period in which the exposure and
hedging instruments unwind.
Empirical evidence on SFAS 133 and derivatives use
In addition to the conflicting findings in the literature on the impact of SFAS 133 on hedging
and speculative use of derivatives, there is a scarcity of empirical evidence on the impact of
SFAS 133 on the use of derivatives in general and risk management in particular.
The investigation of effects of SFAS 133 on either speculative or risk management purposes,
is constrained by the difficulties in differentiating between speculative and prudent risk
management application of derivatives. Derivatives accounting under SFAS 133 did not result
in a sufficiently accurate differentiation of these activities. SFAS 133 requires separate
classification of derivatives used for trading purposes and these can be assumed to represent
speculative use of derivatives. However, at an aggregate level, it remains very difficult to
identify the difference in speculative and risk management use of derivatives. The difficulties
arise due to the poor and inconsistent disclosure on the level of derivatives that qualify for
hedge accounting. These difficulties are compounded by the onerous qualification
requirements that results in the exclusion of some risk management instruments (e.g. non
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linear contracts) from hedge accounting (i.e. unqualified hedges). Hence, unqualified hedges
may erroneously be classified as speculative instruments. The sub standard disclosure and
likelihood of misclassifying unqualified hedges has contributed to the paucity of empirical
evidence on the impact of SFAS 133 on hedging derivatives.
Nevertheless, there are a few empirical papers investigating the impact of SFAS 133 on risk
management choices, speculative choice and risk exposure of derivatives user firms. Similar
to the theoretical papers there is no unanimity of these findings. Lins, Servaes and Tamayo
(2007) provide international survey evidence, where they report mixed results finding that
only 40% of derivatives users indicated that SFAS 133 or IAS 39 (the international
equivalent) had influenced their choice of derivatives use. They find that managers reduced
speculative derivatives use after the introduction of the new accounting standards. They also
find that the introduction of SFAS 133 negatively affects the risk management practices and
that the adoption of SFAS 133 leads to suboptimal hedging.
See Table 2.3 (for details of empirical studies)
Li and Stammerjoan (2004), studying firms that used derivatives 1996 and 2002, find that
derivatives use did not change after the adoption of SFAS 133 and they contend that a
plausible explanation could be that the anticipated benefits of derivatives use outweigh the
concerns about incremental volatility. However, Zhang (2009) studying the impact of SFAS
133 on speculative and risk management derivatives, finds evidence of reduced hedging
derivatives use. She postulates that the impact of SFAS 133 will differ depending on whether
a firm is engaging in derivatives use for speculative purposes or using derivatives for risk
management purposes. She expected SFAS 133 to have a major impact on ineffective
hedgers, as it will result in escalation of earnings volatility compared to the pre-SFAS 133
treatment. In the variable specification, Zhang (2009) identifies speculators versus hedgers
based on the retrospective impact on exposure, measured by sensitivity of stock price returns
to changes in currency exchange rate, interest rate and commodity price movements. She
identifies effective risk managers as those firms whose exposure to the commodity, currency
and interest rate risk factors decreased after the introduction of derivatives program. In
contrast, speculative firms are those whose risk factor exposure increased after the
introduction of derivatives program. She finds that SFAS 133 has discouraged firms’
speculative use of derivatives instruments but has not affected hedging choices. However, the
interpretation of these findings could be potentially limited due to the proxies applied for
speculator (ineffective hedgers) versus hedging firms. Increased exposure after the application
of derivatives program could simply be due to new un-hedged exposure. The implied
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assumption that intention of derivatives use (speculative or hedging) at inception will remain
the same throughout subsequent periods may not hold. The evidence provided by Zhang
(2009) is indirect empirical evidence of the effects of SFAS 133. However, unlike Lins et al
(2007), Zhang (2009) and Singh (2004) find that derivatives use for risk management is not
affected by the introduction of SFAS 133.
As stated earlier the literature on the impact of SFAS 133 is inconclusive, and this could be
because the stream of research is in embryonic stage and for most of extant studies, there are
insufficient data points. For example, the analytical period of Singh (2004) is 2 years (2000-
2001) and this was the transitional period in the adoption of SFAS 133 and hence there could
be question marks on the adequacy of the coverage period. Nevertheless, based on the
analytical arguments of risk pooling and it being desirable for managers to minimise the
interim volatility of earnings, I postulate that SFAS 133 will lead to reduced derivatives use
for risk management purposes.
Hypothesis 2.1
The adoption of SFAS 133 leads to reduced derivatives use for risk management
2.7.2 SFAS 133 and discretionary accruals
After the adoption of SFAS 133, there are several factors that could trigger the increased use
of accruals. Managers could use discretionary accruals for the following reasons:
 To smooth earnings and offset the incremental earnings volatility that arises due to
derivatives accounting as discussed in section 2.6.3.4;
 To capitalise on cash flow hedge accounting requirements;
 As a complement to the speculative use of derivatives.
I discuss the latter two points below
2.7.2.1 Cash flow hedge accounting and discretionary accruals
As discussed in section 2.6.3.2, cash flow hedge accounting effectively results in the deferral
of derivatives gains or losses and thus should lower the incentive to use discretionary accruals
so as to smooth earnings. However, as shown in section 2.4.3.2 of earnings management
literature review, managerial opportunism can also influence earnings management choices.
SFAS 133 provides one such opportunity through the cash flow hedge accounting
requirements. For example, although ineligible, managers could elect to apply cash flow
hedge accounting towards derivatives held. The financial press (Wall Street Journal- 2006)
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highlighted the accounting restatements that Fannie Mae, the US Government Backed
Mortgage Backed Securitisation Agency, made in relation to the inappropriate application and
subsequent reversal of cash flow hedge accounting. Other examples of the opportunistic use
of cash flow hedge accounting are shown in:
 A Bloomberg article36 cites the case of Freddie Mac applying cash flow hedge
accounting for the derivatives used to hedge its own debt. In the process, there was
the deferral of gains and losses for periods of up to 26 years.
 Flawed anticipation of hedge effectiveness: The rules of Statement 133 require the
forecast of AOCI adjustments for the next 12 months. Results of the Hamlen and
Largay (2005) study on the application of Statement 133 by Dow Jones constituent
companies showed that there is significant, average forecast error (63%) in the AOCI
adjustment, where the forecast error is measured as between anticipated and actual
AOCI adjustment. The evidence of significant forecast error shows that managerial
anticipation of hedge effectiveness is often inaccurate
Furthermore, Zhou (2009) provides empirical evidence showing that cash flow hedge
accounting leads to opportunistic accruals. The author finds that when reported income is
adjusted37 for cash flow hedge accounting deferrals, a significant number of reported earnings
increases turn into decreases. However, there is no corresponding significant evidence of
reported earnings decreases turning into increases. He interprets this as being indicative of
unidirectional and opportunistic earnings management.
In effect, opportunistic use of cash flow hedge accounting, leads to increased accruals. On the
other hand, its genuine application should lead to reduced accruals due to reduced earnings
volatility. Hence, while cash flow hedge accounting will likely influence discretionary
accruals the overall impact is indeterminate. The difficulty in determining the impact of
direction is compounded by the empirical difficulty of identifying whether cash flow hedge
accounting eligibility and application is genuine or not.
2.7.2.2 Increase in speculative derivatives use and complementary use of derivatives
Another factor that could trigger an increase in both earnings volatility and discretionary
accruals after SFAS 133 could be the increased use of derivatives for speculative purposes as
postulated in the analytical model by Barnes (2002). Barnes asserts that managers are likely
to capitalise on the difficulties that outsiders to the firm have in differentiating between
36
Bloomberg article by Jonathan Weil dated December 5, 2007.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&refer=columnist_weil&sid=ahoxGPj68WN0
37 Cash flow hedge accounting deferrals are recognised in current period income
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speculating and hedging firms, by increasing the speculative use of derivatives (see discussion
in section 2.7.1). Pre-SFAS 133, the impact of this would be off the income statement and
balance sheet but in the post-SFAS 133 periods any associated gains or losses will be
reflected in the income statement. To offset the incremental volatility due to speculative use
of derivatives, managers will likely increase the use of discretionary accruals. However, as
discussed earlier there is no conclusive evidence that SFAS 133 increases speculative
derivatives use and this is due to data quality it is difficult to identify for empirical purposes,
the proportion of derivatives that are used for speculative purposes.
In sum, based on the combination of increased SFAS 133 associated earnings volatility, and
possibly increased usage of discretionary accruals as a complement to speculative derivatives
use after SFAS 133, I postulate that all things being equal, an increase in discretionary
accruals is likely to occur after the adoption of SFAS 133. Hence, from the above discussion
the following hypotheses are yielded.
Hypothesis 2.2
a) The adoption of SFAS 133 leads to an overall increase in discretionary accruals.
b) The use of cash flow hedge accounting influences the level of discretionary
accruals.
2.7.3 SFAS 133 and the substitution relationship between discretionary accruals
and derivatives use
As discussed extensively in sections 2.5.1, 2.5.2 and 2.5.3, derivatives and discretionary
accruals are substitutes for the purpose of income smoothing. However, this substitution
relationship could be negated if the objective is to reduce cash flow volatility, when
derivatives are used speculatively and when the goal is directional earnings management. For
these reasons they could be partial substitutes in a manner that is consistent with the findings38
of Singh (2004) and Rajgopal and Pincus (2002).
At the same time, the review of derivatives accounting literature in 2.6.3.4 shows that the
adoption of SFAS 133, likely increases earnings volatility and this potentially offsets the
benefits of derivatives use as a means of smoothing income. This could in turn, either lower
38 These authors find that derivatives influence discretionary accruals but not the other way round.
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the use of derivatives, or result in the choice of sub-optimal derivatives instruments (i.e.
ineffective hedging instruments).
In parallel, the adoption of SFAS 133 could increase the incentive to use discretionary
accruals for income smoothing, as it is no longer as attractive to use derivatives. In other
words, the adoption of SFAS 133 is likely to influence the extent to which accruals are a
determinant of derivatives use. Based on this reasoning, I would expect a stronger negative
association after SFAS 133 adoption, when accruals are the explanatory variables for
derivatives use. However, according to Hypothesis 2.2, I expect accruals to also potentially
offset other SFAS 133 adoption impacts; namely either the greater use of derivatives for
speculative purposes or the incremental earnings volatility due to SFAS 133’s features. These
other factors could confound the income smoothing substitution relationship and make the
expected direction of the relationship between accruals and derivatives use, to be
indeterminate. These confounding effects also pose an empirical challenge of meaningfully
identifying and interpreting what any observed increase in accruals represents.
Hypothesis 2.3
a) Derivatives and discretionary accruals are substitutes for income smoothing
purposes
b) The adoption of SFAS 133 influences the substitution relationship
- 91 -
Table 2.3: Summary of empirical literature on SFAS 133 and related studies`
Author/s Key research question/s and hypotheses Method and findings
Barton (2001) Does the use of financial derivatives affect the
earnings management decisions?
Hypothesis
Derivatives and discretionary accruals will be
negatively associated, conditional on managers’ desire
to maintain a desired level of earnings volatility
Methods
Two stage least square simultaneous equations due to the
assumed endogeneity of hedging and accrual management
Discretionary accruals are based of modified Jones (1991) and
derivatives use is measured based on the notional amount
Sample
1994-1996 data from Fortune 500 firms
Key Findings
Derivatives and discretionary accruals are substitutes
Comment
This study was a pioneering study in many respects as it
synthesized the analysis of the joint impact of derivatives use
and earnings management. However, it is based on the pre-
SFAS 133 period and the author identifies the research gap
existing with post-SFAS 133 data
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Rajgopal and Pincus (2001) The Interaction between Accrual Management and
Hedging: evidence from Oil and Gas Firms
Study investigates whether oil and gas producing firms
use abnormal accruals and hedging with derivatives as
substitutes to manage earnings volatility.
Hypothesis: Ceteris paribus, managers of oil and gas
firms use hedging with derivatives and smoothing with
abnormal accruals as substitute mechanisms at the
margin to manage earnings volatility induced by oil
and exploration risk
Empirical Method
-Similar to Barton (2001) Uses two stage least square treating
income smoothing and derivatives as endogenous variables
-Based on 1993-1996 oil and gas firms
Key findings
-Study finds that there is a sequential process whereby
managers of oil and gas producing firms first determine the
extent to which they will use derivatives to hedge oil price risk,
and then manage residual earnings volatility by trading off
abnormal accruals and hedging with derivatives to smooth
income
Comments
-It may be difficult to generalise findings due to the focus on a
single sector. However as Adam and Fernando (2006) observe,
studying a single sector has the merits of enabling a more
precise measurement of the risk exposures
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Li and Stammerjoan (2004) Empirical analysis of Effects of SFAS 133 on
Derivatives use and Earnings Smoothing
HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, the number of firms that
use derivatives declined after the implementation of
SFAS 133
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, cash flow volatility
increased for derivatives users after the
implementation of SFAS 133
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris Paribus, earnings volatility
increased for derivatives users after the introduction of
SFAS 133
Empirical Methodology
 Univariate statistics- Difference of means before and after
the implementation of SFAS 133
 Coefficient of variation of quarterly earnings per share
Sample:
1997-2002 data
Key Findings
 Derivatives use did not significantly decline following the
implementation of SFAS 133
 Derivatives users’ cash flow volatility did not increase
after SFAS 133 was introduced
Derivatives users earnings volatility increased but this could be
potentially attributed to factors other than the introduction of
SFAS 133
Comment
In contrast to Singh (2004) but similar to Zhang (2009), the
study has the merit of being based on larger pre and post-SFAS
133 sample. However, unlike the mentioned authors, the
empirical work is restricted to univariate study
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Singh (2004) The effects of SFAS 133 on the corporate use of
derivatives, volatility and earnings management
HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 1: Derivatives users are less likely to use
derivatives in the period after implementation of SFAS
133
Hypothesis 2: Derivatives users have higher
smoothing and have higher volatility of cash flows and
earnings than non users before and after the
implementation of SFAS 133
Hypothesis 3: Derivatives users that do not qualify for
hedge accounting treatment have higher levels of
hedging with respect to smoothing and to volatility of
cash flows and earnings than other derivatives users
before and after the implementation of SFAS 133
Empirical Methodology
Using dummy variables and interaction terms to proxy for
SFAS 133, the differences in coefficients after the
implementation of SFAS 133 are compared to the coefficients
in the period before implementation for derivatives users and a
control group of non users and also within groups of
derivatives users.
Sample:
2000-2001 non -financial Fortune 500 companies. 305 firms
Key Findings
-There is no significant change in the use of derivatives after
SFAS 133
-There are no significant differences in earnings volatility, cash
flow volatility and income smoothing between derivatives
users and non users before and after the implementation of
SFAS 133
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Singh (2004) continued Hypothesis 4; Derivatives users that report a transition
adjustment have higher levels of hedging with respect
to smoothing and to volatility of cash flows and
earnings than other derivatives users before and after
implementation of SFAS 133
Hypothesis 5: Derivatives users that terminated
derivatives have higher levels of hedging with respect
to smoothing and to volatility of cash flows and
earnings than other derivatives users before and after
implementation of SFAS 133
Evidence of partial substitution of hedging with derivatives
and income smoothing. Hedging is a determinant of income
smoothing but income smoothing is not a determinant of
hedging
Within groups of derivatives users, there is some evidence that
firms reporting a transition adjustment or termination of
derivatives, may have smoothed income to reduce volatility
Comments
This study is focused on a short time window. It is focused on
the transition period and there is likely a need for longer time
horizon studies
Zhang (2009) Effect of Derivatives Accounting Rules on Corporate
Risk Management Behaviour
Hypotheses
Author hypothesizes that effect of SFAS 133 is
conditional on hedge effectiveness from an accounting
standpoint.
Empirical approach
-Differentiates between speculative and hedging firms based
on the changes in risk exposure after the introduction of
derivatives program as inferred by Zhang (2009)
-Risk exposure is measured as sensitivity of monthly stock
market returns to changes in key risk factors (e.g. exchange
rate, interest rate)
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Zhang (2009) continued Hypothesis 1a (null): Ceteris paribus, risk exposures in
relation to interest rate, foreign exchange rate and
commodity price do not change for speculative firms
after the adoption of SFAS 133
Sample
1995-2001
Key Findings
-Risk exposures decrease significantly for speculative firms
after the adoption of SFAS 133 but not for effective hedgers
-Cash flow volatility of speculative firms has a significant
decreases after the adoption of SFAS 133
-Earnings volatility remains unchanged
-Combined evidence points to SFAS 133 encouraging firms to
engage in prudent risk management activities
Comments
-Risk exposure is unobservable and the applied proxy may
result in classification error where firms are wrongly labelled
as either hedgers or speculators
-The approach is premised on a static categorisation of
speculators and effective hedgers. Does not capture the
possibility that the purpose of derivatives use could change
after initiation of derivatives program
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- Approach may derive systematic and firm specific risk
exposures and thus there is a likelihood of combining
hedgeable and unhedgeable risk exposures
Park (2004) Economic consequences and financial statement
effects of SFAS 133 on bank holding companies
-Market reactions to related SFAS 133 adoption
announcements. The focus was on events that
increased the likelihood of SFAS 133 adoption
-Impact of SFAS 133 on earnings volatility, earnings
predictability and equity volatility39 after the adoption
of SFAS 133
Sample
69 Bank Holding companies
Sample period (1999-2003)
Key Findings
SFAS 133 did not increase earnings volatility and cash flow
hedges did not increase equity volatility.
There were negative stock market reactions around the date
that FASB announced its plans for new accounting rules for
derivatives and the date that the exposure draft for the new
standard was released.
Supanvanij and Strauss
(2006)
The effects of management compensation on firm
hedging and whether SFAS 133 matters
o What is the relationship between executive
compensation and hedging and is it affected by
Method
1994-2000 data (198 firms)
OLS and fixed effect regressions
Key findings
SFAS 133 magnifies the agency conflict i.e. the negative
39
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SFAS 133
o Has SFAS 133 altered the hedging decision by
more properly aligning firm performance and
management compensation
relationship between hedging and management compensation
SFAS 133 increases the use of derivatives when compensation
is in the form of stocks
Richie, Gleason and (2006) The effects of SFAS 133 on foreign currency exposure
of US based multinational corporations
Did SFAS 133 affect earnings volatility and hedging
strategies of exporting firms?
Sample
US multinationals with foreign currency exposure in Europe
with data from 1996 to 2002
Key Findings
Firms that used derivatives prior to SFAS 133 experienced an
increase in earnings volatility
Huang, Zhang, Deis and
Moffitt (2009)
Does artificial income smoothing and real income
smoothing (through derivatives use) contribute to firm
value equivalently?
Hypotheses
H1: The value of the firm is decreasing in the
magnitude of abnormal accruals and increasing in the
Empirical Methodology
Multivariate studies: Two stage least square regression with
Tobin q as the proxy for firm value
Sample:
1992-1996 non US listed financial firms. 477 firms with 1105
firm-year observations
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Huang, Zhang, Deis and
Moffitt (2009)-continued
magnitude of derivatives use.
H2: The value erosions from abnormal accruals are
more pronounced in weakly governed firms and gains
derived from derivatives use are greater for firms with
poor governance mechanisms
H3: The magnitude of abnormal accruals is increasing
in poor corporate governance whereas the magnitude
of derivatives use is decreasing in poor governance
structures.
Key Findings
-Discretionary accruals are used in opportunistic fashion and
mainly in firms with poor investor protection. Thus
discretionary accruals do not increase firm value. On the other
hand, derivatives use positively contributes to firm value
Comment
Study has insights on the differential impacts of different
earning smoothing mechanisms. It is based on pre-SFAS 133
data and there is an opportunity to extend similar studies to the
post-SFAS 133 period
Ahmed, Kilic and Lobo
(2006)
Does Recognition versus Disclosure Matter? Evidence
from value relevance of US Banks recognised and
disclosed derivatives financial instruments
Method
Assessment in changes and levels of market value and
independent variables including disclosed and recognised fair
values.
Run regressions on two separate samples. 146 banks with
1995-2000 data is the pre-SFAS 133 sample, while 82 banks
with 2001-2004 is the post-SFAS 133 data.
Result
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Ahmed, Kilic and Lobo
(2006)-continued
Provides evidence that recognition of fair values under SFAS
133 is value relevant, while the disclosure through the notes of
the fair value is not. This is based on there being a statistically
significant and positive coefficient in the recognised amounts.
Lins, Servaes and Tamayo
(2007)
Does Derivatives Accounting Affect Risk
Management? International Survey Evidence
New derivatives accounting standards have
conditional impact on hedging behaviour of firms
-Firms that are more likely to write contracts based on
accounting numbers (e.g. bonuses, covenants)
-Firms for which stabilising earnings is an important
benefit of risk management
-Firms with low institutional ownership
-Firms that take active positions in speculative
derivatives
Method
-Global survey incorporating impact of SFAS 133 and IAS 39
-Sample of 354 worldwide firms
Key Findings
 Mixed evidence on impact of accounting standards
on risk management.
 More than 40% of respondents indicated that their
risk management activities have been affected and
that they curtailed risk management activities due
to concerns about eligibility for hedge accounting
Limitations
 Bears limitation of survey evidence including
construct validity, self selection bias and low
response rate (i.e. 9%)
- 101 -
Zhou (2009) Does Fair Value Accounting for Derivatives Improve
Earnings Quality
Study investigates the income statement effects of
SFAS 133 by examining
a) whether SFAS 133 improves the information
content of accounting earnings and b) whether the
differential accounting treatment of different
categories of hedging activities under SFAS 133
induces opportunistic earnings management behaviour
Methods
Study is based on a sample of bank holding companies during
the period from 1995 through 2005.
Findings
-SFAS 133 through fair value recognition results in more
informative earnings
-Cash flow hedge accounting, through its deferral
requirements, is applied opportunistically to avoid earnings
decreases.
Comments
-Extends the work of Ahmed, Kilic and Lobo (2006) by
providing evidence on the information of SFAS 133 income
statement effects
-The first study I am aware of with empirical evidence of cash
flow hedge accounting and earnings management
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2.8 CHAPTER CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITY
This chapter has conveyed that there is an emergent stream of empirical studies related to the
adoption of SFAS 133. The issues covered include:
 Impact on risk management choices (Singh, 2004; Richie et al, 2006; Li and
Stammerjoan, 2004; and Zhang, 2009);
 Effect of compensation (Supanvanij et al, 2006);
 Impact on earnings and cash flow volatility (Li and Stammerjoan, 2004; Richie et al,
2006; Park,2004); and
 Inter-changeability of derivatives use and accruals (Barton, 2001; Rajgopal and
Pincus, 2002 and Huang et al, 2009).
These empirical studies are complementary to several analytical studies (Barnes, 2002; Nan,
2007; Shin, 2004; and Duffie and DeMarzo, 1996) postulating on the impact of SFAS 133 on
hedging strategies. There is scope to extend the empirical evidence related to SFAS 133 and
risk management choices on various fronts. First, there is scope to build on the very few risk
management empirical studies that are based on post-SFAS 133 data. Thus it is useful to
extend studies on the determinants of derivatives use.
Second, there is an opportunity for a methodological refinement of the proxies used to
measure primary variables such as discretionary accruals. There is also scope to include
variables omitted from similar research. For example, I include a variable for real earnings
management based on abnormal investments. I also factor in the conditional impact of SFAS
133 cash flow hedge accounting requirements on discretionary accruals.
Third, while there is empirical evidence relating to the joint choice to smooth earnings using
derivatives and accruals, there is an unresolved question of whether the adoption of SFAS 133
changes the extent to which derivatives and risk management are used interchangeably. In
other words how does SFAS 133 alter the empirical findings of Barton (2001)? Finally there
is an unaddressed research opportunity relating to the interaction of SFAS 133 recognition
and measurement requirements and derivatives related footnote disclosure. As observed
across several empirical papers and during the data analysis in this study, the quality of
reported data is such that it is still difficult to consistently distinguish between hedgers and
speculators. The impact of SFAS 133 on and the determinants of derivatives related
disclosure is the second key question of this thesis. Chapter 3 provides the theoretical
framework for this second question.
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PART 1- THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:
DERIVATIVES RELATED DISCLOSURE
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3 SFAS 133 AND DERIVATIVES DISCLOSURE
3.1 Introduction
The unifying theme of this thesis is the evaluation of how SFAS 133 influences key
managerial financial reporting choices such as the decision to a) smooth observable earnings
and b) to disclose information related to derivatives use. The common denominator is that
both these factors can influence the perceived riskiness of reporting firms. Chapter 2 develops
the theoretical framework and hypotheses in relation to the impact of SFAS 133 and earnings
smoothing. However, the empirical investigation of SFAS 133 on derivatives disclosure is
minimal and this gives rise to an opportunity for research opportunity. Specifically regarding
the following closely related research questions
 ‘Does SFAS 133 adoption increase the level of derivatives related footnote
disclosure’?
 ‘What is the interaction between SFAS 133 and the incentives to disclose derivatives
related information through financial footnotes?
Below is the development of the theoretical framework and proposed hypothesis to test these
questions. The chapter is structured as follows:
 Description of footnote disclosure requirements;
 Framework of SFAS 133 and footnote disclosure;
 Incentives influencing footnote disclosure of derivatives information.
3.2 Derivatives related footnote disclosure
As described in section 2.6.1, prior to the promulgation of SFAS 133, derivatives disclosure
requirements were determined by different standards including SFAS 52, 80, 105, 107 and
119. SFAS 133 primarily focuses on recognition and measurement requirements and provides
very limited additional guidance on disclosure requirements. It only requires some addition
disclosures related to the application of hedge accounting.
SEC risk disclosure requirements
In addition to the standards promulgated by FASB, at various junctures, the SEC recommends
additional disclosures. SEC proposals tend to arise due to perceived inadequacies of
prevailing disclosure practices. For example there were concerns about SFAS 119. SFAS 119
mandated the disclosure of notional amounts of derivatives instruments. The notional amount
of derivatives is useful information as it can convey to users information about the underlying
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risk exposure. However, the SEC noted that such information was often a) abbreviated b)
dispersed across different parts of the financial statements and c) does not apply to all market
risk sensitive instruments. This made it difficult for investors to assess how financial
instruments such as derivatives affected overall risk exposure. Companies are likely to be
responsive to SEC disclosure proposals because the SEC has powers to enforce the quality of
financial reporting.
In response to the mentioned inadequacies, the SEC issued Financial Reporting Release No
48 (FRR 48) that mandated the disclosure of forward looking, quantitative market risk
disclosures for derivatives and other financial instruments. FRR 48 requires disclosure based
on market risk category (e.g. interest rate, foreign currency and commodity price risk) using
any of the three following formats
 Sensitivity analysis describing the effect on earnings, cash flow or fair value from
selected, hypothetical changes in underlying market prices
 Value at Risk (VAR) expressing the probability of potential loss on earnings, cash
flows and fair values from underlying market changes. In addition to risk disclosure,
VAR proffers various advantages. VAR measurement improves the governance of
derivatives as it necessitates a systematic process of risk measurement. For financial
institutions VAR measurement tends to lower the capital charge (Jorion, 2002)
 Tabular presentation of fair values and contract terms sufficient to determine market
risk sensitive instruments’ future cash flow amounts by expected maturity dates.
SEC requirements in combination with US GAAP specification consist of the prescribed
footnote disclosure requirements. In the empirical testing, I construct a disclosure index that
measures compliance with key elements of the prescribed disclosure requirements.
3.3 SFAS 133 and footnote disclosure
What is the impact of SFAS 133 on the disclosure of related derivatives information through
the footnotes? This is a question of interest as I am not aware of any study that evaluates how
derivatives recognition and measurement requirements influence supporting disclosure. There
are several empirical studies that have addressed the determinants of derivatives disclosure
but they have not done so in the context of recognition and measurement requirements. For
example, Aggarwal and Simkins (2004) focus on the determinants of currency derivatives
related disclosure during the period that firms were reporting under a predecessor standard
SFAS 107. As described in section 2.6.1, SFAS 107 required the disclosure of derivatives
fair values in the footnotes but it did not require the recognition and measurement of
- 106 -
derivatives through the balance sheet and income statements. Dunne, Helliar, Power, Mallin,
Ow-Young and Moir (2004) conduct a review of disclosures in the UK context under FRS 13.
However, FRS 13 did not have fair value recognition and measurement requirements.
Hamlen and Largay (2005) conduct a descriptive study analysing the derivatives disclosures
of Dow Jones constituent companies during the 2000-2001 periods (i.e. pre- and post-SFAS
133 disclosures). They show that the introduction of SFAS 133, leads to an aggregate
improvement of certain elements of disclosure, but concurrently it leads to the deterioration of
other elements. For example there is an improvement in the disclosure of the income effects
of ineffective and/or discontinued hedges and the disclosure of the net investment in foreign
operations. The influence of SFAS 133 on disclosure can be viewed from an analytical
framework of whether disclosure requirements are either a substitute or a complement to
recognition and measurement requirements.
3.3.1 Substitution effect
Footnote disclosure can be a substitute to recognition and measurement (Ahmed, Lobo and
Kilic, 2006). This is where it is viewed as no longer necessary to include information in the
income statement and balance sheet, when such information has been disclosed in the
footnotes. As discussed in section 2.6.3.4, financial statement preparers are likely to be
opposed40 to recognition and measurement requirements that result in increased earnings
volatility and therefore they are likely to prefer if any such information is only disclosed in
the footnotes.
Another aspect of the substitution mindset occurs when the inclusion of items on the balance
sheet and income statement induces the omission of other useful and related information
through the footnotes. For example, if a firm no longer provides notional derivatives amounts
simply because it has included the corresponding fair value on the main financial statements.
Or alternatively, when the provision of footnote disclosure provides the rationale for not
including items on the income statement and balance sheet (e.g. in the accounting of operating
leases and pension obligations prior to SFAS 87).
40 The opposition to recognition and measurement is evidenced by negative reaction of corporations to the promulgation of
recognition and measurement of Stock options and Pension obligations. Ndubizu, Choi and Rohit (1993) found that firms that
lobbied strongly against the Exposure Draft leading to SFAS no 87, Employers Accounting for Pensions, had higher earning
volatility than those that did not lobby against the standard.
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3.3.2 Complementary effect
When a recognition and measurement standard such as SFAS 133 is adopted with its
increased fair value application requirements and increased complexity, footnote disclosure
could be a complement. I argue that the anticipated increase in disclosure could, in part, be
based on the need to reduce the perceived riskiness of reporting firms due to users
misinterpreting derivatives accounting related earnings volatility.
As highlighted in the description of SFAS 133 in section 2.6.1, there are two distinctive
approaches applied to derivatives accounting, namely, hedge accounting and the full fair
value recognition and measurement. These can result in both increased implementation
complexity and artificial earnings volatility. The complex requirements can lead to the
perverse consequence of users misinterpreting the risk of reporting firms. This could in turn
negate the benefits of increased transparency through recognition and measurement of
derivatives instrument fair values (Gastineau, Smith and Todd, 2001). As described in section
2.6.3.4, derivatives accounting related artificial earnings volatility can arise due to:
 Unqualified hedges: hedging derivatives not eligible for hedge accounting being
confused to be speculative derivatives.
 Excluded valuation portions in hedge effectiveness tests: For example, the time value
portion of option contracts is not eligible for hedge accounting.
Other factors that can lead to misinterpretation of reported derivatives gains and losses are the
rules that allow their deferral and recycling. Income recycling rules (i.e. transfer between
income statement and other comprehensive income statement) can distort the economic
meaningfulness of observed derivatives gains and losses in the income statement. Kawaller
(2004) pinpoints that the hedge ineffectiveness that is observed by losses or gains passing
through the income statement related to hedge accounting could in fact be misleading as an
indicator of hedge effectiveness41. Gigler, Kanodia and Venugopalan (2007) affirm the
misinterpretation risk due to the application of multiple accounting treatments under SFAS
133. They assert that a mixed attribute measurement 42model can lead to distorted
interpretation of a firm’s performance at points of financial distress. Applying theoretical
models, they infer that outsiders can erroneously assume a firm to be in a better position than
they would have if the measurement was carried out purely on either a historical cost basis or
41 This is due to the asymmetrical recognition of gains and losses of the hedged item. For example, the cash flow hedge
accounting rules allow the recycling of under-hedges but they do not allow the same for over-hedges. Under hedge is partially
effective hedge, the derivatives only offsets part of the risk exposure
42 The mixed measurement applies to the hedge (i.e. risk exposure). Some are accounted for at amortised historical cost and
others at fair value.
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fair value basis. For example, this can occur due to disclosure deficiencies making it difficult
for firm outsiders to infer the overall risk exposures, the un-hedged risk exposures and
whether derivatives are used speculatively.
The misinterpretation risk due to a) mixed attribute accounting highlighted by Gigler et al
(2007) and b) the overall complexity of derivatives accounting can be mitigated by robust and
informative supplementary disclosures. Financial footnote disclosure can mitigate the
likelihood of user misinterpretation of accounting volatility by enabling users to piece
together balance sheet, income statement gains or losses and related derivatives information.
Hence it is expected that the secondary effect of SFAS 133 will be to incentivise managers to
disclose more information so as to avoid misinterpretation. As a corollary to Gigler et al
(2007), I hypothesize that footnote disclosure is likely to be seen by reporting firms, as a
complement to recognised derivatives values, gains and losses. This postulation is consistent
with Ryan’s (2007) view that a multi-faceted analysis by investors, focusing on fair values
and information disclosed through the notes such as sensitivity analysis, is necessary to fully
understand the underlying risks and prospects of reporting firms. Intuitively, information
regarding the income and balance sheet effects of derivatives coupled with other related
information such as notional amounts of derivatives contracts, should have higher information
content than reporting only derivatives fair values through the income statement and balance
sheet. For example, the observed income and balance sheet effect coupled with risk exposure
information and/or information on the level of hedge accounting applied will more likely
convey a total picture on overall hedge effectiveness.
I postulate that ceteris paribus, reporting of fair value gains and losses should influence the
demand for the enhancement of disclosure of related information by investors.
Correspondingly, this should lead to greater disclosures. In other words, I expect that
managers will consider the complementary nature of disclosure and this should outweigh their
inclination to treat it as a substitute to recognition and measurement.
Hypothesis 3.1
SFAS 133 leads to an increase in the level of disclosure of related derivatives
information provided by reporting managers.
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3.4 Disclosure incentives before and after SFAS 133
A study of disclosures by 57 companies, conducted by Fitch Ratings in 2004, finds
derivatives disclosures to be inconsistent and patchy. The mentioned inconsistencies in
disclosure quality motivate the need to understand the determinants of disclosure of
derivatives related information. Derivatives related footnote disclosure is a subset of overall
risk disclosure. Dobler (2008), in his review of risk disclosure literature, points to the fact that
incentives for risk reporting matter, even in the presence of mandatory regulation (e.g. GAAP
and SEC requirements). The forward looking and uncertain nature of risk information (e.g.
risk exposure) makes it easy for corporate managers to justify any inadequacies in risk related
disclosure and this makes the incentives to disclose risk related information particularly
important.
Observable risk disclosure levels can be anticipated by evaluating the cost versus the benefit
of the required disclosures. Indeed, using theoretical models, Grossman and Hart (1981) show
that if disclosure is costless and easily understood by outsiders, then there ought to be a full
supply of all the private information held by corporate managers. This is because full
disclosure is beneficial as it contributes to lower cost of external capital for firms by
potentially reducing uncertainty related to future firm performance, risk exposures and current
financial condition. Partial disclosure makes it more difficult for investors to accurately
distinguish between firms with good prospects from those with poor prospects and thus they
can end up systematically over-valuing poor firms and undervaluing good firms. This can
result in overall capital misallocation (Verrecchia, 2004). Given the potential benefits of full
disclosure, it would be expected that publicly listed organisations ought to have sufficient
incentive to fully disclose their financial information.
The empirical literature (Darus and Taylor, 2006; Aggarwal and Simkins, 2004; and Chalmers
and Godfrey, 2004) identifies key incentives that influence the disclosure of related
derivatives information. These include capital markets and proprietary cost incentives. A key
focus in the analysis of incentives in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 is on capital markets and
proprietary costs, as these factors can be influenced by SFAS 133. I also analyse managerial
reputation, compensation and litigation cost incentives in section 3.5.
3.4.1 Capital markets incentive to disclose related derivatives information through
footnotes under SFAS 133
Capital markets incentives to disclose information arise when managers believe that such
disclosure will influence the firm’s value. This view is based on the parallel arguments
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developed in relation to income smoothing in sections 2.4.3.1, in relation to information risk.
Management disclosure can reduce the information asymmetry existing between managers
and outsiders and also between sophisticated and less sophisticated investors. By reducing the
information gaps that exist between relatively informed and uninformed investors, disclosure
can improve the liquidity of a firm’s shares. In addition, an increased level of disclosure
reduces the cost of capital, as it lowers the information asymmetry between managers as
agents and shareholders as principals and therefore reduces the perceived risk of the firm and
correspondingly risk premium demanded by shareholders in their required return.
More specifically, risk disclosure can also help in the assessment of the risk profile,
estimation of market value and accuracy of security price forecasts (Helliar and Dunne, 2004
and Linsley and Shrieves, 2001). By reducing information asymmetry and estimation risk,
risk reporting may decrease the firm’s risk premium and decrease the firm’s cost of capital
(e.g. Linsley and Shrives, 2000). The required risk premium can be altered by the
information content of a) recognised derivatives fair value and b) related derivatives
disclosure.
3.4.1.1 Utility and information content of recognised and disclosed correlated
derivatives information
I infer the information content of balance sheet, income statement and footnotes information,
based on value relevance studies. Value relevance empirical studies ascertain whether there is
an association between the information being tested and the stock price. They are often
applied as a means of inferring the usefulness of financial reporting information. Despite their
widespread application, there are possible limitations to the value relevance approach. For
example, even if a study does not provide value relevance evidence, it does not necessarily
mean that disclosed information cannot be useful. The usefulness of disclosure information
could simply be a function of the level of sophistication of users (Hooder, Koonce and
McAnally, 2000). Users may simply not be paying sufficient attention to analytical
significance of disclosed data. As Ahmed et al (2006) note investors may face incremental
processing costs and/or cognitive processing challenges in relation to footnote information.
Nevertheless, despite the mentioned limitation, value relevance studies provide a useful
pointer of the benefit and the likely demand by capital markets participants of particular
information sets.
3.4.1.2 Information content of recognised derivatives fair value
Ahmed et al (2006) provided evidence on the value relevance of SFAS 133. Their study
assessed the differential impacts of balance sheet and income statement disclosure of
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derivatives fair values versus footnote disclosure of derivatives fair values, on firm value. The
study provides empirical evidence, showing that balance sheet and income statement
disclosure of fair values has a greater impact on firm value when compared to note disclosure
of derivatives fair value. The findings of Ahmed et al (2006) suggest that balance sheet and
income statements disclosures of derivatives fair value impact on stock price, while footnote
disclosure does not. At first glance, the findings of Ahmed et al (2006) implies that capital
markets incentives are unlikely to influence the fair value disclosure and therefore such
disclosure in the footnotes does not matter both before and after the introduction of SFAS
133. However, their study focused only on the value relevance of fair values located in notes
and not of other derivatives information e.g. notional amounts or sensitivity analysis
information. Besides there are other studies (Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 1996;
Venkatachalam, 1996) that conflict with the findings of Ahmed et al (2006) on fair value
footnote disclosure. These studies find fair values of financial instruments disclosed in the
notes to be value relevant, hence one cannot conclude that information through the notes has
no information content for capital markets participants. The key takeaway from Ahmed et al
(2006) is that having derivatives information on the balance sheet and income statement
conveyed information to capital markets participants to a greater extent than having the same
information in the footnotes.
3.4.1.3 Information content of related derivatives information
Capital markets incentives also apply to the disclosure of derivatives related information.
Related derivatives information includes the notional derivatives amount, derivatives contract
maturity and linearity, a sensitivity analysis measure such as value at risk (VAR), an
identification of the sources of risk exposure, percentage of hedged exposure and level of
instruments designated for hedge accounting treatment. Disclosure of this information should
have information content for capital markets participants.
There is supporting empirical evidence on the information content of several of these
identified components of risk disclosure. Wong (2000) finds that quantitative disclosures
about notional amounts of foreign currency derivatives are associated with the information
used by equity investors to assess risk exposures. Similarly, Venkatachalam (1996) finds there
to be a significant association between the disclosure of notional derivatives amounts and the
observed stock price. Linsmeier, Thornton, Venkatachalam and Welker (2002) provide
evidence of the information content of FRR48 market risk disclosures. They hypothesize that
FRR48 requirements would reduce investor uncertainty and diversity of opinion about the
impact on firm value of changes in interest rate, foreign exchange and commodity prices.
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They assume trading volume to be a proxy43 for investor uncertainty and diversity of opinion
(due to information gaps between investor groups). They find that when firms disclose FRR48
mandated information about their exposure to market risk factors, trading volume sensitivity
to changes in the market risk factors declines, even after controlling for factors associated
with trading volume. Jorion (2002) finds that disclosure of VAR (value at risk) of financial
instruments across a sample of financial institutions helps predict the variability of trading
revenues and therefore VAR measures are useful to capital markets participants. Looking at
Oil and Gas companies, Rajgopal (1999) finds that measures of sensitivity analysis as
prescribed by FRR48 are significantly associated with the stock return sensitivities to oil and
gas price movements. Aggarwal and Simkins (2004) found that market to book ratios have a
positive association with derivatives disclosure of fair values in the notes. In the empirical
testing in chapters 6 and 7, I construct an index that includes the various components of
prescribed disclosure requirements.
3.4.1.4 SFAS 133 and disclosure requirements
As proposed in section 3.3.2, the adoption of SFAS 133 fair value requirements could
enhance the information content of information disclosed through the footnotes. This is
because SFAS 133 increases the visibility of derivatives losses and gains and this should
correspondingly increase the information content of other related derivatives information. For
example, fair value gains and losses coupled with risk exposure information and/or
information on the level of hedge accounting applied can potentially and more readily convey
information on the hedge effectiveness. Due to the increased information of related footnote
information after SFAS 133, managers will anticipate increased usefulness of notes disclosure
to capital markets participants, due to the observable income and balance sheet effects of
derivatives used. As a result they will have greater incentives to disclose.
Hypothesis 3.2
a) Capital markets incentives influences disclosure of derivatives related
information through the footnotes
b) Capital markets incentives to disclose are more significant after the adoption of
SFAS 133
43 Bamber and Cheon (1995) document reliable associations between investor uncertainty /diversity of opinion and the observed
trading volume.
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3.4.2 SFAS 133 and proprietary costs
Proprietary costs of disclosure embody the adverse impact of disclosure to firms that arise
from competitors, creditors or suppliers having access to the disclosed information. For
example there could be an adverse impact on product markets arising from competitor actions
based on disclosing commercially sensitive information. Hence, firms have an incentive not to
disclose any information that managers could expect to compromise their competitive
advantage. Healy and Palepu (2001), Leuz (2004) and Verrecchia (1983) point to proprietary
costs as providing a key impediment to full disclosure. While capital markets incentives
encourage greater disclosure, proprietary cost concerns could deter disclosure and therefore
the interaction of these two incentives could influence the observed disclosures (Sridhar and
Evans III, 2002).
In the context of derivatives use, the categorisation of disclosure information as proprietary
probably stems from financial statement preparers anticipating an adverse impact of such
disclosures on their competitive position. Knowledge of what competitors risk exposures and
hedging strategies, gleaned through financial statements, could influence a firm’s choice of
whether to hedge or not. To understand the interaction between firm risk, hedging strategies,
disclosure, and the competitor response it is useful to make reference to Nain’s (2004) game
theoretical, strategic interaction model44. This model shows that it is in a firm’s interest to
44
Nain (2004) developed a game theoretical strategic interaction model to illustrate a firm’s decision making process on
whether to hedge or not within a competitive industry setting. He postulates that firms ought to be sensitive to the use of
derivatives within their respective industries. For example, if a firm is in an industry where competitors do not hedge, upward
input cost shocks are likely to reduce the aggregate output and thereafter result in a corresponding increase in price within the
industry. This is because input cost increases result in the reduced supply of goods or services. This then leads to a situation
where there is a natural hedge through a price pass-through mechanism and this negates the need to use hedging instruments as a
means of minimising the profit volatility. Under such circumstances where competitors do not hedge, if a firm was to hedge, it
would minimise input cost volatility but yet experience undesirable profit volatility.
On the other hand if a firm is in an industry where most of its competitors hedge, then input cost shocks will not trigger
corresponding price pass-through as there is no adjustment of aggregate industry output. This is because firm specific input cost
increases are offset by changes in value of the hedging instrument. As a result, individual firms do not reduce their supply and
there will be no corresponding reduction in the aggregate output. In such an industry setting, it is in the interest of the firm to
hedge because the failure to hedge in an industry with widespread hedging practices can result in profit volatility when there is an
input cost shock. This contrasts with the scenario of a firm undertaking unilateral hedging in industries with limited hedging
practices, where in such a case it is the hedging choice that causes profit volatility. In addition to the game theoretical model,
Nain (2004) provides supporting empirical evidence showing that exchange rate pass through depends on the extent of hedging
within the industry. Consequently, individual firms are likely to be interested in their competitors hedging strategies while
expecting their hedging policies to be subject to scrutiny from competitors.
A corollary of Nain’s (2004) strategic interaction model is that firms are likely to pursue safety in conformity to practices within
their respective industries and that hedging is likely to be either non existent or widespread in different industries. The underlying
premise of this corollary is that firms will not adopt a differentiated hedging approach to its competitors as a means of managing
either input cost or price volatility.
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pursue a similar hedging strategy to that of its competitors within the industry. A corollary of
firms pursuing similar hedging strategies is that it is also to their advantage to fully disclose
their hedging strategies and risk exposures. However, Nain’s (2004) model is limited as it
works if all firms are price takers (i.e. they do not have pricing power) and would appear not
to be valid for firms with pricing power. Such type of firms can opt to pursue differentiated
hedging strategies in order to obtain competitive advantage and in turn they would likely not
disclose their hedging strategies so as to make it difficult for competitors to replicate. As an
example of firms of the offsetting tension on whether to disclose or not, Chalmers and
Godfrey (2004) note that mining companies which normally face greater currency and
commodity price risks, relative to other industries, have incentives not to reveal their hedging
strategies to their competitors. On the other hand because the risk exposures of oil and gas
companies tend to be well known, they would be expected to be transparent about their
hedging strategy.
3.4.2.1 SFAS 133 and proprietary costs
An explanation of how SFAS 133 could influence the proprietary45 cost concerns related to
derivatives disclosure is provided by Dye (1986). He postulates that an increase in mandatory
disclosure levels ought to result in an increase in related proprietary and non-proprietary
disclosure. His reasoning is that if the disclosure of non-proprietary information is mandatory,
there is reduced benefit from withholding related proprietary information. On the other hand,
if proprietary information is included under mandatory disclosure requirements, the impact
will be that all competitor firms will also have to disclose their proprietary information and
thus at an aggregate level the adverse impact of disclosure is negated. Thus it would eliminate
the proprietary cost of disclosing related information.
The adoption of SFAS 133 makes derivatives instrument, fair value gains and losses, more
visible to financial statement users. These reported gains and losses can convey information
about either the presence of underlying risk exposures or risks related to the derivatives
contracts. The implication of Dye’s (1986) postulation is that the greater visibility of
derivatives fair value gains or losses of derivatives makes corporate managers less inclined to
be opaque on their unhedged or hedged risk exposures. On this basis I expect that the
adoption of SFAS 133 should increase the disclosure of related derivatives information,
which hitherto might have been considered proprietary. I am not aware of any empirical
45 Risk information e.g. risk exposure and hedging strategy (e.g. whether a firm is fully or partially hedged) can be considered
proprietary in situations where such disclosure triggers unfavourable competitor or supplier responses. Suppliers can include
providers of financial capital. Risk disclosure can alter the perceived riskiness and consequently the cost of capital.
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evidence of the impact of proprietary costs on derivatives related disclosure after the adoption
of SFAS 133.
Hypothesis 3.3
a) Proprietary cost concerns influences the disclosure of derivatives related
information through the footnotes
b) Proprietary cost concerns are lower after the adoption of SFAS 133
3.5 Other determinants of disclosure
3.5.1 Organisational legitimacy and Managerial reputation
Chalmers and Rogers (2004) assert that firms disclose information so as to safeguard their
reputation. A sustained reputation confers the legitimacy necessary to support their business
model in the long term. This line of argument differs from capital markets and proprietary
cost incentives where disclosure is based on the direct economic costs and benefits of
disclosure. Chalmers et al’s (2004) theoretical framework, drawn from organizational theory,
is based on a blend of institutional and legitimacy organisational theories. Legitimacy is
defined as the generalised perception that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.
Institutional organisational theory asserts that legitimacy is achieved by firms conforming to
current conventional practices. Applying this framework to derivatives disclosure, Chalmers
et al (2004), looking at Australia firms, find evidence that when confronted with societal
pressures to make derivatives more transparent, managers responded in a manner that can be
explained by legitimacy and institutional theories and the maintenance of the managers’ and
their firms’ financial reporting reputations. They conduct their study over the 1992-1996
period and in their modelling of managerial reputation and legitimacy concerns; they use
variables indicating whether a firm has a professional affiliation, was audited by the then Big
6 accounting firms, and is a member of the G 100. They find that concerns about firm
reputation result in higher levels of disclosure.
Trueman (1986) affirms the legitimacy and firm reputation maintenance perspective, albeit
focusing on individual manager reputation concerns. The author contends that there are
incentives for talented managers to increase disclosure so as to differentiate themselves.
Disclosure levels can influence investor perception of managers’ ability to anticipate and
respond to future changes in the firms’ economic environment. Extending this reasoning to
derivatives disclosures, I expect that managers will provide high quality disclosures so as to
convey their sophistication and ability to effectively manage risk exposures. Hence, the talent
signalling perspective would predict that more talented managers would disclosure more than
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those who are less talented. For modelling purposes, I assume organisational legitimacy and
managerial reputation to be closely related.
3.5.2 Managerial compensation
Executive compensation is another determinant of disclosure. Executive compensation can
influence managers’ risk aversion and this can influence how managers disclose information.
Chapter 2, sections 2.3.3 and 2.4.5.1, show that the agency costs arising from executive
compensation, can influence corporate managers’ desire to smooth firm performance through
either derivatives use or discretionary accruals. The same motivation can influence their
disclosure of derivatives related information with a view of influencing the perceived
riskiness of their firms. Along similar lines, Healy and Palepu, (2001) argue that
compensation value maximisation can influence disclosure. Managers with significant levels
of stock based compensation have incentives to disclose so as to bolster the liquidity and
correct any perceived under-valuation of their stock portfolio. Managers can also be in a
position where they do not want to be constrained by restrictive insider trading rules and
therefore may disclose all potentially price sensitive private information that they hold prior
to trading of their stock holding.
As described in earlier chapters, sections 2.3.3 and 2.4.5.1, managerial compensation typically
comprises of stock based compensation and stock options in addition to cash compensation.
The overall value of stock compensation and in-the- money stock options tends to be sensitive
to price variation, namely the delta of compensation dominates. When delta dominates stock
price and firm performance volatility become undesirable. On the other hand, out-of-the-
money options can induce a desire for higher volatility as this increases the value of the stock
options (Supanvanij and Strauss, 2006). In other words when vega dominates managers may
welcome uncertainty and volatility of firm performance.
There is limited empirical evidence linking managerial compensation and derivatives
disclosure. Aggarwal and Simkins (2004) find that firms where managers have higher
proportions of stock options tend to have lower levels of derivatives disclosure. They infer
that this is evidence of agency costs restraining disclosure. Although they do not explicitly
measure vega and delta sensitivities, it is likely that vega dominated their sample or that the
sample of stock options were largely out-of-the- money.
It is necessary to qualify that the described relationship between managerial compensation
and derivatives disclosure is predicated on derivatives being used for risk management
purposes. If a firm is engaging in speculative use of derivatives, enhanced disclosure will
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only result in greater perceived riskiness. On the assumption that it is difficult to readily
observe upfront, whether derivatives are used for hedging or speculation, it is hard to predict
the direction of the relation between compensation and disclosure. Nevertheless, similar to
other studies (Aggarwal and Simkins, 2004), managerial risk incentives are included as a
determinant of disclosure.
3.5.3 Litigation cost
Disclosure of information can occur so as to avoid negative litigation consequences.
Companies could disclose information due to the fear of legal sanctions should they provide
either untimely or inadequate disclosures (Skinner, 1994). Unlike capital markets incentives,
litigation cost concerns could deter the provision of forward looking information due to the
risk of measurement error and low credibility of such information.
3.5.4 Corporate Governance
Chapter 2, section 2.4.6.1, discussed how corporate governance can influence earnings
management reporting practices. The anticipated impact of an effective oversight role on
firms reporting practices can be extended to risk disclosure. Stringent corporate governance
structures can lead to higher levels and quality of disclosure. Another factor that could
influence corporate governance and disclosure quality in the post-SFAS 133 period is the
Sarbanes Oxley legislation. The Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted in 2002 in response
to a number of high profile accounting related failures such as Enron and WorldCom. The
legislation aimed to improve the corporate governance regime and internal control
environment46, and consequently to improve the overall financial reporting quality (SEC 2003
and Leech, 2005). On corporate governance, the Act addresses board composition and
responsibilities, auditor independence, auditor review of internal controls and CEO and CFO
certification of financial statements. The improvement in disclosure involve reporting off-
balance-sheet transactions and contractual obligations, communicating information that has a
material impact in a timely fashion and assessing the adequacy of internal controls (Akhigbe,
Martin and Newman, 2008).
Although SOX does not prescribe specific quantitative risk disclosure requirements, it can be
inferred that the enhancement of financial reporting quality will include the provision of more
and better risk disclosures. SOX could also induce firms to disclose negative information, in
the context of derivatives use. This could include information on risk exposures and
speculative use of derivatives. Akigbhe et al (2008) find evidence to the effect that SOX led
46 Section 404 requires companies to include an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control over financial reporting
and an auditors’ attestation of the assessment in their annual reports. Section 302 requires a report on any changes in the internal
control
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to an increase in the perceived riskiness of firms by investors. This study controls for SOX
through inclusion of the year dummy for when the change was enacted (i.e. 2002). Similar to
Aggarwal and Simkins (2004), this study includes a proxy for corporate governance as a
determinant of disclosure (i.e. the level of institutional ownership and corporate governance
index). More discussion of this is included in 2.4.6.1.
3.5.5 Firm performance
Some theoretical models (Verrecchia, 1983) propose that good performance ought to result in
increased disclosure, as firms tend to withhold negative news and disclose positive news.
However other studies suggest that while performance is related to disclosure, the nature of
the relation is unclear (Miller, 2002). Miller (2002) studies a set of disclosures and how these
relate to earnings performance. He studies disclosure patterns as firms experience earnings
increases, as earnings performance nears its end and when earnings are in decline. He finds
unambiguous evidence that firms increase their disclosure levels as earnings increase. The
trend is somewhat ambiguous when the earnings increase ends. During such a phase, firms
with strong performance increase their long-term related disclosures while those with poor
performance focusing on short-term oriented disclosures. At points of earning decline, there is
a decrease in the level of disclosure.
Similar to Miller (2002), Leuz (2004) asserts that the relation between profitability and
disclosure is complex and ambiguous, as it depends on the nature of the competitive
landscape and the potential proprietary costs that could result. In a situation of high barriers to
entry, firms are likely to disclose more than if there were lower entry barriers. Consistent with
the above mentioned disclosure studies (Leuz, 2004); firm performance is included as a
determinant of disclosure.
3.5.6 Firm size
Derivatives use and derivatives accounting require highly skilled personnel and sophisticated
supporting technological platforms and internal processes. Leuz (2004) asserts that firm size
is expected to be positively associated with disclosure levels. This is because size provides
firms with economies of scale in relation to bearing the costs of disclosure i.e. costs of
producing and disseminating information (Nikolaev and van Lent, 2005 and Leuz, 2004).
However, larger firms also typically have a larger institutional and analyst following and such
investors are better placed to derive potential cost savings for private information acquisition.
This can result in large firms being in a better position to hide their proprietary information
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(Leuz, 2004). Therefore, the relation between firm size and observed disclosure is ambiguous.
In addition, firm size can also be a proxy for both institutional legitimacy and reputation.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework of the impact of SFAS 133 on disclosure,
alongside proposing testable hypotheses. The main contribution is the focus on the interaction
between SFAS 133 fair value recognition and measurement, and disclosure requirements,
combined with an analysis of the incentives that influence disclosure. This line of inquiry will
illuminate whether SFAS 133 fair value requirements and increased complexity resulted in
footnote disclosure becoming a complement or whether there is still a substitution effect. It
builds on the work of Hamlen and Largay (2005) that focuses on the SFAS 133 impact of a
small sample study (i.e. 30 Dow Jones companies) over a limited time period but does not
factor in the interaction of incentives and disclosure levels. It is an enhancement of Aggarwal
and Simkins (2004), where the focus is on incentives in the context of SFAS 107 which only
required fair values to be disclosed through the footnotes. It also extends the work of Dunne,
Helliar, Power, Mallin, Ow-Young and Moir47 (2004) who conducted a similar study in the
UK context under FRS 13. However, FRS 13 did not have fair value recognition and
measurement requirements.
On other derivatives footnote incentives, apart from the SFAS 133 recognition and
measurement requirements, I primarily investigate the impact of capital markets and
proprietary cost incentives as these incentives can be influenced by SFAS 133. The incentive
postulations are premised on the increased information content under a regime that requires
fair value disclosures and reduced proprietary nature of footnote disclosure information, after
SFAS 133. I further control for other determinants such as managerial reputation,
compensation based incentives, corporate governance (including SOX), firm performance and
geographic diversification. The development of this chapter continues through chapters 6
(data, sample and research design) and 7 (empirical findings), where I also include
discretionary accruals as one of the variables similar to other studies.
47 These authors found that FRS13 resulted in a step change in the financial risk disclosure
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4 DATA, SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN
This chapter outlines the research methodology applied to test the impact of SFAS 133 on
income smoothing choices. The empirical testing consists of a combination of parametric and
non parametric univariate statistical and multivariate regression analysis of the data. The
statistical tests are conducted using Stata 10 IC and SAS software. The rest of the chapter is
structured as follows:
1. High level conceptual model specification (section 4.1)
2. Data (section 4.2)
3. Variable specification (section 4.3)
4. Detailed model specification (section 4.4)
5. Appendix of detailed variable definition (section 4.6)
4.1 High-level conceptual model specification
The literature review in chapters 2 has yielded several testable hypotheses. Below is a recap
of the formulated hypotheses, alongside a description of the high-level conceptual testing
model.
Hypothesis 2.1: The adoption of SFAS 133 leads to the reduced use of derivatives
The primary univariate tests conducted for this hypothesis are
 Difference in means and medians of derivatives use between pre-SFAS 133 and post-
SFAS 133 observations of derivatives users.
 Pair-wise difference in means for firms with both pre- and post- SFAS 133
observations
The multivariate testing is based on the below conceptual model
Derivatives use = f (SFAS 133 dummy variable, accrual use, interaction of accrual and SFAS
133, other control variables).
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Hypothesis 2.2a: The adoption of SFAS 133 leads to an overall increase in discretionary
accruals.
Hypothesis 2.2 b: Cash flow hedge accounting influences the level of discretionary accruals.
The univariate tests conducted are:
 Difference in means and median, t-test and wilcoxon test, between pre and Post-SFAS
133 observations.
 Pair-wise test of discretionary accruals for firms with observations across pre- and
post- SFAS 133 periods.
The multivariate conceptual formulation is as shown below
Discretionary accruals = f (derivatives use, SFAS variable, derivatives use*Post-SFAS 133
variable, cash flow hedge accounting variable, control variables)
Hypothesis 2.3a: Hedging derivatives and discretionary accruals are substitutes
Hypothesis 2.3 b: The adoption of SFAS 133 influences the substitution relationship
This is based on the same model as Hypothesis 2.1 and Hypothesis 2.2, but it also includes
interaction variables of SFAS 133 and discretionary accruals/derivatives coefficients when
they used as independent variables.
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4.2 Data
This section reviews the sampling and data sources
4.2.1 Sample period
The hypotheses are tested using data from the 1999 to 2003 period. Due to some firms either
missing data or not using derivatives during certain years of the sample period, the data is
essentially unbalanced panel48 data. The application of the year 200049 as the cut-off date is
consistent with other empirical studies such as Ahmed, Kilic and Lobo (2006), Supanvanij and
Strauss (2006), Park (2004) and Singh (2004) who consider the Post-SFAS 133 period to
commence from the year 2001 in their model specification.
This research focuses on US data. The sample firms were selected from the 1999-2003 period in
order to study the impact of SFAS 133. The focus on US data is due to the relatively rich data
history available, related the disclosure of derivatives use before and after SFAS 133. SFAS 133
was introduced with effect from fiscal year starting after June 15th 2000. On the other hand, the
equivalent under IFRS, IAS 39 was effective for European (including UK) companies with effect
from fiscal year starting January 2005. The reason for focusing on the US is because of the
limited data history of European firms due to the relatively recent introduction of IAS 39.
48
Kennedy (2004) describes several advantages of using panel data. Panel data can be used to deal with unobservable heterogeneity
across sample firms. This is firm specific variation that is constant over time. In the context of this study, unobservable heterogeneity
could result due to differences in dimensions of human capital, such as treasury expertise, managerial talent and reputation, which
influence the use of derivatives. Panel data captures variation across time. For instance, the point of uptake of SFAS 133, by firms can
influence the use of derivatives, across time horizons. Panel data creates more variability, through combining variation across firms
with variation over time, alleviating multi-collinearity problems. Finally, panel data can be used to examine issues that cannot be
studied using time series or cross sectional data alone. Cross sectional data do not provide any information on time dynamics. Time
series data need to be very lengthy to provide good estimates of dynamic behaviour.
49 A potential limitation of the sample period is that the 1999 to 2000 period was a transition period and there could be early adopters
during the transition period in our sample who applied SFAS 133.
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4.2.2 Sample size specification
The sampling criterion is outlined in Table 4.1. The sample consists of large firms with market
capitalisation greater than $1billion and sales greater $1 billion. The focus on large firms is
because they are likely to be users of derivatives contracts as they can derive the economies of
scale through their capacity to set up sophisticated and expensive treasury departments. The
selected firms were listed on either the NYSE or NASDAQ. Sample firms had foreign sales
greater than 30% of total sales as such firms would likely have significant risk exposures that
necessitate the use of derivatives. The approach of selecting samples for derivatives related
studies based on the criterion of an anticipated exposure is common in empirical studies (e.g.
Barton, 2001). Similar to several studies, the following firms were excluded from the sample:
 Regulated firms such as financial services, as the incentives for derivatives use in these
industries would differ significantly given that derivatives are extensively used for
trading purposes rather than risk management.
 Foreign firms listed in the US that did not comply with US GAAP. The focus is on SFAS
133 and international firms had a different implementation date of the equivalent standard
(i.e. IAS 39).
 Firms without matching key control variable data (accruals, derivatives use, managerial
risk incentives).
The sampling criteria yielded 253 firms with 850 firm-years of data, out of which 681 (80%)
firm-years (218 firms) had data showing derivatives use. The selected sample is used to test both
research questions on the impact of SFAS 133 on a) income smoothing choices and b) footnote
disclosure of related derivatives information. Of the 218 firms, 49 (22%) use derivatives through
the entire sample period, 53 (24%) use derivatives for 4 years, 33 for 3 years, 42 for 2 years and
41 for 1 year (see Table 4.1-Panel C). This study with a sample of 218 hedging firms and 69 non
hedging firms and 850 firm-year observations, compares well with similar empirical studies.
Quoted below are a few examples of similar studies:
 Zhang et al (2009) use 1105 firm-year of observations (477 firms) with data collected
from the 1992-1996 period;
 Barton (2001) uses 912 firm-year observations (312 firms) with data collected from
1994-1996 period;
 Supanvanij and Strauss (2006) sample consists of data collected from 1994 –2000 period
and uses 138 hedging firms and 60 non hedging firms.
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4.2.3 Data sources
I collected data from multiple sources. These include:
 Derivatives data: This data is hand collected. It is sourced by downloading 10 K financial
statements from SEC’s Edgar Thomson Research website and extracting from these the
derivatives usage data. Derivatives users are identified by searching the financial
documents for key words like risk management, hedging, derivatives, options,
forwards/futures and swaps.
 Accounting variable and firm attributes data: Sourced from Standard and Poor’s
Compustat database. Using these data, I estimated several key variables such as the
discretionary accruals and abnormal investments.
 Executive compensation: Standard& Poor’s Execucomp database lists compensation
details of constituent firms in the Standard &Poor’s indices. The constituent firms are
large and listed firms. Using Execucomp data, I calculated key variables such as the vega
and delta of executive compensation package.
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Table 4.1 Sample details
Panel A: This table delineates the sampling criteria for US listed (NYSE and NASDAQ) firms selected for the 1999-2003 period. Accounting and firm control variable data was collected
from Compustat database, executive compensation data was extracted from Execu-Comp database. The derivatives data was hand collected based on downloads from SEC Edgar Thomson
Research database.
Sampling criteria
Firm-year
observations Rationale/Comments
Observations (market value >$1 billion and sales> 1
billion) 7185
Large firms are likely to use derivatives. Demonstrated on ISDA 2003 website survey and
empirical papers make same assumption (Rogers, 2002; Barton,2001)
Observations with foreign sales > 30% of sales 2192 Extract firms with ex ante foreign exposure same as Geczy et al(1997)
Observations after excluding financial services and
utilities 2063
Financial service firms and utilities have regulatory incentives for risk management. Different
writers (Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Burgstahler et al, 2003) have same approach
Observations after excluding ADR listed firms 1479 ADR listed firms comply with different accounting standards (IAS rather than US standard)
Observations with Form 10-K disclosure on
derivatives usage 850
850 observations from 253 companies. These are firms reporting on whether or not they use
derivatives use with the required control variables. These includes derivatives users and non
users
Derivatives users 681 681 observations from 218 firms that reported derivatives use
Derivatives users 551 551 observations from 193 firms that reported notional amounts.
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PANEL B (Breakdown by derivatives use)
Non derivatives user
observations 169
Derivatives user
observations 681
Total 850
Firms with derivatives
usage data 218
Add Firms without
derivatives usage data 69
287
Less Firms with and
without derivatives
usage data across
different years 34
Total number of firms 253
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Panel B: Continued
Firms that increased derivatives use after SFAS 133 66
Firms that decreased derivatives use after SFAS 133 62
Firms with no change in derivatives use across both periods (non users) 19
Total firms with observations across pre- and Post-SFAS 133 147
Use derivatives only after SFAS 133 58
Use derivatives only before SFAS 133 36
Total number of firms that at least use derivatives 241
Firms missing notional values 12
Total 253
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PANEL C (Breakdown of derivatives and non derivatives users)
Combined sample firms (i.e. users and non users of derivatives)
Number of firms50 72 67 36 36 42 253
Number of years with
observations 5 4 3 2 1
Firm-year observations 360 268 108 72 42 850
Derivatives users firms
Number of firms 49 53 33 42 41 218
Number of years with
observations 5 4 3 2 1
Firm-year observations 245 212 99 84 41 681
Non derivatives user firms
Number of firms 6 9 15 19 20 69
Number of years within sample
period 5 4 3 2 1
Firm-year observations 30 36 45 38 20 169
50 The number of firms with 1,2,3,5 observations in the combined sample of hedgers and non hedgers differs from the sum of those of only hedge and non hedge samples.
This can be explained by 34 firms that fall into both categories. Hence for example a firm with 3 years of data as a hedging firm and 2 years as a non hedging firm will migrate
to being a firm with 5 years of observations under the combined sample.
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4.3 Variable Specification
4.3.1 Focal variables
4.3.1.1 Hedging Derivatives
The most appropriate measure of derivatives use for risk management would be the ratio of
positions in derivatives measured by notional amount to the size of risk exposures. However, risk
exposure information tends to be unobservable due to the inadequate and inconsistent levels of
disclosure across companies. The selected measure for derivatives usage is the scaled gross
notional value (Gross notional value of derivatives/ Total Assets). The use of notional amount is
an improvement from many studies that simply use a dichotomous dummy variable to
differentiate derivatives users from non users. Judge (2006), Bartram, Brown and Fehle (2009),
Mian (1996) and Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) all make use of a binary variable for
derivatives use.
The main argument put forward for the use of gross notional value is that there is a strong
relationship between contract size and underlying risk exposure (Nguyen and Faff, 2002; Henshel
and Kothari, 2001; Supanvanij and Strauss,2006). It could be argued that gross notional value
does not factor in netting effect of derivatives assets and liabilities and as a result, could be
considered to be overstating the liquidation value of the held derivatives instruments. Despite this
shortcoming, the gross notional value is a better reflection of the quantity and underlying
exposure of the derivatives contracts that management assumes. For example, for our purposes, a
zero net notional value reflected from offsetting long and short derivatives positions, could
potentially erroneously be misinterpreted as being equivalent to the non usage of derivatives.
Gross notional values would however reflect the volume of derivatives contracts undertaken by
management. It is used by several authors (Barton, 2001; Allayanis and Ofek, 2001; Singh, 2004;
Ahmed et al, 2006; and Supanvanij et al, 2006). There are other studies that use net notional
value to reflect offsetting contracts (Graham and Rogers, 2002; and Singh and Upneja, 2007)
Notwithstanding the improvements made through SFAS 133, it still remains difficult to
accurately and consistently differentiate between risk management and speculative derivatives
use. Pre-SFAS 133 there was inadequate disclosure through either balance sheet and income
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statement recognition and measurement and notes disclosure. After the introduction of SFAS 133,
derivatives that do not qualify for the hedge accounting treatment are deemed to be speculative
but these could include hedging instruments that simply do not qualify due to the stringent hedge
accounting requirements. In addition, there is very poor disclosure of the notional amounts of
derivatives that do or do not qualify for hedge accounting treatment and therefore it remains
difficult to identify speculative use of derivatives (Zhang, 2009).
In this study, I assume that reported derivatives use is for risk management. Hence, the reported
notional amount is treated as a proxy for risk management. Although as noted above, this could
fail to recognise when derivatives are used for speculation and thus could lead to the
overstatement of derivatives application for hedging purposes. However, this error exists even
with other studies in existing empirical literature as noted by Bartram et al (2009). Using a
sample of only non financial institutions, increases the likelihood that derivatives are indeed used
for hedging. For the rest of the study, derivatives use is assumed to be synonymous with hedging
derivatives.
4.3.1.2 Discretionary accruals
There are three types of empirical proxies applied when investigating discretionary accruals.
These include:
 Specific accruals such as loan loss provisions, deferred tax charges and goodwill
impairments;
 Aggregate accruals measures; and
 Directional earnings management: proxies: Proxies for the distribution51 of earnings
around a benchmark level such as zero earnings or analyst forecast
Relative to aggregate discretionary accruals estimates, specific accruals (e.g. loan loss provisions)
have the advantage of not requiring guesstimates and thus are less prone to estimation error.
However, taking a single type/s of accruals as a proxy for discretionary accruals, fails to capture
all possible accruals employed by managers. On the other hand, directional earnings management
proxies are more suited to studies that focus on target earnings level rather than income
smoothing questions, for example those that represent how accruals are influenced by bonus
targets. For these reasons, I consider it appropriate to mainly focus on an aggregate accrual
51 For example use of accounting discretion to avoid reporting negative earning surprises can be measured by frequency around a
benchmark level.
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estimate as the proxy for income smoothing. This proxy is widely used approach in earnings
management empirical literature, these include Jiraporn et al, 2008 and Barton 2001.
Determination of aggregate discretionary accruals
Total accruals can be decomposed into discretionary or abnormal accruals (i.e. estimates that
require managerial judgement but susceptible into managerial manipulation e. bad loan estimates)
and non discretionary accruals (normally based on transactions and not relying on managerial
judgements e.g. initial recognition of credit sales based on actual sales). Due to the high
incidence of accrual accounting decisions that are based on managerial estimates, the aggregate
level of discretionary accruals is unobservable and thus can only be estimated. The Jones (1991)
model is the most frequently applied approach in recent capital markets based financial reporting
research as it has been found to have the highest power of test52 (Dechow, 1996). DeChow et al
(1995) did a power of test simulation of the different models and found that the Jones (1991)
model exhibited the most power in detecting discretionary accruals. More recently in empirical
accounting research, variants of the Jones (1991) model have been widely used. Similar to Barton
(2001), Klein (2002) and Jiraporn et al (2008), I use a version of Jones (1991) model. In the
appendix to this chapter (section 4.6.1), I explain in detail the determination and refinements of
the modified accrual proxy.
Alternative discretionary accrual variable
There have been various other empirical proxies for discretionary accruals. These include the
Healy (1985) model53 which assumes that the level of non discretionary accruals during a period
is the same as the total accruals in the preceding accounting period; the Dechow and Sloan (1991)
model54 which postulates the existence of a representative level of accruals within an industry
group and thereafter determines the representative level based on the median total accrual of
firms within the same industry. Other studies (Singh, 2004; and Huang et al, 2009) have used the
ratio of standard deviation of firm’s quarterly earnings before abnormal accruals divided by the
standard deviation of quarterly earnings.
52 Power of test, simply means that it has the highest predictive ability as it is least likely to classify normal accruals as abnormal
accruals. In other words, it is the least prone to making classification error
53 NDA=TACC prior period
54 NDAt =  1 +  2 median (TAt), Median (TAt) – the median value of total accruals scaled by lagged assets for all non-sample
firms in the 2 – digit SIC code
- 133 -
As an alternative, I use Dechow and Sloan (1991) model that is based on measuring the normal
accrual level as the median of total accruals scaled by total assets, within a 4 digit SIC industry
classification. Total accruals is derived by taking the difference between net income before
extraordinary items and the operating cash flow of firms, as reported in the Compustat database.
I expect more precision in an estimate based on 4 rather than 2 digit SIC code, expecting that
firms’ within such a category are likely to have more closely resembling characteristics.
4.3.1.3 SFAS 133 dummy
I use a dummy variable to differentiate the pre- and post-SFAS 133 periods. Pre-SFAS 133 is
1999 to 2000 while post-SFAS 133 is 2001 to 2003.
4.3.1.4 Cash flow hedge accounting dummy
As discussed in the formulation of Hypothesis 2.2b, SFAS 133 has a conditional impact on
earnings volatility and by extension earnings management, depending on the application of cash
flow hedge accounting requirements. Cash flow hedge accounting is allowed under SFAS 133
and results in the deferral of gains and losses through the OCI statement and this lowers current
period net income volatility (see section 2.6.3.2). Therefore, I expect that the incremental
derivatives accounting earnings volatility will depend on the extent to which derivatives users
elect to apply the cash flow hedge accounting treatment.
I include a dichotomous variable to identify whether or not a hedging firm uses cash flow hedge
accounting. The application of a dichotomous variable rather than continuous variable is due to
the poor and inconsistent disclosure of notional amounts related to cash flow hedge accounting.
Many firms disclose that they use cash flow hedges, but fail to provide the corresponding details
of their underlying risk exposures. In addition, with the deferral and recycling of cash flow hedge
accounting gains and losses, alongside the netting of reported amounts, it is difficult to determine
a suitable alternative proxy for the application of cash flow hedge accounting.
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4.3.2 Other independent control variables for both derivatives use and discretionary
accruals
4.3.2.1 Real Earnings Management
In order to smooth earnings, managers can alter their operating and investment decisions as
discussed in 2.4.2.1. The use of operating and/or investment decisions to smooth earnings is also
referred to in the literature as real earnings management. I expect there to be a negative and
significant association between real earnings management and discretionary accruals as they can
be substitutes towards the goal of income smoothing.
I introduce a novel proxy to measure abnormal investment levels. The determination of abnormal
investment is based on initially estimating the expected investment level for each firm-year
observation. The determination of an expected investment level is based on the assumption that
firms within the same industry category, should have similar levels of investment, and that only
certain differentiating firm attributes should drive within industry variation. This differentiating
firm attributes include the increase in sales, the tangible asset intensity and sales growth
percentage. This approach is similar to that taken to determine the discretionary accruals estimate
by Jones (1991). Cohen and Zarowin (2008), also apply this type of approach to determine
abnormal cash flow from operations. They determine the normal cash from operations, based on
regressing discretionary expenses and production costs within an industry grouping.
Investment level is measured as capital expenditure divided by sales. Expected or normal
investment is determined using Equation 4.1. This equation is applied to firms within the same
industry category (i.e. 2 digit SIC category). The normal investment is the predicted value for
each firm and the abnormal investment is the difference between the observed investment and
normal investment. The absolute/unsigned value of the abnormal investment is then applied as a
proxy for income smoothing through investments. A non-directional proxy is appropriate given
that the focus is investments used to smooth income.
Equation 4.1
Capital expenditure/Sales= 1(1/TAit-1) +  1(PPEit/TAit-1) +  2{(REVit-RECit)/TAit-1} +  3
(Sales growth rate it) +  it
 TAit-1 is the beginning of period total assets
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 PPE is gross property, plant and equipment, included to control for normal
depreciation expense
 (REVit-RECit)- change in cash sales
4.3.2.2 Shareholder value control variables
As discussed in sections 2.3.1 and 2.4.4.1, shareholder value maximisation incentives can
influence the decision to smooth earnings. These include a) reducing expected costs of financial
distress b) lowering information asymmetry and c) reducing the expected tax liabilities. I expound
on the related variables below:
Reducing expected costs of financial distress
The probability of and loss associated with financial distress is positively associated with the
level of borrowing undertaken by a firm, as discussed in section 2.3.1.1. There is widespread
application in empirical literature of different proxies for leverage and financial distress. Similar
to Judge (2006) and many other studies, I use debt/total assets as the leverage proxy. As an
alternative, I use debt service coverage (Debt/ Operating cash flow), due to the fact that it is
commonly applied by credit market investors to proxy for the level of indebtedness and thereafter
the likelihood of a firm being in financial distress.
Graham and Rogers (2002) note that proxies that are based on leverage could pose problems of
endogeneity.55 Despite this situation, I treat leverage as an exogenous variable as it is mainly a
control variable and not a core variable in the testable hypothesis. Treating it as an exogenous
variables helps to keep the models tractable. It is worth noting that leverage can also be a proxy
for the incentives to smooth earnings so as to avoid covenant violations (Chalmers et al, 2004). It
too could be a proxy for underlying interest rate exposure (Judge, 2006).
Information asymmetry
As discussed in sections 2.3.1.3 and 2.4.3.1, there is lower perceived risk and uncertainty
associated with smooth earnings. As a result, firms with smooth earnings are likely to be more
frequently traded, liquid and correspondingly more closely followed by a larger number of
analysts, as they likely have lower forecast error. The variable used to measure the liquidity is the
55 Endogeneity arises as the debt level increases probability of financial distress and necessitates the need for financial hedging.
Financial hedging, on the other hand, reduces the volatility of cash flows and earnings and this reduces the perceived risk of the firm
and results in increased debt capacity as external lenders are more willing to lend to firms that they deem to be less risky.
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natural logarithm of trading volume of shares. The more traded a firm is, the lower is the level of
assumed information asymmetry. I implicitly assume that the frequency of trading of a firm’s
shares is linked to the level of coverage by institutional investors and thereafter the information
asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. Linsmeier et al (2002) and Bamber and
Cheon (1995) have applied the proxy in the same fashion. Bamber and Cheon (1995) document
reliable associations between trading volume and investors’ uncertainty and diversity of opinion.
However, I take cognisance that trading volume is potentially a noisy proxy for information
asymmetry between investors for various reasons. To begin, Linsmeier et al (2002) note that
investors’ trade for reasons other than their uncertainty or diversity of opinion. For example they
could trade for the purposes of rebalancing their portfolios or for liquidity reasons.
Second, trading volume could also be a proxy for firm size. Therefore I conduct diagnostics tests
(i.e. variance inflation factors (VIF)) to ensure that there is no multicollinearity related estimation
error, and where appropriate I exclude either this or the alternative firm size variable from the
testing models.
Reducing expected tax liabilities
Section 2.3.1.2 discusses the convexity of tax function and how this influences the expected tax
liabilities. A commonly used measure of the tax function convexity is the scaled tax losses carry
forwards Tax Loss Carry Forwards/Total Assets. Tax loss carry forwards are used as they provide
tax shields; this is because they are assumed to be extending the convex portion of tax function
(Stulz, 1996; and Graham and Rogers,2002).
4.3.2.3 Managerial risk incentives
Vega and delta
Guay (1999) proposes the use of the sensitivities to volatility (vega) and stock price (delta) as
proxies for managerial risk incentives. The description of the method used to calculate vega and
delta is included in the appendix – section 4.6.1 and the conceptual discussion is in section 2.3.3.
An increase in the vega of the stock option component of compensations, makes a firm’s financial
performance volatility to be desirable. The implication of convex pay- performance sensitivity is
a reduction in managerial risk aversion. When managers are less risk averse, earnings volatility in
fact becomes desirable, from the manager’s standpoint. This in turn should lead to reduced
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hedging (Supanvanij et al, 2006). It should also lead to reduced use of discretionary accruals or
derivatives use as the incentive to smooth earnings decreases. An increase in delta should lead to
increased managerial risk aversion. Guay (1999) has proposed the use of delta and this has been a
common measure of risk avoidance incentive in recent empirical papers (Supanvanij and Strauss,
2006; Rogers, 2002; Core and Guay 2002; Knopf, Nam and Thornton 2002).
Vega and delta are scaled by cash pay to facilitate econometric modelling. As Rogers (2002)
notes the absolute dollar vega and delta are also a function of firm size, given that larger firms are
able to grant more options. I use variables that control for firm size as one of the control
variables. Hence scaling is necessary to minimise the problem of multi-collinearity caused by the
correlation of independent variables.
Executive cash pay
As discussed in section 2.3.3.3, the greater the cash compensation that can be invested outside the
firm, the more likely it will be that the CEO holds a diversified wealth portfolio, and the lower the
risk aversion that he/she is likely to bear. The current period cash compensation is a suitable
proxy for risk aversion, as it represents the proportion of compensation demanded by managers,
which is not sensitive to stock price volatility (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2005).
4.3.2.4 Corporate governance
As discussed in sections 2.3.4.1 and 2.4.6.1, corporate governance mechanisms influence both
prudent use of derivatives and the level of accounting discretion. I apply the percentage of
institutional ownership as did Huang et al (2009) and Rogers (2002). I also use the managerial
share ownership percentage and a dummy variable for executives with interlocking relationships.
Inclusion of corporate governance variables is an improvement to the literature because several
similar studies omit this type of variables. Both Barton (2001) and Singh (2004) do not control
for corporate governance.
While I control for corporate governance, I have concerns about the quality and completeness of
such data and recognise that this could be a source of measurement error or even still, the models
could retain problems associated with unobservable heterogeneity related to corporate governance
variables. The corporate governance environment consists of multiple dimensions and modelling
specific attributes such as institutional ownership can fail to capture the overall corporate
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governance effectiveness (Jiang et al, 2008). Recent literature, Bowen, Rajgopal and
Venkatachalam (2008) and Jiang et al (2008) makes use of more complete and better proxies such
as composite corporate governance indices Gov-Score and Gov Index. However, I was
constrained to doing the same due to data access constraints for the period related to my sample.
For example the Gov-Score Index56, available from the Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC), only had data with effect from 2003.
4.3.3 Derivatives Discriminating variables
The control variables that are unique for derivatives usage are the underinvestment, operational
hedging, internal liquidity levels, risk exposure and size effect. These are also considered as
instrumental variable candidates in the models that correct for endogeneity (see section 4.4.2.2.)
4.3.3.1 Avoiding underinvestment due to growth options
As discussed in section 2.3.1.4, firms with growth opportunities face larger opportunity costs
whenever underinvestment occurs. This is due to their concerns about internal liquidity and
access to costly external capital markets (Froot et al, 1993). I use the Price to Book ratio as a
proxy for firms with growth options. The higher the price to book ratio, the higher will be the
implied growth options and correspondingly the underlying positive net present value projects.
For such firms there is a greater need to avoid underinvestment. Firms with high Market to Book
ratios are more likely to hedge so as to minimise underinvestment (Judge, 2006). In other words,
a positive association is expected between the price to book ratio and hedging derivatives. This
proxy is also used by Bartram and Bodnar (2007).
4.3.3.2 Operational hedging
As discussed in section 2.3.4.2, operational hedging is a mechanism of managing long term
economic or operational currency exposure. Despite being long term in nature, operational
hedging can be used in some instances either as a substitute or even as a complement to the use of
currency derivatives. The level of geographic diversification can be used as a proxy for the
operational hedging choices. I use number of foreign divisions or business units as a proxy for the
extent of operational hedging. The underlying assumption is that the operations in foreign
divisions are set up to offset exchange rate fluctuation risk. On the basis of a substitution
56 Gov Score is a composite index consisting of 51 internal and external characteristics that are individual measures of corporate
governance.
- 139 -
relationship, the expected sign of the regression test is negative. However, if operational hedging
is a complement, then the expected sign is positive.
4.3.3.3 Liquidity
As discussed in section 2.3.1.4, firms with higher levels of internal liquidity are less likely to be
concerned about the volatility of cash flow, when compared with firms that are strapped for cash
and therefore such firms are less likely to have to use derivatives. In other words, there should be
a negative association between liquidity levels and derivatives used. However, cash holdings can
also be a consequence of over/under investment. When cash held is a consequence of over/under
investment then it is likely to be positively associated with derivatives use. Due to the
countervailing interaction between investment, liquidity levels and derivatives use, the expected
sign is indeterminate. I use the quick ratio (i.e. (cash +debtors)/current liabilities), as a proxy for
liquidity. This proxy is also used by Marsden and Provost (2005) and Lin and Smith (2007).
4.3.3.4 Other Determinants
Other determinants include risk exposure and size of firms.
Risk exposure
Similar to a number of studies, I use the percentage of foreign sales to proxy for financial price
exposure. Singh and Upneja (2007), Judges (2006), Allayanis and Ofek (2001), Geczy, Minton
and Schrand (1997) and Lel (2006) employ the same variable.
Size effect
Large firms have the level of risk exposure that makes it viable to employ hedging strategies
based on derivatives (see section 2.3.4.3). They are also likely to enjoy the economies of scale
and scope from implementing such programs (Culp and Miller, 2002). I use the natural logarithm
of total assets as a proxy for size.
4.3.4 Discretionary accruals discriminating variables
The independent control variables that are unique to discretionary accruals are the operating cash
flow and bonus. These are also considered as candidate instrumental variables for models that
correct for endogeneity (see section 4.4.2.2 for further discussion).
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4.3.4.1 Operating Cash Flow
Similar to Barton (2001), I include operating cash flow as a control variable for discretionary
accruals. Poor operating cash flow is expected to incentivise income increasing accruals, while
strong operating cash flow is expected not to (Lobo and Zhou, 2006). Strictly speaking on that
basis, a negative association would be expected (Jiang et al, 2008). However, it can be argued
that even firms with strong operating cash flows, may undertake income decreasing accruals so as
to smooth period to period earnings. Hence if strong positive operating cash flows lead to income
decreasing accruals while negative operating cash flows lead to income increasing accruals, there
will be a positive association.
I further construct a categorical variable that incorporates various factors that could incentivise
either income increasing or decreasing accruals. These include the following conditions:
 Net income percentage change is negative; or
 Net income is negative; or
 Operating cash flow is negative; or
 Operating cash flow is positive but net income is negative.
4.3.4.2 Bonus
As discussed in section 2.4.5.2, several authors (Healy, 1985; Balsam,1998; and Burgstahler and
Dichev,1997) show bonus compensation can create incentives for either income increasing or
income decreasing accruals. Similar to Balsam (1998) and Carter, Lynch and Zechman (2005), I
use proportion of bonus in total compensation as the bonus related risk incentive. However, this is
an imperfect proxy as it does not capture the directionality of incentives to use accruals. To do so
requires firm specific data on bonus structures, so as to enable modelling around the bonus
targets. This type of data is not available for this study.
4.3.4.3 Dividend payout
As discussed in section 2.4.4.1, Daniel, Denis and Naveen (2007) find high earnings management
in high dividend payout firms. They propose that this is due to upwards directional earnings
management so as to meet dividend targets. Similar to Barton (2001), I use dividend payout ratio
as a proxy.
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4.3.4.4 Auditor expertise
As discussed in section 2.4.6.1, auditors are part of the overall corporate governance
framework and have an influence on the use of discretionary accruals. Similar to Bowen,
Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2008), to determine auditor expertise and relate this to
accounting discretion as motivated in section, I sort all firms by two digit SIC codes and set
the dummy to one (zero) if the audit firm for a particular company audits more than 15%
(<15%) of firms in two digit SIC code.
4.4 Multivariate model considerations
The sample consists of unbalanced panel data spanning from 1999 to 2003. In determining the
multivariate testing model, there are several important dimensions to consider. The first is
whether or not the individual firm effects arising from panel data, necessitate a deviation from the
typically applied pooled OLS regression approach. Second, is the determination of the best
approach to identify and resolve the endogeneity of key independent variables. Below is a
detailed description of the test procedures.
4.4.1 Individual Effects
4.4.1.1 Poolability of data
A primary consideration is the poolability of the panel data sample, in other words whether it is
appropriate to run a pooled OLS regression. Yafee (2003) evaluates three possible approaches to
panel data related regressions. The first approach, the constant coefficient approach, assumes that
there is no time or cross sectional effect in the panel data, treats the data as pooled data and solves
the regression using the OLS in a fashion similar to any other study of cross sectional data.
However Koop (2008) argues that applying pooled OLS can results in serious estimation error of
the regression slope coefficient, and is thus often inappropriate for panel data as it excludes
individual firm effects.
The combined sample of hedging and non hedging firms consists of 253 firms. Of these, only 72
firms have data through the 5 year sample period. On the other hand, 42 firms have a single
observation. Based on the few data points (average 3) per firm, alongside, the relatively short
time period of 5 years for a total of 253 firms, the question arises as to whether the individual
firm effects expected from panel data would in fact be significant. If individual effects are
significant, a pooled OLS can result in significant misstatement and thus it is only appropriate to
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use the pooled OLS regression if individual effects are insignificant. The poolability test is
achieved by running a fixed effect model and thereafter conducting an F test to ascertain whether
all individual firm intercepts are zero (O’Connell, 2007). This is premised on the fixed effect
approach being equivalent to the OLS, except that it includes intercepts for all firms.
4.4.1.2 Fixed effect versus random effect
Apart from pooled OLS, the other two key approaches to panel regression are the fixed effect and
random effect models. The fixed effect model assumes that there is a constant slope (i.e.
parameter estimates of the independent variables) but allows for variation in the intercept of
individual units, in this case the sample firms. Hence the fixed effect will have varying intercepts
for each company. On the other hand, the random effect captures individual firm differences
through the error term as opposed to the intercept.
The fixed effects approach requires the inclusion of a dummy variable for each observation. This
approach is describes at the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) approach. However LSDV has
several shortcomings. It excludes all time invariant independent variables. Hence a variable such
as the number of geographically dispersed business units that is expected to be a determinant of
derivatives use, would be omitted from the model. It also is inefficient as it includes very many
parameters (i.e. the number of firms plus the number of independent variables) and loses many
degrees of freedom (1/T). When T=1, 2 or 3, this compromise on degrees of freedom is costly. In
the sample 72 of the 253 firms have either 2 or 3 observations and 42 have a single observation.
On the other hand, the alternative panel data model, the random effects, does not result in a
similar loss of degrees of freedom as is the case with the fixed effect. The random effect is more
efficient due to its preservation of degrees of freedom. To determine which of these models
should be applied, the Hausman test of whether the parameters are significantly different. Due to
the significant loss of precision of the model under a fixed effect, I narrow57 down the selection to
either random effect panel regression or pooled OLS. The random effect is acceptable if the data
is drawn from a random sample and is not for example from a group of companies. It also is
preferred to the OLS, in so far as the individual effects exist in the error term.
57 To determine between random effect and pooled OLS, the Breusch Lagrange multiplier test is applied and the null hypothesis of
there being no individual effects is rejected. Hence the key model is the random effects model.
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4.4.1.3 Panel data regression-Summary
In a nutshell, the key considerations include whether there is evidence that intercepts are
significant (i.e. for fixed effect versus pooled OLS), whether the individual error term is zero
(pooled OLS versus random effect) and a Hausman test of whether there is a systematic
difference in coefficients between the random effects and fixed effects models. The proof of
systematic differences in coefficients under the Hausman test, would imply the correlation
between error term and regressors in the random effect model. If there is a correlation, then the
random effect is not appropriate. On the other hand, if there is no correlation between the
disturbance term and the independent variables, then the random effect model is preferred as it is
more parsimonious (Yafee, 2003). The use of dummy variables, under fixed effect model tends to
compromise the efficiency/parsimony of the model (i.e. including more variables increases the
variance of the sample estimator distribution) due to the huge number of regressors (i.e. each firm
effectively has a dummy variable). The fixed effects model is also undesirable as it excludes time
invariant variables. For example it will exclude variables such as the number of business units as
this is unlikely to change during the 5 year sample horizon.
4.4.2 Endogeneity
Another source of measurement error is the problem of endogeneity58 of independent variables. I
primarily assume endogeneity arises from the simultaneity or joint determination of hedging
derivatives and discretionary accrual use. As discussed in the theoretical framework, discretionary
accruals and derivatives usage are assumed to be jointly determined. The problem of endogeneity
leads to inconsistent59 and biased60 estimates.
Endogeneity is a matter that has been receiving great attention in recent accounting research.
Larcker and Rusticus (2008) in providing a critique on resolution of endogeneity, reviewed 42
studies published in Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics and
58
One of the core violations of OLS regression arises when independent variables are correlated with the error term. This presents
the problem of endogeneity. Nikolaev and van Lent (2005), also identify the main sources of the endogeneity problem in econometric
modelling. The main sources being omitted variables, firm specific heterogeneity and simultaneity. The assumption of this research is
that the problem of endogeneity primarily arises from simultaneity. However, The problem with endogenous variables as independent
variables in the model specification could arise due to them having a high correlation to the disturbance term. For example the
derivatives value, used as an independent variable in the discretionary accrual specification, will have a strong correlation with the
error term. This problem leads to inconsistent and biased estimates.
59 Large samples do not create greater estimation efficiency
60 The expected value of the sample is not equal to the value of the population
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the Accounting Review, conducted 1995-2005 period. However, as these authors find, most of
these studies fail to provide an adequate explanation on the rationale underpinning the chosen
approaches of resolve endogeneity and the likely accompanying limitations. Larcker and Rusticus
(2008) emphasize the need for empirical researchers to carefully consider and outline basis of
model selection, especially given that an inappropriate resolution approach such as the choice of
inappropriate instruments, simply amplifies the measurement error. As Baum (2007) describes
‘the cure can be worse than the disease’.
Below is an outline of the test selection procedure. The building blocks to selecting the model
include:
 Understanding and testing the sources of endogeneity of the independent variables;
 Selection the right solution to resolving endogeneity, including instrument selection, and
assessing strength and validity for the 2SLS model;
 Models testing including whether 2SLS model is identified, and checking for
heteroskedascity.
4.4.2.1 Sources of Model Endogeneity
Chenhall and Moers (2007) emphasize the need to have a clear understanding of the sources of
endogeneity based on underlying economic theory rather than as an artefact of econometric
models. The theoretical framework, section 2.5.1, shows that derivatives and discretionary
accruals are jointly determined and influenced by an overlapping set of determinants and this is a
source of endogeneity. As a first step, there is need is to test the assertion of endogeneity of
derivatives use as an independent variable for discretionary accrual as the dependent variable and
vice versa (i.e. simultaneity based endogeneity).
Apart from the simultaneity of derivatives and discretionary accrual use, there could be other
factors that introduce endogeneity. For example compensation could be endogenous to
derivatives use (Supanvanij and Strauss, 2006 and Guay, 2002). Also given that the objective is to
smooth income, unusual investment levels or operational hedging decisions made for this purpose
could imply that these variables are endogenous. However, the likelihood and severity of
inference error can be compounded by modelling many variables as endogenous. Assuming
endogeneity for every variable can lead to significant loss of efficiency and produces biased
results. Hence for model tractability, I confine the model to endogeneity arising from derivatives
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and discretionary accruals use. Nikolaev (2005) proposed that the endogeneity of primary
variables should be the focus and a sensitivity analysis based on multiple models is a suitable way
of getting satisfaction about the reliability of the regressions.
I cannot preclude that endogeneity could arise due to omitted unobservable variables (e.g. level of
treasury expertise) as well as due to measurement error amongst the selected variables. This risk
is mitigated by aiming to fully specify the model and with the assumption that firm specific
characteristics, such as total assets and firm performance, proxy for some aspects of unobservable
firm heterogeneity. The use of industry and year dummy variables captures industry and time
fixed effects and also minimises measurement error due to omitted variables.
4.4.2.2 Solution to the endogeneity problem
There are various approaches to resolving endogeneity. Kennedy (2003) divides the approaches
into two main categories, namely the single equation method and the systems equation method.
The single equation methods, also described as limited information models in econometric
literature, entail the solution of each equation of the system of simultaneous equations separately.
On the other hand, the systems equation or full information method solves the system of
equations simultaneously (Kennedy, 2003).
Single equation methods: the 2SLS approach
The single equation method includes the indirect least squares and the instrumental variable
approach. The single equation model options are described below
 Indirect least squares- a different set of equations, which sets the endogenous variable as a
linear function of the exogenous variables. For example, both a system of two equations with
derivatives and discretionary accruals only as dependent variables would be set. These set of
equations is described as the reduced form of equations. Thereafter, the OLS approach is used
to determine the regression parameter estimates. The empirical challenge of the indirect least
squares approach, is then determining the original or structural equation parameters. The
process of determining the original structural equation parameters is known in economic
literature as ‘identification.
 Another single equation approach is the use of instrumental variables approach. Instrumental
variables are used as substitutes to the endogenous variables in the model specification. An
instrumental variable is highly correlated to the endogenous variable but is not influenced by
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or correlated to the disturbance term in the regression specification. The use of instrumental
variables results in consistent but not unbiased estimates. The empirical challenge, however,
tends to be the identification of appropriate instrumental variables.
A special application of the instrument variable approach is the use of the two stages least square
(2SLS) regression approach. The 2SLS approach makes the assumption that the exogenous
variables are suitable candidates to be used as instrumental variables. As the name implies, the
2SLS is run in two stages. The first stage of the solution entails determining predicted values of
the endogenous variables using the exogenous independent variables. The first stage is similar to
determining reduced form equations in the indirect least squares method. The second stage of the
regression then uses the predicted endogenous variable value as an instrumental variable, in
addition to the exogenous variables. The regression parameter estimates are then both consistent
and unbiased. Kennedy (2003) describes the 2SLS method as robust (insensitive to other
estimating problems such as multi-collinearity and other specification problems). He also
mentions that it has the advantage of low computational cost. Due to the advantages of
robustness, low computational cost, and not needing to identify the structural form equation
solutions, this study applies the 2SLS regression (i.e. separate equation 2SLS method.).
As Kennedy (2003) points out there are other methods, such as the limited information/maximum
likelihood, the 3SLS (a full information extension of the 2SLS) and full information maximum
likelihood. The 3SLS method is used in the robustness testing.
4.4.2.3 2SLS- Model evaluation
Instrument variable selection
One of the principal approaches of resolving endogeneity is the use of instrument variables, under
the 2SLS approach. Instrument variables are a key input to the identification of a suitable
reduced form equation. Flawed identification simply leads to model mis-specification. The use of
the 2SLS approach is widespread in accounting research. Larcker and Rusticus (2008) review,
finds that 15 of 42 studies apply single equation 2SLS and 20 of 42 apply the simultaneous
equations. The instrument variable approach is susceptible to error arising from a) difficulties in
identifying instruments b) selection of weak instruments that are endogenous or weakly correlated
to the exogenous independent variable and c) correlation of instruments to error term. It is often a
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significant empirical challenge to identify instrument variables that are valid61 and strong62.
Instrument variables that are endogenous or have weak association with the endogenous variable
can result in biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. Hence, instrument variable validity and
strength are necessary attributes for the model specification.
For an instrument variable to be valid, it must be correlated to the endogenous variable and also
be orthogonal to the error process (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2003). The correlation to the
endogenous variable is determined by assessing the results of the first stage that consists of the
endogenous independent variable being modelled as the dependent variable with the instruments
and other variables as independent variables. The partial F-test and R-squared are used to
determine the strength of the instruments. If the F-test is greater than 10 then the instrument is
considered strong as recommended by (Baum et al, 2003). Weak instruments lead to biased
results concurrent to the loss of efficiency that goes with the switch from OLS to instrument
variable solution. Hence if instruments are weak, the parsimonious model (i.e. OLS) should be
preferred. For this study, instrument variable candidates are those identified as discriminating
determinants of derivatives use and discretionary accruals as discussed in sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4.
2SLS model assessment-Other considerations
Over-identification: For effective identification or determination of an appropriate reduced form
model, each endogenous variable should have at least one instrument variable. For the 2SLS IV,
the Sargan and Bassman statistics are used to test over-identification based on a null hypothesis of
instrument validity and identified.
OLS versus 2SLS: The Hausman test helps to determine whether the 2SLS approach should be
preferred to the OLS. If OLS parameter estimates are significantly different from 2SLS it is
considered to be inconsistent and 2SLS is preferred. If not OLS is preferred as it is more efficient.
Wooldridge (2003), notes that the asymptotic variance of the IV estimator, is larger than the
asymptotic variance of the OLS estimator. The Hausman test ascertains whether endogeneity
actually exists in the model.
61 Validity has several components a) non zero correlation with independent endogenous variable b)uncorrelated with error terms c)
uncorrelated with dependent variable except through the endogenous variable and d) monotonicity (it increases as the endogenous
variable increases)
62 Strength implies it has a high correlation with the endogenous variable
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Heteroskedasticity: Another key decision is whether 2SLS model is heteroskedastic63.
Fundamentally, heteroskedasticity creates problem of flawed coefficient standard errors and t-
tests. As a detection test, as prescribed by Baum et al (2003), I apply the Pagan Hall test.
4.4.3 Detailed empirical model specification
4.4.3.1 Determinants of derivatives use
Equation 4.2 is based on derivatives use, measured by the notional amount as the dependent
variable.
Equation 4.2
DRNV= α +  1 133DUM +  2 DAC +  3 133DUM *DAC +  4 ABINV +  5TAXLOSS +  6 PTOB+  7 LEV +  8
QRATIO +  9 LNASSETS +  10 GEOG_DIV +  11 FSALES +  12 VEGA +  13DELTA +  14 CSHPAYPER +  15
INSTOWN +  16- INDDUM +  YRDUM
Table 4.2: Summary of multivariate testing procedures for determinants of derivatives use
Phase Key steps
Model
determination
 Assess the fixed effect, pooled OLS and random effect models
 Test endogeneity of discretionary accrual as an explanatory
variable
 Test of instrument variable validity and strength
 Test endogeneity of model (Hausman test)
Sample testing
approach
 Run censored regression on combined sample of derivatives
and non derivatives users
 Run regression on sample of derivatives users that have
disclosed notional amounts
Robustness
tests
 2SLS models
 Tobit/Probit regression
63
One of the assumptions of the classical linear regression model is that disturbance terms have the same variance and are not
correlated. The violation of this assumption leads to the problem of heteroskedasticity. The problem of heteroskedasticity leads to
biased estimates and also compromises efficiency and hence the parameter estimates are incorrect.
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4.4.3.2 Determinants of discretionary accruals
DAC= α +  1 133DUM +  2 CHDUM +  3 DRNV +  4 133*DRNV +  5 ABINV +  6 R&D +  7TAXLOSS +
 8 LEV +  9 LN_TRADVOL+  10 DIV_POUT +  11OPCSHFLOW +  12 VEGA +  13 DELTA +  14 CSHPAY
+  15 BONUS_PERC+  16 INSTOWN +  17 MGR SHROWN +  18 AUDEXP +  19 INTERLOCK +  20-
INDDUM +  YRDUM
Table 4.3: Summary of multivariate test procedures for determinants of discretionary accruals
Phase Key steps
Model
determination
 Assess the fixed effect, random effect and pooled OLS models
 Test for endogeneity of derivatives as an explanatory variable
 Test instrument variables strength and validity
 Test endogeneity of model (Hausman test)
Sample testing
approach
 Run regression on sample of derivatives users that have disclosed
notional amounts
 Run regression on sample that combines derivatives and non
derivatives users
Robustness tests  2SLS models simultaneous
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has defined the sample and outlined the methodology to test the impact of SFAS 133
on the decision to smooth earnings using derivatives and discretionary accruals.
I have included the definition of the dependent and independent variables, linking them to the
theoretical framework in chapter 2. I have highlighted the key methodological challenges including
the endogeneity problem due to the simultaneity of the decision by managers to either use
derivatives use or discretionary accrual use as a means of smoothing earnings. Endogeneity can
lead to biased and inconsistent results. Thereafter, I have highlighted the approaches proposed in
econometric literature to mitigate the endogeneity problem.
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I further discuss the methodological decision of the appropriate model to cater for individual effects
that could bias the results. The sample consists of unbalanced panel data and therefore would
require panel regression and this necessitates the choice of whether to run random or fixed effects
model. I describe the reasoning guiding the model determination. Also outlined is the approach for
the robustness testing. Chapter 5 contains the findings of the empirical tests conducted.
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4.6 Appendix –Research design
4.6.1 Detailed variable definition
Discretionary accruals: Modified Jones
The Jones (1991) model was developed by Jennifer Jones as part of her contribution to an
investigation by the US Trade International Trade Commissions (Bruce and Bradshaw, 2004) on
firms that were evading tax. The Jones model is essentially implemented in two stages. In the first
stage, an estimate of non-discretionary or normal accruals is made. The first step is to calculate
the total or aggregate accruals of the firm. This can be determined from either the income
statement or balance sheet. Total accruals can be derived from the:
 income statement, by taking the difference between the operating cash flow during a
period and reported earnings (Barton, 2001).
 balance sheet; by taking the difference between changes in assets and changes in
liabilities, during a particular period.
The determination of total aggregate accruals is a top down approach, rather than a bottom up
aggregation of every conceivable specific accrual. A bottom up approach would be time
consuming and most likely inaccurate as it may not be exhaustive or may not capture all the
possible entries. Hence the top down approaches of inferring accruals tends to prevail in empirical
research. A number of empirical papers (Barton, 2001; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Gao and
Shrieves, 2002) prefer deriving the total accrual figure from the income statement as it entails
making a calculation using only the two figures, as opposed to using the balance sheet, due to the
need to deal with multiple lines of liabilities and assets. I adopt the income statement based
derivation of total accruals.
The core assumption of the first stage of the Jones (1991) model, modified by Dechow (1996), is
that the expected level of accruals or normal accruals of any firm is determined by the underlying
economic characteristics of the firm. Hence, the level of a) changes in cash revenue during a
period (increases in revenue should correspond to an increase in the level of non discretionary
accruals as it likely also corresponds to an increase in the level of working capital items that
necessitate accrual accounting) and b) the level of Property Plant and equipment (this influences
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depreciation levels. Depreciation is often the largest income decreasing accrual in the income
statement) (Bruce and Bradshaw, 2004; Dechow (1995)). Using an OLS regression procedure, as
formalised in equation 2 below, a forecast of expected accruals is made, with the derived total
accruals as the dependent variable and cash revenues and levels of property, plant and equipment
as independent variables. To predict expected accruals, there is the option of either using the same
firm’s time series data or doing a cross sectional estimate based on firms with similar
characteristics. Due to constraints in obtaining sufficient time series data for the same firm (e.g.10
years of data) and due to desirability of making the estimate during the same time period, so as to
capture the prevailing economic impact on firm performance, it is preferable to do a cross
sectional estimate of firms with similar characteristics. On this basis, the estimate is done using
firms in the industry grouping during the same year. The industry classification is the 2 digit SIC
code to ensure sufficient estimation points. The dependent and independent variables are divided
by the lagging value of total assets or total assets vale at the beginning of the period. This is done
to scale the estimates and cater for differences in size of firms in the regression. The predicted or
fitted value of total accruals, from the regression below, is assumed to be the level of non
discretionary or normal accruals
Equation 4.3
TACit/TAit-1= 1(1/TAit-1) +  2{(REVit-RECit)/TAit-1} +  3(PPEit/TAit-1) +  it
 TACit is total accruals measured as earnings before extraordinary items and
discontinued operations less operating cash flows
 TAit-1 is the beginning of period total assets
 REVit is change in revenue from year t-1 to year t,
 RECit is change in accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t,
 REVit-RECit represents the change in cash revenues
 PPE is gross property, plant and equipment, included to control for normal
depreciation expense
The second stage of the estimation process is done by subtracting the normal accruals estimate
derived above from the total accruals. This yields an estimate of non discretionary accruals. In
other words the residual or abnormal component of total accruals is deemed to be discretionary.
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Refinements to the Modified Jones Model
To refine64 the discretionary accrual estimate, the forward looking model adjusts the revenue
factor that is used in the modified Jones (1991) model. Phillips, Pincus and Rego (2003) proposed
some refinements to the mentioned Jones (1991) model. The key difference is that in the refined
model, normal or non discretionary accruals are assumed to vary with the level of changes in cash
sales plus expected changes in credit sales, rather than only changes in cash sales. To determine
expected changes in credit sales, a regression of changes in credit sales as dependent variable and
changes in sales as the independent variable is done for firms in the same industry (2 digit SIC
code) category and year. A fitted value of change in credit sales is thereafter determined, after a
winsorisation65 process that ensures that the predicted credit sales falls within a particular range of
a firm’s actual credit sales changes. The expected credit sales figure is then included in the
change in cash sales estimate i.e. ((REVit-RECit) + (CSit)). Phillips, Pincus and Rego
(2003) introduce additional independent variables that are deemed to be related with an increase
in normal level of accruals
 Sales growth rate
 Lagging total accruals
The model takes the form shown in equation 5 below. This is the regression used to determine the
normal or non discretionary accrual estimate and thereafter to infer the discretionary accrual
estimate.
Equation 4.4
TACit/TAit-1= 1(1/TAit-1)+ 2{(REVit-RECit)+(CSit))/TAit-1}+ 3(PPEit/TAit-1) +  4(Sales
growth rate it) +  5(TACit-1 /TAit-2) +  it
 TACit is total accruals measured as earnings before extraordinary items and
discontinued operations less operating cash flows
 TAit-1 is the beginning of period total assets
64
Modified Jones models estimates discretionary accruals with considerable imprecision that could result in misclassification of
normal accruals as discretionary accruals (DeChow et al, 1995). This can be due to omitted variables in the equation determining
normal accrual level.
65
The discretionary credit sales estimates are constrained to a) being a positive factor of observed credit sales (at least 20% of credit
sales) and b) to not exceeding the level of observed credit sales
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 REVit is change in revenue from year t-1 to year t,
 RECit is change in accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t,
 REVit-RECit represents the change in cash revenues
 PPE is gross property, plant and equipment, included to control for normal
depreciation expense
 CSit expected change in credit sales
As discussed, the use of the Jones (1991) model and its variants is common in contemporary
empirical accounting research. Studies (Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Barton, 2001; Gao and
Shrieves,2002) all make use of the described estimation procedure. All these studies,
acknowledge that measurement error could arise from the use of this model. The errors could
occur when normal accruals are wrongly classified as discretionary accruals or discretionary
accruals are classified as normal accruals. Specification errors for example could arise from the
use of firms with the same 2 digit SIC code66 with the assumption that firms have similar
characteristics.
To minimise extreme outliers, after determining an estimate of discretionary accruals, I apply the
following winsorisation procedures:
 Non discretionary accrual estimates are constrained from exceeding total accruals by 80%
or from being lower than 20% of observed total accruals. This is a judgemental
adjustment introduced in this study in order to minimise the likelihood of extreme
estimates.
 To further minimise the risk of miss-classification, in observations where no
discretionary accruals would be expected (e.g. net income level is positive and the
percentage change in net income does not differ significantly from the percentage change
in cash flow), then the discretionary accrual estimate is reduced to 80% of the estimate.
The estimation of discretionary accruals was done using the full sample of firms listed on the
NASDAQ and NYSE (7185 firms, and approx 23, 000 firm-year combinations during the 1998-
2003 period. 1998 data was used to determine lagging accruals for 1999). Firm-year
combinations, within the same 2 SIC category, consisting of less than 10 observations were
excluded from the regression estimate to avoid estimation errors. Firms with missing data, ADR
listed companies, financial services and utilities were then excluded. The dataset of extracted
66 Use of 2 digit SIC code is primarily motivated by the likelihood of using sufficient data points in the regression process
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discretionary accruals data was then matched to firm sample as specified in the sampling criteria
in Table 1. 1427 firm-years (363 firms) had matching discretionary accrual data.
Determining vega and delta sensitivities
The calculation of vega and delta is done using compensation data collected from Execucomp.
Execucomp discloses compensation data for a number of high level executives within its
constituent firms. Core and Guay (2002) use the partial derivatives of the dividend adjusted
Black-Scholes model to calculate vega and delta. Rajgopal and Shelvin (2002) are critical of the
Black Scholes method of calculating executive stock options, mainly due to the constraints in the
trading of these options. The Black Scholes model is likely to overstate the value of the options
and correspondingly overstate the vega and delta sensitivities. Despite the shortcoming in
valuation, Triki (2005) and Rogers (2002) pinpoint the attractiveness of the Core and Guay
(2002) estimation procedure of vega and delta, namely that it is structured to deal with incomplete
information (e.g. absence of exercise price and expiry date of options not granted during the year)
and that corresponds to the data disclosed in proxy statements and the Execucomp database.
While some studies (Core and Guay, 2000) focus on CEO pay, I use the average figure of the
disclosed executive compensation per firm-year as the proxy variable. The average executive
compensation is assumed to be representative of the incentives of the top management team
rather than of the CEO as an individual. This approach is assumed that this will likely be a more
accurate pointer of the risk management choices.
Core and Guay (2002), Guay (1999), provide the method to calculate Delta and Vega measures.
Estimating Delta and Vega of a single option
Option value is based on Black-Scholes European option pricing formula (Black and Scholes,
1973), as modified by Merton (1973) to account for dividend payouts.
Option value= )()( 21 dNXedNSe
rTdT  
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S = price of the underlying stock
X = exercise price of the option
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T = time to maturity
R = ln (1+ risk-free rate)
D = ln (1+ dividend rate), where the expected dividend rate is the per-share
dividends
 = annualised volatility
N ( ) = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution
Delta = the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% change in stock price
= [ (option value) /  (stock price)]  (stock price/100)
= )100/()( 1 SdNe
dT 
Vega = the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 0.01 change in stock
volatility
= [ (option value) /  (stock volatility)]0.01
= 01.0)( 1  TSdNe dT
)( 1dN  is the normal density function. I multiply the sensitivity and Delta by the number of
options to obtain the total dollar values of the change in CEO’s wealth that will result from a 1%
change in stock price and 0.01 changes in stock volatility.
Estimating Delta and Vega of portfolio of options
I calculate fiscal year end value and sensitivities of executives’ option portfolios using the Core
and Guay (2002) approximation method. Regarding US data, I use ExecuComp data, which gives
the realisable value, i.e., the potential gains from exercising all options on the fiscal year end
price, and the number of options separately for both exercisable and unexercisable options and
also details of the current year’s option grant.
 For the current year’s grant, I compute the Black-Scholes value and sensitivities using the
above formulae.
 For previously granted options, I compute the Black-Scholes value and sensitivities (Delta
and Vega) separately for vested and unvested options.
o Compute the average exercise price separately for the portfolio of exercisable options
and unexercisable options. First, I divide the realisable value by the number of
options, which gives the average of (stock price-exercise price). I then subtract the
number from the stock price to obtain the average exercise price.
o For exercisable options, I set the time to maturity as three years less than the time to
maturity of the current year’s options grants, or 6 years if no grant was made in the
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current year67. Hence if time to maturity is 8 years for current option grants, I set time
to maturity of previously granted options as 5 years.
o For unexercisable options, I set the time to maturity equal to one year less than the
time to maturity of the current year’s options grants, or 9 years if no grant was made
in the current year.
o Calculate the Black-Scholes option value, delta, and vega using the average exercise
price and time to maturity.
Compute the delta of the CEO’s portfolio of stocks and options by adding the Delta of
restricted stock and shares held by the CEO to the Delta of his options portfolio.
The vega of the manager’s portfolio of stock and options = vega of new options granted +vega of
all exercisable option held + vega of all unexercisable options held
67 Vesting period is between 3 and 5 years. Execucomp does not provide details of previously granted options. Hence a guesstimate is
necessary. This is consistent with approach in other empirical studies Core and Guay (2002), Coles et al (2006) and Guay (1999).
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Table 4.4 Definition of variables
Variable Definition and construct measured
Focal variables
DRNV Notional amount/Total assets- Measures extent of derivatives
use. The notional amount is a proxy for risk exposure and is
hand collected from Form 10-K statements downloaded from
the SEC Edgar’s database. The notional amount is scaled by
total assets.
FVALUE Derivatives fair value/Total assets-Alternative measure of
derivatives use. This data is hand collected from Form 10-K
statements downloaded from the SEC Edgar’s database. The
fair value is scaled by total assets.
DAC The proxy for discretionary accruals is derived. It is based on
determining what should be a normal level of accrual use based on
the revenue generated, asset intensity as defined in the Jones (1991)
estimate modified by Phillips and Rego (2003) factors (i.e. sales
growth rate and normal credit sales levels). A detailed description
of the formulation is in section. The measure is unsigned and
scaled by total assets.
The inputs into the determination are sales (data item #12), property
plant and equipment (data item #7), total assets (data item #6), net
income (data item #18) and operating cash flow(data item #308).
The Compustat unit of measure for these variables is $millions.
133DUM SFAS 133 dummy variable equals 1 for Post-SFAS 133 data
and 0 for Pre-SFAS 133 data (i.e. 1999 and 2000(0),
2001,2002, 2003 (1))
133*DAC Interaction variable (DAC*133DUM)
133*DRNV Interaction variable (DRNV*133DUM)
CHGDUM Cash flow hedge accounting dummy. This is equal to 1 if
derivatives user discloses use of cash flow hedge accounting
and 0 if it does not. Hand collected from annual statements
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USER Derivatives user dummy (1 for derivatives user, 0 for non
derivatives users). Hand collected from annual statements
Control variables for
derivatives use and
discretionary accruals
ABINV Abnormal Investment- This is a derived measure based on the
deviation from the predicted capital expenditure level. The input is
capital expenditure (data item#128)/sales (data item#12) and a
regression is run to predict what would be expected based on
industry characteristics (see section 4.3.2) . The level of investment
is a proxy for the use of expenditure as a mechanism of income
smoothing i.e. real earning management choices by altering cash
flows. It could also be a proxy for the extent to which the
underinvestment problem exists (see section 2.3.1.4) and therefore
creates need for income smoothing.
R&D Research and development expenditure (compustat data item
#46)/Total assets - (compustat item #9)/Total assets (compustat
item #6). This is a proxy for underinvestment, it also is a proxy for
the use of expenditure as a means of smoothing earnings
TAXLOSS The scaled tax loss carry forward, Tax loss carry forward/total
assets (Compustat data #52/#6). This is a proxy for the convexity of
tax schedule and this reduces the expected future tax liabilities (see
section 2.3.1.2)
LEV Long term debt (compustat item #9)/Total assets (compustat
item #6) – Leverage is a proxy for firm’s incentives to reduce
probability and expected costs financial distress and the
likelihood to need to smooth earnings to do so. Leverage also
proxies for interest rate exposure that can lead to using
derivatives for hedging purposes and the incentive to manage
earnings to avoid covenant violations. The leverage is scaled
by total assets
VEGA Vega/Cash Pay- Vega is a proxy for sensitivity to volatility
and is a measure of managerial risk aversion. It is measured
as the average dollar change in value of the top management
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stock and option portfolio for a dollar 1% change in standard
deviation of stock returns. Vega is scaled by cash pay. This
data is obtained from Execucomp.
Vega = Vega of new options granted during year+ vega of all
exercisable options held+ vega of all unexercisable options
held
DELTA Delta/Cash Pay- Delta is a proxy for sensitivity to changes in
stock price and is a measure of managerial risk aversion. It is
measured as the average dollar change in value of the top
management stock and option portfolio for a dollar 1%
change in stock price. Delta is scaled by cash pay. This data is
obtained from Execucomp.
Delta = Delta of new options granted during year+ delta of all
exercisable options held+ delta of all unexercisable options
held
CSHPAY Cash Pay/Total compensation- controls for managerial risk
aversion due to personal wealth diversification. This is based
on total compensation.
Total compensation= Cash salary + Bonus + stock granted +
stock options granted
This data is obtained from Execucomp.
INST_OWN Percentage of institutional ownership- Proxy for corporate
governance. Sourced from compustat
MGR_SHRS Managerial ownership as a percentage of stock holdings as at
year end. This data is obtained from Execucomp.
INTERLOCK
Dummy variable for where executives are subject to
interlocking relationship. Variable is equal to one when
interlocking relationship exists (1), otherwise it is equals to
zero. This data is obtained from Execucomp.
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INDDUM Industry dummy- Across 6 key broad industry categories
namely mining, manufacturing, transaction, trading, services
and other. This is based on aggregation of SIC codes recorded
in Compustat. This caters for unobservable variation.
YRDUM Year dummy. This caters for impact of any unobservable
macroeconomic factors that could have influenced the use of
derivatives by US companies. For example, the introduction
of the Euro in 2001 could have reduced the overall foreign
currency exposure of US exporter/importer firms due to their
being fewer transaction currencies.
Discretionary accrual
variables
OP_CSHFLOW Operating cash flow (data item#328)/Total assets (data
item#6). Used to control for risk of misclassification of
discretionary accruals when extreme operating cash flows are
in place. Barton (2001) applied this variable in similar
fashion.
DIV_POUT Dividend payout (Dividend/Income before extraordinary
items)- Compustat #21/#20.
BONUS_PERC Proportion of average bonus paid per executive/Total compensation
paid per executive. Total compensation is measured as the sum of
salary, bonus, annual compensation, manager’s stock ownership,
and in-the-money exercisable and unvested options. This data is
obtained from Execucomp
LN_TRADVOL Logarithm of trading volume. (Average annual volume of
shares traded) Trading volume. This is sourced from
Compustat
AUDEXP Sorted all firms by two digit SIC codes and set the dummy to
one (zero) if the audit firm for a particular company audits
more than 15% (<15%) of firms in two digit SIC code.
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Bowen, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2008) applied this
variable in similar fashion.
Derivatives variables
GEOG_DIV Number of geographically spread business units is a proxy for
operational hedging
PTOB Price to Book ratio is a proxy for the presence of growth
options and likelihood of hedging so as to avoid the
underinvestment problem (see section 2.3.1.4). Firm’s price
per share divided by book value per share, as at fiscal year-
end (i.e. compustat data item#60/(#199*#25))
LNASSETS Logarithm of total assets (Compustat #6) is a proxy for size
effect
QRATIO Quick ratio- (quick assets divided by total liabilities) (i.e.
Compustat data (#1+#2)/#5). This is proxy for liquidity
FSALES Percentage of foreign sales (Foreign sales/Total sales) for
each firm-year is a proxy for financial price exposure and is
extracted from Compustat Geographic Segments File.
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5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS: IMPACT OF SFAS 133 ON INCOME
SMOOTHING
5.1 Introduction
This chapter reports the empirical results of testing the impact of SFAS 133 on income smoothing
through the use of discretionary accruals and derivatives. The testing is based on the
methodological approach outlined in chapter 4. The results discussion is structured at follows:
1. Descriptive and univariate statistics (section 5.2);
2. Multivariate analysis (section 5.3); and
3. Robustness tests (section 5.3.5).
5.2 Descriptive and univariate statistics
5.2.1 Derivatives use
Hypothesis 2.1 states that SFAS 133 leads to reduced derivatives use. While Hypothesis 2.3
states that derivatives and discretionary accruals are substitutes for income smoothing. Therefore
it is useful to assess whether there is a difference in derivatives use in the pre- and post-SFAS 133
periods. On the same basis, I assess derivatives use characteristics between high and low accrual
user observations. In addition, assessing the usage of different derivatives types, across different
time periods, as well as derivatives usage amounts and types across different industries helps to
build an overall picture of patterns of derivatives use. This set of tests complements the
multivariate testing.
Hence, the following univariate and descriptive statistics are provided:
 Mean and median for the full sample68 of derivatives users;
 Extent of application of cash flow hedge accounting. This is determined based on the
frequency of a dummy variable identifier;
 Stratified by period: Difference in mean and median values of pre- and post-SFAS 133
derivatives user observations;
 Stratified by level of accruals: Difference in mean and median values of low and high
accrual observations;
68
Excludes firms with missing notional amounts and extreme values (i.e. notional amount greater than total assets)
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 Derivatives usage patterns by industry: (mean and median of derivatives use per industry
category, difference of proportion of instrument type before and after SFAS 133,
instrument type and derivatives amount per industry grouping).
5.2.1.1 Derivatives Use: Full sample mean and median
The aggregate mean of derivatives use (i.e. notional amount / total assets) of the sample, after
excluding extreme values, is 0.116 (see Table 5.1). This compares well with the findings of other
studies such as Singh (2004) - mean of 0.084, Huang et al (2009) - mean of 0.102, Park (2004) -
mean of 0.11 and Ahmed et al (2006) -mean of 0.092.
Table 5.1-Derivatives use: Mean and median values of derivatives users
Reported values are based on scaled notional derivatives (i.e. notional amount/total assets). Derivatives
users are the firm year with reported notional amounts of derivatives but excluding outliers (i.e. 551 firm-
year observations).
Mean Median
Std
deviation Observations69
Derivatives users 0.116 0.083 0.125 551
Cash flow hedge accounting
As discussed in section 4.3.1, I use a dummy variable due to inconsistent disclosure of notional
amounts associated with derivatives use. Results reported in Table 5.2 show that 32% of
derivative users use cash flow hedge accounting in Post-SFAS 133 period. This compares well
with Singh (2004) who found approximately 50% of his sample firms were eligible for hedge
accounting.
Table 5.2-Derivatives use: Related dummy variable statistics
Cash flow hedge accounting Hedging firms Percentage
Post-SFAS 133 observations 140 436 32%
Pre-SFAS 133 observations 11 245 4.5%
Total 151 681 22%
11(4.5%) of the 245 firms in the pre-SFAS 133 observations disclose cash flow hedge
accounting.
69 Excludes firms with missing notional and extreme values (i.e. scaled notional>1)
165
5.2.1.2 Derivatives usage: Difference in means and median values: stratified samples
I test the difference between means and medians of a) separate pre- and post-SFAS 133
observations and b) separate low and high accrual observations. The differentiation between low
and high accrual firms is based on the median of the overall sample (i.e. high accrual firms are
firms whose discretionary accruals are greater than 2.8% of total assets).
Difference between means of Pre- and Post-SFAS 133 observations
The univariate results in
Table 5.3 shows that there are significant differences of means and medians in the scaled
derivatives notional amount between the pre-SFAS 133 (mean of 0.140 and median of 0.093) and
post-SFAS 133 (mean of 0.109 and median of 0.074) observations. These results, based on a
sample of derivatives users, show a significant decline in the level of derivatives use after the
adoption of SFAS 133. I find similar evidence based on a sample that includes both users and
non-users of derivatives. These findings are supportive of Hypothesis 2.1 that expects derivatives
use to reduce after SFAS 133 is adopted.
Table 5.3 - Derivatives use: Difference between mean and median values of separate
Pre- and Post-SFAS 133 observations
Reported values are based on scaled notional derivatives (i.e. notional amount/total assets). Derivatives users
excluded observations with missing notional amounts and notional amount outliers (i.e. 551 firm-year
observations). Similarly, the sample of users and non-users derivatives of 720 firm year observations excludes
missing notional amounts and notional amount outliers.
Derivatives users Derivatives and non-derivatives users
Mean Median Count Mean Median Count
Pre-SFAS 133 0.140 0.093 218 0.110 0.061 277
Post-SFAS 133 0.109 0.074 333 0.076 0.042 443
T-stat 3.27 3.38
Z-stat 2.60 2.56
Pair-wise differences
However, when investigating whether there is an increase or decrease per individual firm the
reduction in derivatives use is not evident. Table 5.4 - Panel A shows the results from the 253
firms in the sample, 58 (22%) used derivatives only during the post-SFAS 133 period, while 36
(14%)70 used derivatives only prior to SFAS 133 and not after. This suggests that they stopped
70
Similarly, Singh (2004) finds that 9% of the sample stopped using derivatives.
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using derivatives. Of firms that had observations in both periods, 66 (26%) increased, while 62
(24.5%) decreased their derivatives use. In addition, I test the difference between means of the
138 firms that have observations in both pre- and post-SFAS 133 periods (i.e. paired firms) and
these results are reported in Table 5.4 Panel B There is no significant difference when the test is
based on average annual usage in either of these periods (i.e. a single annual average per firm for
each of these two periods). However, there is a significant reduction when all observations related
to the paired firms are used. This is consistent with the results based on the full sample (i.e. paired
and non-paired firms).
Table 5.4 – Derivatives use: Trends before and after SFAS 133
Panel A: Trends in Derivatives Use
Firms that increased derivatives use after SFAS 133 66
Firms that decreased derivatives use after SFAS 133 62
Firms with no change in derivatives use across both periods (non users) 19
Total firms with observations across pre- and Post-SFAS 133 147
Use derivatives only after SFAS 133 58
Use derivatives only before SFAS 133 36
Total number of firms that at least use derivatives 241
Add Firms missing notional values 12
Total Sample Firme 253
Panel B Difference in means and medians-Paired firms
Reported values are based on scaled notional derivatives (i.e. notional amount/total assets). This is based on 138 firms that had
observations across the pre- and post-SFAS 133 periods.
Grouped71 mean Mean Median Count
Pre-SFAS 133 0.101 0.108 0.056 227
Post-SFAS 133 0.086 0.080 0.041 353
Difference 0.015 0.028
T-test 0.98 2.64
Z-test 0.35 1.60
Paired number of firms72 138
71 This is based on the mean of average usage per firm both before and after SFAS 133. It only includes firms with observations
across both periods
72 Excludes firms with extreme values (i.e. scaled notional>1) and those with missing notional amounts. 138 derivatives and non
derivatives users firms with data across both periods
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5.2.1.3 Derivatives usage: Difference in means – classified by low and high accrual
observations
The results (see Table 5.5) also show that firms classified as low discretionary accrual firms (i.e.
below median) have higher levels of derivatives use relative to high level discretionary accrual
firms. Using samples of only derivatives users, low accrual firms have a notional amount mean of
0.13 and median of 0.087, while high accrual firms have a mean of 0.1 and median of 0.074. A
similar finding is derived when the sample consists of both users and non users of derivatives.
These findings support Hypothesis 2.3, which states that derivatives and accruals are used as
income smoothing substitutes.
Table 5.5-Derivatives use: Difference between mean and median values of separate low accrual
and high accrual observations
Reported values are based on scaled notional derivatives (i.e. notional amount/total assets). Derivatives users excluded
observations with missing notional amounts and notional amount outliers (i.e. 551 firm-year observations). Similarly, the
sample of users and non-users derivatives of 720 firm year observations excludes missing notional amounts and notional
amount outliers.
Derivatives users Users and non-users of derivatives
Mean Median
Firm-year
observations Mean Median
Firm-year
observations
Low discretionary accrual 0.130 0.087 287 0.105 0.063 354
High discretionary accrual 0.100 0.074 264 0.074 0.036 366
T-stat 2.57 3.50
Z-stat 2.47 3.75
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5.2.1.4 Frequency of Derivatives types across periods
Across the sample, 81% (681 of the 850 firms) use derivatives. Table 5.6 contains results of the
frequency of use of different derivatives instrument. Currency forwards (70%) are the most
frequently used derivatives amongst all observations, with currency swaps (6%) being the least
frequently used. The frequency of commodity derivatives (14%) is much lower than either
interest rate derivatives (46%) or currency derivatives (at least 70%)73. It is possible that the
more widespread use of currency derivatives is simply a by-product of the sampling criteria,
which is based on likelihood of sample firms foreign currency exposure (i.e. foreign sales
percentage >30%). However, the high usage of currency derivatives and low usage of commodity
derivatives is consistent with some other studies. Lins et al’s (2007) survey finds that 83% and
49% of their respondent companies use currency derivatives and commodity derivatives
respectively. However, their survey reveals a higher utilisation of interest derivatives (74%).
The results show that a significant decrease in the use of currency options occurred after
adoption of SFAS 133. A statistically significant decline of proportions from 18% to 11%
occurred across the two periods (before and after the adoption of SFAS 133). This observed
decline is consistent with the anticipation, by Lins et al (2007) that difficulties in qualifying for
hedge accounting, for non linear contracts such as options, leads to their lower usage. It could
also be due to the overall trend of decrease in use of currency derivatives. The proportion of
currency swaps reduced from 8% to 5%. This could be a reflection of the reduction in currency
exposure. Richie et al (2006) observed that the introduction of the Euro coincided with the
introduction of SFAS 133 and this could have lead to a reduction in exposures of US firms to
multiple European currencies and correspondingly reduced the need to use currency derivatives.
In contrast to currency derivatives, there is an observed increase in interest rate derivatives. This
could potentially be explained by the easier qualification for hedge accounting treatment of
interest rate swaps. These are eligible for what is described as the shortcut method that does not
necessitate the stringent prospective assessment of likely hedge effectiveness. Managers are
expected to prefer using such instruments because they easily qualify for hedge accounting.
Clearly there is a pattern to the application of different derivatives instruments and the analysis of
determinants of derivatives instrument type is a potential area for further empirical study.
73 This is inferred from the numbers that use currency forwards. It will be greater if the number of firms that use either forwards or
options or swaps is considered.
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Table 5.6 Derivatives instrument types across periods
Derivatives type between Pre- and Post- SFAS 133
Table outlines the percentage frequency of derivatives use per year based on the analysis of total sample of users and non-users of
derivatives. This is based on full sample of 850 firm year observations. Derivatives users are firms that reported either the notional or
fair value amount of derivatives use.
Year
Firm-year
observations
Derivatives
users
Non users of
derivatives
Currency
forwards
Currency
options
Currency
swaps
Pre-SFAS 133 304 81% 19% 72% 18% 8%
Post-SFAS 133 546 80% 20% 69% 11% 5%
Total 850 80% 20% 70% 13% 6%
Difference of
proportions (t-stat) 0.35 - 0.35 0.92 2.87 1.76
Significance level *** *
***Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%,* Significance at 10%
Panel B (Continued) Derivatives type between Pre- and Post- SFAS 133
Year Interest rate Commodity
Pre-SFAS 133 42% 15%
Post-SFAS 133 48% 14%
Total 46% 14%
Difference of
proportions (t-stat) - 1.68 0.40
Significance level *
***Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%,* Significance at 10%
5.2.1.5 Derivatives use: Industry trends
The analysis is based on six broad key industry categories. The results showing derivatives use by
industry are contained in Table 5.7 and this reveals a pattern of variation in usage across
industries. This is to be expected as different industries have different business risk exposures.
As discussed in 3.4.2, Nain (2004) contended that the interaction of risk exposures, competitive
structure and strategic interaction between competitors, would likely dictate the pattern of
observed derivatives usage within an industry. The notional amount shows that manufacturing
industry firms are heavy users of derivatives, while mining and trading industry firms have lower
usage. This compares well with the univariate analysis of Supanvanij and Strauss (2006). They
found manufacturing companies to be heavy users of derivatives, while wholesale and retail
trade, mining and health were less frequent users of derivatives. Regarding derivatives instrument
types, mining companies are heavy users of commodity derivatives (42%), which is to be
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expected. All the other sectors predominantly use currency forwards and this is coupled with a
significant use of interest rate swap contracts.
Table 5.7-Derivatives use across key industry categories
Panel A Derivatives use by industry category.
Based on scaled notional derivatives (i.e. notional amount/total assets) and excludes outliers
Industry Mean Median Frequency
Mining 0.04 0.01 37
Manufacturing 0.10 0.06 567
Transaction 0.11 0.05 5
Trading 0.06 0.03 19
Services 0.07 0.05 88
Other 0.08 0.07 4
Panel B- Derivatives types applied across key industry groups
Industry Hedge
Currency
forward
Currency
option
Currency
swap
Interest rate
swap Commodity Count
Mining 76% 36% 10% 0% 50% 42% 50
Manufacturing 81% 73% 13% 7% 46% 14% 658
Transaction 100% 83% 17% 0% 33% 33% 6
Trading 93% 67% 30% 0% 70% 7% 30
Services 70% 63% 11% 5% 30% 0% 99
Other 100% 100% 14% 29% 100% 57% 7
Overall, these tests pick up some trends but there remains a need for additional empirical
evidence on the determinants of the level of different derivatives use within industry, so as to
further explain the observed variation across industries. The same can be said of determinants of
application of different derivatives instruments. However, this falls outside the scope of this study
and it is an area that calls for further empirical investigation as discussed in chapter 8.
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5.2.2 Discretionary accruals
Given that discretionary accrual is a focal variable in assessing the impact of SFAS 133, it is
useful to assess how SFAS 133 influences the levels of accruals. In addition, given the
substitution hypothesis, it is useful to assess whether the decision to use derivatives influences the
level of application of discretionary accruals. The following descriptive and univariate statistics
are provided for discretionary accruals:
 Mean and median of full sample;
 Difference in mean and median values between pre- and post- SFAS 133 derivatives
user observations;
 Difference in mean and median values between derivatives user and non user
observations.
5.2.2.1 Discretionary accruals: Means and Medians of full sample
The discretionary accrual mean of the sample firms is 0.041 or 4.1% of total assets, with a median
of 2.8% (see Table 5.8). This is in comparison with Huang et al’s (2009) sample (mean of 6.3%
and median of 4.4%) Barton’s (2001) sample (mean of 1.9% and median of 3.4%). The total
accrual mean is 8.1% with a median of 6.4%.
Table 5.8-Discretionary accruals: Mean and median values of full sample
(i.e. derivatives users and non users)
Reported values are based on unsigned scaled discretionary accruals (i.e. unsigned discretionary
accruals/total assets) and are based on full sample of 850 firm year observations.
Discretionary accruals Total accruals
Category Mean Median Mean Median
Firm-year
observations
Combined
derivatives and
non derivatives
users 0.041 0.028 0.081 0.064 850
5.2.2.2 Discretionary accruals: Difference between means and median tests
Difference between means and median of separate Pre- and Post- SFAS 133 observations
I reviewed the difference between the means and median of separate pre- and post- SFAS 133
period observations. Table 5.9 outlines the results, which show a statistically significant increase
in the level of discretionary accruals. Using the sample of derivatives users, the mean of
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discretionary accruals has a statistically significant increase from 3.2% to 4.2%. Using the
combined sample, the mean of discretionary accruals has a statistically significant increase from
3.6% to 4.3%. These results support Hypothesis 2.2 that SFAS 133 leads to an increase in
discretionary accruals.
Table 5.9-Discretionary accruals: Difference between means and medians of separate
Pre and Post-SFAS 133 observations
Panel A-Partitioned findings between separate samples of a) derivatives users and
b) users and non users of derivatives
Reported values are based on unsigned scaled discretionary accruals (i.e. unsigned discretionary
accruals/total assets). Derivatives users are the firm year with evidence of derivatives use through either
reported notional amounts or fair values (i.e. 681 firm-year observations). The sample of users and non-
users derivatives consists of 850 firm year observations. Unlike derivatives measures, there are no
dropped observations due to missing or extreme amounts. In determining the discretionary accruals,
values are winsorized to minimise the impact of outliers.
Derivatives users Users and non users of derivatives
Discretionary accruals Discretionary accruals
Category Mean Median
Firm-year
observations Mean Median
Firm-year
observations
Pre-SFAS 133 0.032 0.024 245 0.036 0.024 304
Post-SFAS 133 0.042 0.030 436 0.043 0.031 546
T-test -3.06 -2.23
Z-test 2.96 -3.04
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Paired Sample
I repeat the tests using 166 firms that have observations across both pre- and post- SFAS 133
periods (i.e. paired firms). Of these firms, 100 increased and 66 decreased their average annual
level of discretionary accruals. There is no significant difference based on the t-test when the test
is based on average annual usage in either of these periods (i.e. a single annual average per firm
for each of these two periods). But, there is a significant difference when the Wilcoxon z test is
used and the same when all observations related to the paired firms are used. (see Table 5.10-
Panel B).
Table 5.10 - Discretionary accruals: Paired difference of means between pre-and post-SFAS 133
observations
Panel A Difference in means and medians- paired observations
Reported values are based on unsigned scaled discretionary accruals
(i.e. unsigned discretionary accruals/total assets. This is based on 166
firms with observations across the pre- and post-SFAS 133 periods.
Mean Median
Pre-SFAS 133 0.0356 0.024
Post-SFAS 133 0.0412 0.03
T-test 1.79
Z-test 2.54
Panel B Difference in means and medians- based on average use per firm
before and after SFAS 133
Pre-SFAS 133 mean of paired observations 0.037
Post-SFAS 133 mean of paired observations 0.041
Difference - 0.004
T-test 1.19
Z-test 2.56
Firms that increased discretionary accruals after SFAS 133 100
Firms that decreased discretionary accruals after SFAS 133 66
Firms with observations across pre and Post-SFAS 133 166
Discretionary accruals amount: Difference in means and medians (classified by derivatives users
and non users)
I analyse the difference in means and medians of discretionary and total accruals, between
observations stratified by users and non users of derivatives. The results in Table 5.11 show that
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non users have a statistically significant higher level of accrual usage. Non users have 5.1% of
total assets as discretionary accruals, while derivatives users have 3.8% of total assets. This
finding supports Hypothesis 2.3 on substitution of derivatives and accruals. Furthermore, in
combination with univariate findings on derivatives in section 5.2.1, these findings point to the
likelihood of managers having preference for accruals as a means of smoothing earnings, after
SFAS 133 adoption.
Table 5.11 Difference in means and medians between users and non users of derivatives
Reported values are based on unsigned scaled discretionary accruals (i.e. unsigned discretionary
accruals/total assets). Derivatives users are the firm year with evidence of derivatives use through either
reported notional amounts or fair values (i.e. 681 firm-year observations). In determining the
discretionary accruals, values are winsorized to minimise the impact of outliers.
Category Mean Median Count
Non users of derivatives 0.051 0.036 169
Derivatives users 0.038 0.027 681
T-test 3.23
Wilcoxon Z-test 3.17
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5.2.3 Control variables
Independent control variables are proxies for the determinants of derivatives use and
discretionary accruals. The stratification of means and medians of the independent control
variable by derivatives and the extent of use of discretionary accruals sheds some light on which
control variables are likely to be associated with the focal variables. Results of the following tests
of independent control variables are reported:
 Mean and median;
 Difference in the mean and median values between derivatives users and non derivatives
users; and
 Difference in mean and median values between low (i.e. below full sample median) and
high accrual users (i.e. above full sample median).
In addition, the control variables; delta, leverage, dividend payout and price to book ratio, have
significant outlier amounts74. These specific variables are winsorised at the 99% confidence level,
so as to minimise the effect of extreme observations in the empirical modelling. Table 5.12
(Panels A, B and C) outline the descriptive statistics related to the other control variables.
5.2.3.1 Control variables- Full Sample mean and median
Table 5.12 (Panel A) contains results of the full sample. The results shed light on overall data
attributes. Some variables namely, R&D and managerial share ownership percentage have a
median value of 0. This could be due to missing variables or it could effectively mean that firms
that do not report these variables had zero values for them. If it is due to missing variables, this
could be a source of error in the inferences made in the multivariate models. The total assets
median of $3.96 billion is much lower than the mean $11.6 billion and this shows a skewed
distribution across the sample. However the logarithmic transformation of total assets brings the
mean (8.4) and median (8.28) closer together. As described in 4.6.1, the logarithmic
transformation is used as a proxy for firm size.
74 Based on descriptive statistics of percentile, max and min (not reported)
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As a supplemental test, I test but do not report on the quarterly earnings volatility of firms before
and after SFAS 133 adoption. I find univariate evidence of increases in quarterly earnings
volatility.
5.2.3.2 Control variables: Stratification by Users and Non Users of Derivatives
Table 5.12 (Panel B) contains the control variables stratified by users and non users of
derivatives. Relative to non users, derivatives users have:
a) Higher Price to Book ratios: this finding is consistent with the notion that firms with higher
growth opportunities and higher cost of underinvestment are more likely to use derivatives, as
discussed in 2.3.1.4.
b) Higher leverage: this is consistent with the notion that firms with higher levels of debt are
more likely to use derivatives to reduce earnings volatility, their perceived riskiness and
expected costs of financial distress, as discussed in 2.3.1.1. The higher leverage can also be
explained by the increased likelihood of firms issuing debt, concurrently using derivatives, so
as to minimise the cost of debt capital. As explained in 2.3.1.4, debt capital providers are
likely to impose tighter covenants and demand higher spreads, due to their anticipation of
asset substitution (i.e. engage in high risk investments that lower the risk adjusted return for
debt-holders). However, having a risk management program in tandem with external financing
plans alleviates this concern and reduces the cost of capital.
c) Higher bonuses and lower delta: the observation of these compensation dimensions do not
conform to theoretical expectations discussed in 2.3.3 that managers with a higher delta should
be more likely to use derivatives
d) Higher total assets: this is consistent with larger firms being more likely to use derivatives.
Large firms do enjoy economies of scale whilst incurring costs of derivatives instruments
usage (Culp and Miller, 2002). See 2.3.4.3 for further discussion.
e) Lower levels of liquidity: this is consistent with the expectation that derivatives use lowers
concerns about having to raise external financing and thus have to conserve cash (Myers and
Majluf, 1984). See 2.3.1.4 for further discussion.
f) Higher dividend payouts: despite the observed differences, there is no study I am aware of that
provide a conceptual justification of dividends influencing derivatives use.
g) Higher percentage of foreign sales: this is consistent with the expectation that firms with a
higher exposure to currency risk should use greater levels of derivatives.
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5.2.3.3 Control variables: Stratification by High and Low accruals firms
Table 5.12 (Panel C) contains the control variables stratified by high and low accrual use.
Relative to low accrual firms, high accrual firms have the following characteristics
a) Higher trading volumes of their shares: this is consistent with accruals being used with
capital markets considerations in mind, as discussed in section 2.4.3. This would most
likely be supported by the information hypothesis of accruals, where accruals are used to
convey private information. This reduces the information asymmetry between informed
and uninformed investors and leads to higher levels of stock trading and this is
manifested by a higher turnover of shares as captured by the share trading volume.
b) Higher level of abnormal investments and higher research and expenditure levels: this is
consistent with alternative mechanisms of income smoothing (e.g. operating and
investment decisions) being used as substitutes.
c) Higher levels of liquidity: there is however, no conceptual explanation for this
observation that I am aware of.
d) Lower proportion of cash pay and bonuses as a percentage of total compensation: as
articulated in section 2.3.3.3, executives with lower cash pay are likely to be more risk
averse, as their personal wealth is more likely to be concentrated in their employer firms.
This will lead them to employ higher level of accruals so as to smooth earnings
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Table 5.12-Control Variables Descriptive Statistics
Panel A- Control variable statistics for full sample
The mean and median values are based on full sample of 850 observations of users and non users of derivatives.
Variable Definition-TAXLOSS-Tax loss carry forward/Total assets, LN (TRADVOL) - Logarithm (Trading volume),
DIV_POUT-Dividends paid/Income before extraordinary items, LEV- Debt/Total assets, ABINV- Unsigned Over/under
investment (Capital expenditure/Sales)- relative to predicted value, UNDER INV-Underinvestment relative to predicted
value , R&D-Research and development expense/Total assets, PTOB- Price per share/Book value per share as at fiscal
year end, QUICKRATIO-(Current assets-Inventory)/Current liabilities, LNTASSETS- Log (Total assets), ASSET
INTENSITY- Property plant and equipment/Total assets, FSALES-Foreign sales/Sales, VEGA- ($change in stock and
stock options value for 0.01 change in stock price volatility)/Cash Pay, DELTA- ($change in stock and stock options
value for 0.01 change in stock price)/Cash Pay , PERC CASHPAY-Cash Pay/Total compensation, FSALES- Foreign
sales/sales, GEOG_DIV- Geographical diversification, number of key regions with foreign operations, ASSETS-Total
balance sheet assets at fiscal year end, OPCASHFLOW-Annual Cash flow from operations, INST OWN-Institutional
ownership percentage, MGR SHROWN- Manager shareholding/Total stock holding, AUDEXP-Dummy for auditor
with industry expertise, INTERLOCK-Dummy for Executives with interlocking relationships.
Continuous variables Mean Median
Capital markets incentive proxies
TAXLOSS 0.03 0.00
LN_TRADVOL 5.91 5.84
DIV_POUT 0.14 0.02
LEV 0.191 0.188
ABNORMAL INV 0.03 0.02
UNDER INV -0.016 -0.0045
R&D -0.002 0.00
PTOB 4.53 3.08
QRATIO 1.31 1.04
Managerial Compensation
VEGA 0.34 0.204
DELTA 0.43 0.40
BONUS_PERC 0.14 0.12
CASHPAY_PERC 0.24 0.22
Corporate Governance
INST_OWN 0.78 0.80
MGR SHROWN 0.013 0.00
Firm attributes
GEOG DIV 5.45 5.00
FSALES 0.49 0.46
LOGASSETS 8.40 8.28
ASSET INTENSITY 0.28 0.23
ASSETS ($ million) 11,643 3,962
OPCASHFLOW 0.12 0.11
Dichotomous variables Total Percentage
AUDEXP 329 39%
INTERLOCK 27 3.2%
NUMBER OF UNDERINVESTED FIRMS 502 59%
***Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%,* Significance at 10%
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Panel B-Control variable differences stratified by users and non users of derivatives
Variable Definition- TAXLOSS-Tax loss carry forward/Total assets, LN (TRADVOL) - Logarithm (Trading volume),
DIV_POUT-Dividends paid/Income before extraordinary items, LEV- Debt/Total assets, ABINV-Over/under investment (Capital
expenditure/Sales), R&D-Research and development expense/Total assets, PTOB- Price per share/Book value per share as at fiscal
year end, QUICKRATIO-(Current assets-Inventory)/Current liabilities, LNTASSETS- Log (Total assets), ASSET INTENSITY-
Property plant and equipment/Total assets, FSALES-Foreign sales/Sales, VEGA- change in stock and stock options value for 0.01
change in stock price volatility, DELTA- change in stock and stock options value for 0.01 change in stock price , PERC
CASHPAY-Cash Pay/Total compensation, FSALES- Foreign sales/sales, GEOG_DIV- Geographical diversification, number of
key regions with foreign operations, ASSETS-Total balance sheet assets at fiscal year end, OPCASHFLOW-Annual Cash flow
from operations, INST OWN-Institutional ownership percentage, MGR SHROWN- Manager shareholding/Total stock holding.
Non
derivatives
users
Non
derivatives
users
Derivatives
users
Derivatives
users
Mean Median Count Mean Median Count T-stat
Wilcoxon
z-stat
Capital markets incentive proxies
TAXLOSS 0.02 0.00 169 0.03 0.00 681
LN_TRADVOL 5.80 5.85 169 5.93 5.84 681
DIV_POUT 0.10 - 0.00 169 0.15 0.03 681 *** ***
LEV 0.163 0.16 169 0.199 0.196 681 *** ***
ABNORMAL INV 0.0436 0.00 18 168 0.00 28 0.0016 671 **
R&D -0.0014 0.00 162 -0.0022 0.00 669
PTOB 3.73 3.10 166 4.74 3.07 674 ***
QRATIO 1.71 1.36 166 1.21 0.96 674 *** ***
Managerial Compensation
VEGA 0.27 0.17 169 0.37 0.21 681
DELTA 0.46 0.45 169 0.43 0.39 681 *** ***
BONUS_PERC 0.12 0.11 169 0.14 0.12 681 ** **
CASHPAY_PERC 0.27 0.22 169 0.37 0.22 676
Corporate Governance
INST_OWN 0.78 0.80 166 0.77 0.81 674
MGR SHROWN 0.019 0.00 169 0.011 0.00 681
Firm attributes
GEOG UNITS 5.44 5.00 169 5.45 5.00 681
FSALES 0.47 0.44 169 0.50 0.47 681 * ***
LOGASSETS 7.77 7.59 169 8.55 8.41 681 *** ***
ASSET INTENSITY 0.25 0.19 169 0.28 0.24 681 ** ***
ASSETS ($ million) 6,148 1,985 169 13,007 4,500 681 *** ***
OPCASHFLOW 0.12 0.11 169 0.12 0.11 681
***Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%,* Significance at 10% based on Wilcoxon z-stat
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Panel C- Control variable differences stratified by low and high accrual firms
Variable definition- TAXLOSS-Tax loss carry forward/Total assets, LN (TRADVOL) - Logarithm (Trading volume),
DIV_POUT-Dividends paid/Income before extraordinary items, LEV- Debt/Total assets, ABINV-Over/under investment (Capital
expenditure/Sales), R&D-Research and development expense/Total assets, PTOB- Price per share/Book value per share as at fiscal
year end, QUICKRATIO-(Current assets-Inventory)/Current liabilities, LNTASSETS- Log (Total assets), ASSET INTENSITY-
Property plant and equipment/Total assets, FSALES-Foreign sales/Sales, VEGA- change in stock and stock options value for 0.01
change in stock price volatility, DELTA- change in stock and stock options value for 0.01 change in stock price , PERC
CASHPAY-Cash Pay/Total compensation, FSALES- Foreign sales/sales, GEOG_DIV- Geographical diversification, number of
key regions with foreign operations, ASSETS-Total balance sheet assets at fiscal year end, OPCASHFLOW-Annual Cash flow
from operations, INST OWN-Institutional ownership percentage, MGR SHROWN- Manager shareholding/Total stock holding.
Low accrual Low accrual High accrual High accrual
Mean Median Count Mean Median Count T-stat
Wilcoxon
z-stat
Capital markets incentive proxies
TAXLOSS 0.03 0.00 417 0.03 0.00 433
LN_TRADVOL 5.74 5.65 417 6.07 6.03 433 *** ***
DIV_POUT 0.14 0.02 417 0.14 0.01 433 *
LEV 0.196 1.82 417 0.47 1.32 433
ABNORMAL INV 0.025 0.015 410 0.037 0.019 429 *** ***
R&D -0.001 0.00 407 -0.003 0.00 424 ** **
PTOB 4.56 3.20 417 4.51 2.91 433
QRATIO 1.20 0.97 409 1.42 1.09 426 *** ***
Managerial Compensation
VEGA 0.37 0.20 417 0.33 0.21 433
DELTA 0.43 0.38 417 0.44 0.43 433
BONUS_PERC 0.15 0.13 417 0.13 0.11 433 *** ***
CASHPAY_PERC 0.25 0.23 417 0.23 0.21 433 *** **
Corporate Governance
INST_OWN 0.78 0.80 410 0.77 0.80 430
MGR SHROWN 0.012 0.00 417 0.014 0.00 433 **
Firm attributes
GEOG UNITS 5.52 5 417 5.38 5 433
FSALES 0.49 0.46 417 0.49 0.46 433
LOGASSETS 8.41 8.30 417 8.38 8.22 433
ASSET INTENSITY 0.27 0.22 417 0.28 0.24 433
ASSETS ($ million) 10,738 4,024 417 12,516 3,702 433
OPCASHFLOW 0.11 0.10 417 0.13 0.12 433 *** ***
***Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%,* Significance at 10% based on Wilcoxon z-stat
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5.3 Multivariate testing
5.3.1 Multivariate model selection- SFAS 133 and derivatives use
The determinants of derivatives use are modelled based on Equation 5.1. In the testing, for
comparative purposes, I run models with and without the interaction term between the SFAS 133
dummy variable (133DUM) and the discretionary accrual proxy (DAC).
Equation 5.1
DRNV= α +  1 133DUM +  2 DAC +  3 133DUM *DAC +  4 ABINV +  5TAXLOSS +  6 PTOB+  7 LEV +  8
QRATIO +  9 LNASSETS +  10 GEOG_DIV +  11 FSALES +  12 VEGA +  13DELTA +  14 CSHPAYPER +  15
INSTOWN +  16 MGR SHROWN +  17 INTERLOCK  19- INDDUM +  YRDUM
To determine the appropriate regression model, I evaluate the influence of panel data individual
firm effects and endogeneity on the overall regression. This is based on the criteria discussed in
section 4.4. This informs the choice between different possible regressions models (i.e. pooled
OLS, panel fixed effect, panel random effect and 2SLS). The key model diagnostic results that
underpin the selected models are described further below:
5.3.1.1 Individual firm effects
Unobservable heterogeneity of individual firms or firm fixed effects, are potentially part of the
variables omitted in the model specification. Possible inference errors arising from omitted
variables could be minimised by having a fully specified model or suitable proxies that represent
the omitted variables. These include industry and time dummy variables as these capture industry
and time fixed effects. I have specified this model including the full range of determinants (i.e.
17 variables excluding industry and year dummies), identified in the conceptual framework
(section 2.3), as well as the time and industry dummy variables.
Therefore, I assume that the pooled OLS regression should have minimised the impact of omitted
variables. However, I conduct a range of econometric diagnostic tests to ascertain the existence of
individual effects. These include:
 The F-test to ascertain whether there are differences of intercepts due to firms. The F-test
has a critical value of 4.21 (p-value of 0), leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis
that all firm intercepts have zero value. This is interpreted as evidence that individual
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firm fixed effects are significant. However, the fixed effect regression omits industry and
other time invariant75 variables, such as number of geographic segments and therefore
may simply be failing to capture heterogeneity that could be captured by the industry
dummy.
 Test of whether individual firm differences are captured in the error term. The Breusch
Lagrange multiplier, testing the null hypothesis of variance of firm specific error being
zero, has a chi squared value of 135.76 (p-value of 0). I therefore reject the null
hypothesis that there is no individual firm effect in the error term.
 The Hausman test of whether coefficients of the random effect and fixed effect are
systematically different has a chi-squared value of 23.24 (p-value - 0.142). The null
hypothesis is that there are no differences in coefficients. Hence, I do not reject the null
hypothesis and infer that the random effect approach is preferable to the fixed effect
model, and is more parsimonious.
Based on the above diagnostics, the exogenous pooled OLS and random effect GLS models are
the primary models. A combination of these models provides both consistent and efficient
estimations of association of the determinants of derivatives.
5.3.1.2 Endogeneity assessment
As discussed in 4.4.2.1, endogeneity arises due to the simultaneity of discretionary accruals and is
solved using the 2SLS model. The determination of appropriateness of the 2SLS is based on the
tests of endogeneity of discretionary accruals as an endogenous explanatory variable. This is in
addition to tests on the selected instruments’ strength and validity, over-identification and
homoskedasticity of the model.
The Durbin Hausman Wu76 (results not reported) shows discretionary accruals are endogenous.
As discussed in section 4.3.4, the instrument variables for the 2SLS model are operating cash
flow and a constructed categorical variable for the likelihood of discretionary accruals.
Operating cash flow is expected to be associated with discretionary accruals and is also applied as
an instrument variable by Barton (2001). The categorical variable is constructed including
75 Does not vary over the testing time period for each company
76 Durbin Wu Hausman test- Is applied when one is testing whether the independent variable is endogenous. This entails the
regression of the endogenous variable on other exogenous variables as well as the selected instrument variables and determination of
the residual. Thereafter the residual is included one of the regressors in the original equation. If the residual has a significant
coefficient then this is proof of endogeneity.
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indicators for whether either net income percentage change or net income is negative, so as to
capture income increasing incentives. It also has a component for positive operating cash flow to
capture income decreasing incentives.
The instrument variable strength, measured by the Cragg-Donald F –test has a value of 28.55 (p-
value -0) and a partial R-squared of 10.94% in the first stage regression. This leads to the
rejection of the null hypothesis of weak instruments. The Sargan statistic of 1.96 (p-value
0.1606), means the null hypothesis that the model is over-identified cannot be rejected. The
Pagan-Hall statistic (30.16-p-value 0.218) leads to the failure to reject the null hypothesis of
homoskedasticity and inference that there is no problem of heteroskedasticity in the 2SLS model.
Hence the results of the 2SLS model are consistent and the model can be relied on.
Evaluation of 2SLS versus OLS
As my findings suggest that the 2SLS model can be relied upon for assessing the determinants of
derivatives use, I further test whether the coefficients differ from those of the pooled OLS model.
To do this I conduct a Hausman test assessing whether the coefficients of the exogenous
OLS/random effect models differ from those derived from the 2SLS models. The Hausman test
chi-squared of 0.03 (OLS) and 0.47 (random effect), has p value of 1. Therefore I do not reject
the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the exogenous and 2SLS models’ are the same. For this
reason the pooled OLS is preferred as it is a more consistent model. Nevertheless, I report the
2SLS results, in Table 5.14, as part of the robustness testing.
5.3.1.3 Censored regression
An important factor influencing the modelling is the need to distinguish the determinants of the
decision to hedge from the determinants of extent of hedging for derivatives users. As noted by
various authors (Barton, 2001; Singh and Upneja, 2007; and Judge, 2006), these are separate
decisions and the determinants will be correspondingly different. Only 80% (681 of the 850 firm-
year observations) of selected sample reported derivatives use. Even for firms that reported the
use derivatives, 85 were missing the dependent variable (i.e. notional values). Hence, for the
combined sample, the dependent variable will be censored (i.e. left censored at zero) because the
notional amount is zero for non derivatives users and for derivatives users with missing values. I
run a censored (tobit) regression, for the combined sample of users and non users of derivatives,
but exclude any derivatives users that had missing notional amount. The derivatives notional
value as dependent variable is left censored for firms that do not hedge. This effectively allows
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the modelling of determinants of whether to use derivatives. The censored regression
supplements the above mentioned tests (i.e. 2SLS, pooled OLS and random effect panel
regressions), as these focus on the extent of derivatives use among observations of derivatives
users. As an additional robustness test of the determinants of decision to hedge, I run a logistic
regression using a dummy variable for the decision of whether to use derivatives or not, as the
dependent variable. The logistic regression is based on the sample of users and non users of
derivatives.
Summary- model selection
Based on the above diagnostics, I effectively run 10 regression models, including the pooled
OLS, random effects model, censored regression, 2SLS and logistic regression. The results are
reported in Table 5.13, Table 5.14, Table 5.15, Table 5.16 and Table 5.16.
5.3.2 Derivatives use-Multivariate results
5.3.2.1 SFAS 133 and derivatives use
There is some evidence supporting Hypothesis 2.1 that the adoption of SFAS 133 leads to
reduced derivatives use. There is significant negative association in only four of the ten
regression models. The significant findings are in the both pooled OLS and random effect that
include an interaction variable. The evidence is not robust across all the different models and
hence is inconclusive.
This partial supporting evidence is consistent with the theoretical expectations of reduced
derivatives use after SFAS 133. As discussed in section 2.7.1, Barnes (2002), Shin (2004) and
Nan (2007), using analytical models, propose that derivatives use for risk management would
decline after SFAS 133. Barnes (2002) posits that firms with hedgeable projects will aim to
distinguish themselves from speculating firms that are likely to increase derivatives use. This is
due to anticipated difficulties that outsiders such as investors would face when attempting to
differentiate hedgers and speculators. Another explanation for expected derivatives reduction is
that managers aim to minimise interim rather than terminal earnings volatility and SFAS
increases interim earnings volatility (Shin, 2004). In contrast to the analytical models, other
empirical findings on how SFAS 133 impacts on derivatives use are mixed. Li and Stammerjoan
(2004) find that derivatives use did not decline after SFAS 133, and they suggest that the benefits
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of derivatives use should outweigh the concerns related to its accounting method. Similarly,
Singh (2004) does not find conclusive evidence of reduced derivatives use. On the other hand,
based on survey evidence, Lins et al (2007) conclude that effective risk management was
curtailed as many firms were concerned about qualifying for hedge accounting. Zhang (2009)
comes to the conclusion that SFAS 133 leads to reduced speculative activities and more prudent
risk management. Her study is however based on indirect evidence77.
5.3.2.2 Impact of discretionary accruals on derivatives use (Substitution) relationship
The use of accruals is expected to influence derivatives use (Barton, 2001). Results show a
significant negative association in seven of ten models. The supporting evidence is robust across
different models including pooled OLS, 2SLS, censored regression and random effect models.
This finding is similar to Barton (2001) but differs from Singh (2004) and Huang et al (2009).
The latter authors found that whereas derivatives had a significant negative association with
discretionary accruals as the dependent variable, there was no evidence that discretionary accruals
had a similar association with derivatives use as the dependent variable. Overall, these findings
support the Hypothesis 2.3a, which states that hedging derivatives and discretionary accruals are
substitutes.
In order to test whether the substitution relationship differs through the pre- and Post-SFAS 133
periods, I include an interaction variable between SFAS 133 and Discretionary accrual proxy (i.e.
as independent control variable), in some of the reported models. Thereafter, I perform the chow
test for the joint significance of the dummy and the interaction variable. While the SFAS 133
dummy and the discretionary accrual coefficients are negative and significant, the interaction
term is positive and significant. The F-test leads to the rejection of the interaction term
coefficient being equal to zero. I conclude both the intercept and slope are significant in the
models. This finding sheds light on the difference in the discretionary accrual coefficients across
the pre- and post-SFAS 133 periods. It points to the reducing impact of accruals on derivatives
use after SFAS 133 adoption. For example in Table 5.13- Panel A, the coefficient of discretionary
accruals post- SFAS 133 is effectively (  2 +  3 )) or -0.06 (-6%) while it is -1.069 (  2 ) in the
pre-SFAS 133 period.
77 As discussed in 2.7.1, her study was based on changes in risk exposure of firms she designated as speculators. The designation was
not based on disclosed derivatives use
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There are various plausible explanations for the reduced impact accruals as an independent
variable of derivatives use after SFAS 133. To begin, accruals may be required as a complement,
to offset the increased earnings volatility due to derivatives accounting, and this would offset the
substitution effect. Another factor that could make discretionary accruals complement rather than
substitute derivatives use, could be that the adoption of SFAS 133 led to an increase in
speculative use of derivatives as discussed in section 2.7.1. Nan’s (2007), Shin (2004) and
Barnes (2002) analytical model suggests that SFAS 133 would reduce prudent risk management
activities, but increase the speculative use of derivatives. It could be that firms classified as
having risk management derivatives in this study, are in fact speculative derivatives users.
However, as noted earlier, it remains a difficult empirical challenge to differentiate speculative
and risk management derivatives, due to the quality of available disclosures. Besides the
empirical findings in this study on the relationship between SFAS 133 and derivatives use, do not
give any pointer on whether either the risk management or speculative derivatives use, increases
or decreases.
In parallel, the adoption of SFAS 133 could increase the incentive to use discretionary accruals
for income smoothing, as it is no longer as attractive to use derivatives. In other words, the
adoption of SFAS 133 is likely to influence the extent to which accruals are a determinant of
derivatives use. Based on this reasoning, I expected a stronger negative association after SFAS
133 adoption, when accruals are the explanatory variables for derivatives use. However, either
the use of speculative derivatives or incremental volatility due to SFAS 133’s features can
induce the increased use of accruals in a manner that confounds the income smoothing
substitution relationship. These confounding effects pose the empirical challenge of
meaningfully identifying and interpreting what any observed increase in accruals represents.
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5.3.2.3 Other determinants of derivatives use
As Triki (2005) suggested, there is a need to extend the risk management empirical evidence that
is based on improvements in derivatives accounting due to SFAS 133 and other disclosure
enhancements. Hence studies that are based on post-SFAS 133 data are a contribution, albeit
being confirmatory in nature. There is significant evidence of association with abnormal
investment, price to book ratio, liquidity within the firm, size effect, diversification through
foreign operations, and leverage. An elaboration of these findings is made below.
Real earnings management (Abnormal Investment)
The level of abnormal capital expenditure levels is applied as the proxy for over/under
investment and it has a significant negative association across all the related models. However, a
careful interpretation is required. As intended, this proxy could represent investment decisions as
a means of income smoothing. However, it could partially represent the incentive to use
derivatives to alleviate the under investment problem, due to concerns about available cash
(Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993). The partial representation occurs when the proxy relates to
firm under-investment.
Investment avoidance (Incentive to avoid underinvestment)
Price to Book ratio and the level of research and development (R&D) are used as proxies for the
extent to which firms avoid investment as discussed in 4.6.1. Price to Book ratio reflects the
extent to which there are growth opportunities. There is robust evidence of a positive significant
association of the Price to Book ratio as a regressor, across all the related models. This conforms
to the expectation that firms with growth opportunities are likely to hedge so as to minimise the
opportunity cost of underinvestment (Froot et al, 1993). However the R&D ratio (R&D /total
assets) has a negative association in four of the ten models. The unexpected sign on R&D could
simply be a result of R&D expenditure being reported with a minus sign in the data used for the
regression78.
78 Hence an increase in R&D/Total assets (e.g. from -0.05% to -0.10) would be measured as a -0.05% change. Hence a negative
association is in real terms actually a positive association.
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Liquidity conservation
Liquidity, as measured by the quick ratio, has a significant negative association in only the
censored and tobit regression models. This implies that liquidity is likely to be a determinant of
whether to use derivatives rather than the extent of their use. This finding conforms to the
proposition that hedging and availability of cash or liquidity are substitutes. Liquidity can
alleviate the under-investment problem (Minton and Schrand, 1998). It can also reduce the
perceived riskiness and probability of financial distress (Nance, 1993). All these perspectives are
discussed in 2.3.1.
Leverage
Leverage is a proxy for the probability of financial distress and interest rate exposure has a
positive significant association. The higher the leverage, the higher the probability of financial
distress, the higher the interest rate exposure and therefore the higher the likelihood of corporate
managers using derivatives. Hence, this finding is consistent with the expected sign and with the
finding of the univariate testing of control variables as described in section 5.2.3.2.
There is some limited and weak evidence of managerial risk incentives as a determinant. Vega
has a positive association in the 2SLS, censored and tobit regression models (i.e. 4 of 10 related
models). This is inconsistent with the expected negative sign and it could be a reflection of un-
modelled endogeneity. In addition there is no evidence of either delta or cash pay percentage
being associated with derivatives use. As discussed earlier, the endogeneity of variables that are
not primary can be ignored in the interests of model tractability and to minimise the risk of
measurement error due to instrument variables. Furthermore, there is some evidence that
managerial share ownership is in the random effect and censored regression models (i.e. 3 out of
10). Institutional ownership has a positive significant association in the censored and tobit
regression models. This indicates that institutional ownership may be more of a factor in
determining the decision to use derivatives but not on the extent of usage.
Regarding other firm specific regressors, there is some evidence of association for firm size
(measured by the logarithm of total assets) and the percentage of foreign sales. Both firm size and
percentage of foreign sales are significant in the censored and tobit regression, indicating that
they are likely to be mainly determinants of the decision to use derivatives and not extent of use.
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Table 5.13: Multivariate regressions on determinants of derivatives use
MODEL SPECIFICATION
DRNV= α +  1 133DUM +  2 DAC +  3 133DUM *DAC +  4 ABINV +  5TAXLOSS +  6 PTOB+  7 LEV +  8
QRATIO +  9 LNASSETS +  10 GEOG_DIV +  11 FSALES +  12 VEGA +  13DELTA +  14 CSHPAYPER +  15
INSTOWN +  16 MGR SHROWN +  17 INTERLOCK  19- INDDUM +  YRDUM
Panel A-Derivatives determinants-Pooled OLS regression
Pooled OLS regression of DRNV as the dependent variable is based on 516 observations of derivatives users with reported notional amounts
that have all control variable data. VIF factor is less than 10 for all variables and hence no concern on multi-collinearity. Year dummy are not
significant. Dropped manufacturing industry dummy due to multi-collinearity, and thereafter only the trade industry is significant. The
reported standard errors and t-stats are heteroskedasticity robust. For comparative purposes, Model 1 excludes but Model 2 includes an
interaction variable. The Chow test of joint significance of the interaction term (133DUM* DAC) and 133DUM, shows that both the slope
and intercept are significant. The Chow test with an F- value of 4.57 (p-value of 0.0108); leads to rejection of the null hypothesis that  1
and  3 are zero, in Model 2.
Variable Definition- DRNV-Notional amount of derivatives/Total asset, 133DUM- SFAS 133 dummy variable, DAC- Discretionary
accruals, ABINV- (Capital expenditure/Sales)-Over/under investment based on predicted, R&D-Research and development expense/Total
assets, PTOB- Price per share/Book value per share as at fiscal year end, TAXLOSS-Tax loss carry forward/Total assets, LEV- Debt/Total
assets, QUICKRATIO-(Current Assets-Inventory)/Current Liabilities, LNTASSETS- Log (Total assets), FSALES-Foreign sales/Sales,
VEGA- ($change in stock and stock options value for 0.01 change in stock price volatility)/Cash Pay, DELTA- ($ change in stock and stock
options value for 0.01 change in stock price)/Cash Pay , PERC CASHPAY-Cash Pay/Total compensation, FSALES- Foreign sales/sales,
GEOG_DIV- Geographical diversification, number of key regions with foreign operations, INST OWN-Institutional ownership percentage,
MGR SHROWN- Manager shareholding/Total stock holding, INTERLOCK-Dummy variable for Executives with interlocking relationships,
INDDUM-Industry dummy, YRDUM-Year dummy.
Model 1 T-stat Model 2 T-stat
INTERCEPT 0.090 (1.28) 0.117 (1.61)
FOCAL VARIABLES 133DUM -0.024 (-1.28) -0.055** (-2.25)
DAC -0.253** (-2.58) -1.069*** (-3.67)
133*DAC 1.009*** (3.04)
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTIC&CAPITAL ABINV -0.457*** (-2.78) -0.487*** (-2.79)
MARKET INCENTIVE VARIABLES R&D -0.445 (-0.65) -0.470 (-1.13)
TAXLOSS -0.037 (-0.90) -0.043 (-1.06)
PTOB 0.002* (1.89) 0.002* (1.81)
LEV 0.089* (1.83) 0.092* (1.90)
QUICKRATIO -0.001 (-0.09) -0.001 (-0.17)
LNASSETS 0.005 (0.86) 0.005 (0.86)
GEOG DIV -0.005 (-1.08) -0.005 (-1.06)
FSALES -0.007 (-0.15) -0.006 (-0.13)
MANAGERIAL RISK INCENTIVES VEGA 0.019 (0.55) 0.021 (0.66)
&CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES DELTA -0.005 (-0.16) -0.002 (-0.06)
PERC CASHPAY -0.011 (-0.21) -0.017 (-0.34)
INST OWN 0.012 (0.33) 0.008 (0.23)
MGR SHROWN -0.110 (-1.22) -0.107 (-1.21)
INTERLOCK 0.033 (0.60) 0.031 (0.59)
OTHER INDUSTRY DUMMY Yes Yes
YEAR DUMMY Yes Yes
Observations 516 516
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 5.9% 7.6%
F-value 2.53*** 2.57***
***Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%,* Significance at 10%
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Panel B- Derivatives Determinants Random effect panel regressions
Random effect GLS models- This is based on the same variables and sample as panel A. For comparative purposes, Model 1 excludes
but Model 2 includes an interaction variable. The Chow test of joint significance of the interaction term (133DUM* DAC) and
133DUM, shows that both the slope and intercept are significant. The Chow test, F- value of 9.57 (p-value of 0.0084), leads to
rejection of null hypothesis that  1 and  3 are zero, in Model 2.
Model 1 T-stat Model 2 T-stat
INTERCEPT 0.126 (1.44) 0.135 (1.55)
FOCAL VARIABLES 133DUM -0.020 (-1.53) -0.037** (-2.39)
DAC -0.101 (-1.33) -0.585*** (-3.32)
133*DAC 0.587*** (3.04)
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTIC&CAPITAL ABINV -0.243** (-2.37) -0.249** (-2.35)
MARKET INCENTIVE VARIABLES R&D -0.404** (-2.15) -0.410** (-2.49)
TAXLOSS 0.035 (0.87) 0.033 (0.83)
PTOB 0.002** (2.03) 0.003** (2.14)
LEV 0.118** (2.04) 0.118** (2.05)
QUICKRATIO -0.007 (-1.00) -0.007 (-0.96)
LNASSETS 0.001 (0.11) 0.001 (0.16)
GEOG DIV -0.001 (-0.25) -0.001 (-0.19)
FSALES -0.005 (-0.08) -0.010 (-0.14)
MANAGERIAL RISK INCENTIVES VEGA 0.005 (0.24) 0.006 (0.31)
&CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES DELTA 0.001 (0.05) 0.002 (0.06)
PERC CASHPAY -0.028 (-0.58) -0.032 (-0.68)
INST OWN -0.013 (-0.28) -0.013 (-0.27)
MGR SHROWN -0.172*** (-2.62) -0.163** (-2.48)
INTERLOCK 0.026 (0.66) 0.028 (0.74)
OTHER INDUSTRY DUMMY Yes Yes
YEAR DUMMY Yes Yes
Observations 516 516
R-squared 7.5% 9.1%
Wald 54.49*** 62.21***
***Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%,* Significance at 10%
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Table 5.14: Derivatives determinants (Two stage least squares (2SLS) regression)
This is based on the same variables Table 5.13-Panel A. Discretionary accruals’ is treated as an endogenous
variable. Operating cash flow and a constructed categorical dummy variable are the instrument variables. The
Cragg-Donald test –F value of 28.55 and partial R-squared (10.94%) statistics of first stage regression
provide evidence of instrument strength and validity. The Sargan statistic of 1.96 (p-value of 0.1606) is
evidence that the model is over-identified. The Pagan Hall statistic of 30.16 (p-value- 0.218) shows that there
is no problem of heteroskedasticity and thus the 2SLS model can be relied on. This regression is based on
observations of derivative users (i.e. 516 firm year observations). The same results are obtained with a
sample that includes users and non users of derivatives.
DRNV T-stat
INTERCEPT 0.100 (1.23)
FOCAL VARIABLES 133DUM -0.015 (-0.83)
DAC -1.098*** (-2.63)
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTIC&CAPITAL ABINV -0.342* (-1.96)
MARKET INCENTIVE VARIABLES R&D -0.884** (-2.16)
TAXLOSS 0.004 (0.06)
PTOB 0.003** (2.17)
LEV 0.090* (1.92)
QUICKRATIO 0.002 (0.34)
LNASSETS 0.006 (1.09)
GEOG DIV -0.002 (-0.46)
FSALES -0.013 (-0.30)
MANAGERIAL RISK INCENTIVES VEGA 0.016* (1.81)
&CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES DELTA -0.014 (-0.41)
PERC CASHPAY -0.024 (-0.47)
INST OWN -0.002 (-0.04)
MGR SHROWN -0.108 (-0.87)
INTERLOCK 0.045 (1.34)
OTHER INDUSTRY DUMMY Yes Yes
YEAR DUMMY Yes Yes
N 516
F 2.26***
***Significance at 1%, ** Significance at 5%,* Significance at 10%
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Table 5.15 Derivatives determinants (Censored Regression)
Panel A: Determinants of Derivatives usage based on pooled OLS censored regression
Pooled OLS regression of DRNV as the dependent variable is based on 673 observations of derivatives users with reported notional
amounts and non users. VIF factor is less than 10 for all variables and hence no concern on multi-collinearity. Year dummy are not
significant. Only the trade industry is significant. The reported standard errors and t-stats are heteroskedasticity robust. For
comparative purposes, Model 1 excludes but Model 2 includes an interaction variable. The Chow test of joint significance of the
interaction term (133DUM* DAC) and 133DUM, shows that both the slope and intercept are significant. The Chow test, F- value of
8.74 (p-value of 0.0002), leads to rejection of null hypothesis that  1 and  3 are zero, in Model 2.
Variable Definition- DRNV-Notional amount of derivatives/Total asset, 133DUM- SFAS 133 dummy variable, DAC- Discretionary
accruals, ABINV- (Capital expenditure/Sales)-Over/under investment based on predicted capital expenditure/sales, R&D-Research
and development expense/Total assets, PTOB- Price per share/Book value per share as at fiscal year end, TAXLOSS-Tax loss carry
forward/Total assets, LEV- Debt/Total assets, QUICKRATIO-(Current Assets-Inventory)/Current Liabilities, LNTASSETS- Log
(Total assets), FSALES-Foreign sales/Sales, VEGA- ($change in stock and stock options value for 0.01 change in stock price
volatility)/Cash Pay, DELTA- ($ change in stock and stock options value for 0.01 change in stock price)/Cash Pay , PERC
CASHPAY-Cash Pay/Total compensation, FSALES- Foreign sales/sales, GEOG_DIV- Geographical diversification, number of key
regions with foreign operations, INST OWN-Institutional ownership percentage, MGR SHROWN- Manager shareholding/Total stock
holding, INTERLOCK-Dummy variable for Executives with interlocking relationships, INDDUM-Industry dummy, YRDUM-Year
dummy.
Model 1 T-stat Model 2 T-stat
INTERCEPT -0.154** (-2.10) -0.122* (-1.66)
FOCAL VARIABLES 133DUM -0.028 (-1.55) -0.062*** (-2.93)
DAC -0.325*** (-2.98) -1.167*** (-5.03)
133*DAC 1.087*** (4.15)
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTIC&CAPITAL ABINV -0.451*** (-3.01) -0.479*** (-3.05)
MARKET INCENTIVE VARIABLES R&D -0.534* (-1.91) -0.551** (-2.45)
TAXLOSS 0.034 (0.83) 0.025 (0.60)
PTOB 0.005*** (4.45) 0.005*** (4.42)
LEV 0.104** (2.10) 0.108** (2.19)
QUICKRATIO -0.013* (-1.85) -0.014* (-1.90)
LNASSETS 0.021*** (3.55) 0.021*** (3.51)
GEOG DIV -0.008* (-1.75) -0.007* (-1.68)
FSALES 0.076* (1.81) 0.071* (1.68)
MANAGERIAL RISK INCENTIVES VEGA 0.033** (2.04) 0.035** (2.42)
&CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES DELTA -0.037 (-1.18) -0.034 (-1.09)
PERC CASHPAY -0.010 (-0.21) -0.015 (-0.32)
INST OWN 0.079** (2.14) 0.078** (2.12)
MGR SHROWN -0.131* (-1.65) -0.120 (-1.52)
INTERLOCK 0.010 (0.25) 0.005 (0.14)
OTHER INDUSTRY DUMMY Yes Yes
YEAR DUMMY Yes Yes
Observations 673 673
F-value 5.27*** 4.98***
Log Pseudo-likelihood 194.86*** 200.18***
*** Significance at 1%, **Significance at 5%, * Significance at 10%
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Panel B –Derivatives determinants (Random Effect GLS censored regression)
This is based on the same variable and data defined in Panel A. The reported standard errors and t-stats are heteroskedasticity robust.
For comparative purposes, Model 1 excludes but Model 2 includes an interaction variable. The Chow test of joint significance of the
interaction term (133DUM* DAC) and 133DUM, shows that both the slope and intercept are significant. The Chow test, F- value of
15.35 (p-value of 0.0005), leads to rejection of null hypothesis that  1 and  3 are zero, in Model 2.
Model 1 T-stat Model 2 T-stat
INTERCEPT -0.144 (-1.26) -0.131 (-1.15)
FOCAL VARIABLES 133DUM -0.031** (-2.45) -0.053*** (-3.65)
DAC -0.120 (-1.11) -0.682*** (-3.17)
133*DAC 0.710*** (3.09)
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTIC&CAPITAL ABINV -0.289** (-2.36) -0.292** (-2.39)
MARKET INCENTIVE VARIABLES R&D -0.358 (-1.27) -0.361 (-1.29)
TAXLOSS 0.067 (1.13) 0.063 (1.07)
PTOB 0.004*** (3.38) 0.005*** (3.59)
LEV 0.124** (2.44) 0.124** (2.46)
QUICKRATIO -0.015** (-2.28) -0.015** (-2.18)
LNASSETS 0.020** (2.45) 0.020** (2.48)
GEOG DIV -0.001 (-0.20) -0.001 (-0.11)
FSALES 0.022 (0.41) 0.010 (0.20)
MANAGERIAL RISK INCENTIVES VEGA 0.005 (0.70) 0.007 (0.88)
&CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES DELTA -0.002 (-0.05) -0.002 (-0.06)
PERC CASHPAY 0.004 (0.09) -0.001 (-0.03)
INST OWN 0.055 (0.85) 0.058 (0.90)
MGR SHROWN -0.180 (-1.64) -0.169 (-1.55)
INTERLOCK 0.013 (0.43) 0.014 (0.49)
OTHER INDUSTRY DUMMY Yes Yes
YEAR DUMMY Yes Yes
Observations 673 673
Log Likelihood 306.38*** 311.25***
*** Significance at 1%, **Significance at 5%, * Significance at 10%
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Table 5.16-Derivatives use determinants (Tobit regression model)
This is based on the same variables defined in Table 5.15-Panel A. The data is the full sample of
users and non users of derivatives (i.e. 850 observations). 793 observations are due to firms with
missing control variable data.
HEDGE T-stat
INTERCEPT -0.376 (-1.49)
FOCAL VARIABLES 133DUM -0.018 (-0.33)
DAC -0.603 (-1.41)
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTIC&CAPITAL ABINV -0.958** (-2.22)
MARKET INCENTIVE VARIABLES R&D -0.995 (-1.31)
TAXLOSS 0.316* (1.87)
PTOB 0.016*** (4.76)
LEV 0.202 (1.32)
QUICKRATIO -0.074*** (-3.11)
LNASSETS 0.097*** (5.52)
GEOG DIV -0.018 (-1.25)
FSALES 0.345*** (2.68)
MANAGERIAL RISK INCENTIVES VEGA 0.086*** (3.90)
&CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES DELTA -0.182* (-1.88)
PERC CASHPAY 0.071 (0.48)
INST OWN 0.395*** (3.12)
MGR SHROWN 0.114 (0.35)
INTERLOCK -0.063 (-0.55)
OTHER INDUSTRY DUMMY Yes
YEAR DUMMY Yes
Observations 793
F-value 4.74***
Pseudo R-squared 9.72%
Log Pseudo-likelihood -584.65***
*** Significance at 1%, **Significance at 5%, * Significance at 10%
195
5.3.3 Multivariate model selection-SFAS 133 and Discretionary accruals
The model of discretionary accrual is specified in Equation 5.2.
Equation 5.2
DAC= α +  1 133DUM +  2 CHDUM +  3 DRNV +  4 133*DRNV +  5 ABINV +  6 R&D +  7TAXLOSS +
 8 LEV +  9 LN_TRADVOL+  10 DIV_POUT +  11OPCSHFLOW +  12 VEGA +  13 DELTA +  14 CSHPAY
+  15 BONUS_PERC+  16 INSTOWN +  17 MGR SHROWN +  18 AUDEXP +  19 INTERLOCK +  20-
INDDUM +  YRDUM
Similar to the derivatives determinants model selection described in section 5.3.1, the key model
considerations are the requirements to overcome inference problems associated with endogeneity
and individual effects. The diagnostic results that underpin the selected models are described
further below:
5.3.3.1 Individual firm effects
I have specified the model based on the full range of determinants (i.e. 19 variables) identified in
the conceptual framework in section 2.4. I also include time and industry dummy variables to
help capture unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, I assume that the pooled OLS regression
should have minimised the impact of omitted variables. However, I conduct a range of
econometric diagnostic tests to ascertain the existence of individual effects. These include:
 Individual firm differences in intercept: The F-test of the fixed effects model is 1.45 (p
value of 0.0005) and the null hypothesis of all individual firm intercepts being equal to
zero is rejected. However similar to the derivatives determinants model selection in
section 5.3.1.1, fixed effect regression drops industry dummy variables, and may simply
be failing to capture heterogeneity captured by the industry dummy.
 Individual firm differences in error term: The Breusch Lagrange multiplier test has a chi-
squared value of 7.65 (p value 0.0057). This leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis
of the variance of individual firm error term being equal to zero. The random effect
approach is appropriate as there is evidence of unobserved heterogeneity in the error
term.
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 Difference in random effect and fixed effect coefficients: The Hausman test of differences
in coefficient estimates between the random effect and fixed effect models, yields a chi-
squared value of 23.09 (p-value- 0.1113). Hence the null hypothesis of there being no
difference in coefficients cannot be rejected. In this case, the random effect is preferred,
as it is more efficient due to fewer variables and conserves degrees of freedom.
5.3.3.2 Endogeneity assessment
Based on the discussed simultaneity, I consider derivatives use as an endogenous explanatory
variable, in the 2SLS. The instrument variables are the size effect (logarithm of total assets),
number of foreign operations and Price to Book ratio. The Pagan Hall statistic of 28.78 (p-value
of 0.3715) shows no problem with heteroskedasticity79 and the Sargan statistic shows the model is
over-identified (0.437- p value of 0.804 and null hypothesis of over-identification of model.
However, the Instrument validity and strength tests reveal weak instruments. In the first stage
regression, the Cragg-Donald F-statistic is 4.91 (p-value 0.0022) and partial R-squared is 2.19%.
The F-statistic is well below the Stock and Yego critical value of 10 and I conclude the
instruments are weak. Hence I do not report 2SLS findings for discretionary accruals as a
dependent variable.
Based on the above diagnostics of individual effects and endogeneity, I use the pooled OLS and
random effect GLS models as the primary models because they are likely to provide more
consistent/efficient estimations of association of the determinants of discretionary accruals. I
effectively run seven regression models and the results are in Table 5.17.
5.3.4 Multivariate Results- Discretionary accruals
5.3.4.1 SFAS 133 and discretionary accruals
In the reported results, there is consistent and robust evidence of the SFAS 133 dummy being
associated with the use of discretionary accruals. There is significant association in all the seven
regression models (see Table 5.17). This result differs from Singh (2004) who finds no evidence
of income smoothing due to SFAS 133. However, Singh (2004) uses a different proxy for income
smoothing. Whereas I use the absolute magnitude, he uses the ratio of standard deviation of a
firm’s quarterly earnings before abnormal accruals divided, by the standard deviation of yearly
quarterly earnings.
79 Reject Null hypothesis of homoskedasticity
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Section 2.7.2 discusses why SFAS 133 is expected to lead to the increased use of accruals due to
an expected increase in derivatives accounting related earnings volatility80. An increase in
earnings volatility occurs due to a) hedges that do not qualify for hedge accounting b) interim
hedge ineffectiveness of hedge accounting items and c) gains and losses from discontinued
hedges that have to be recognized in the income statement (Park, 2004 and Trombley, 2003).
In addition, the fair value application requirement increases the probability of the opportunistic81
application of accruals. A further factor that could escalate discretionary accruals could be the
increased use of derivatives for speculative purposes, as postulated in the analytical model by
Barnes (2002) and Nan (2007). Barnes asserts that managers are likely to capitalise on the
difficulties that outsiders to the firm have in differentiating between speculating and hedging
firms, by increasing the speculative use of derivatives. Pre-SFAS 133, the impact of this would be
excluded from the income statement and balance sheet. To offset the incremental volatility due to
speculative use of derivatives, managers are likely increase the use of discretionary accruals.
Cash flow hedge accounting:
To test Hypothesis 2.2b {The use of cash flow hedge accounting influences the level of
discretionary accruals}, I control for the application of cash flow hedge accounting, using a
dummy variable. There is evidence of a significant negative association (at a 1% and 5%
significance level) in all the seven models. It is consistent in the full sample and in the sample of
only derivatives users. This implies that the application of cash flow hedge accounting reduces
discretionary accruals. This could be explained by cash flow hedge accounting resulting in, the
deferral of derivatives instrument gains or losses through the OCI, and a reduction in net income
volatility. Correspondingly, this reduces the need to use accruals and therefore a negative
association is to be expected. There is limited empirical evidence about the impact of cash flow
hedge accounting on earnings volatility and earnings management. This could be due to the poor
disclosure of cash flow hedge accounting data e.g. the notional amounts associated with cash flow
hedge accounting. The only two studies, I am aware of are; Park (2004) who finds that cash flow
hedges do not affect equity volatility and Zhou (2009) who finds that cash flow hedge accounting
leads to an increase in opportunistic accruals. Hence this study provides indirect evidence that
80 Supplemental tests of earnings volatility (not reported) show that they did increase after SFAS 133 was introduced
81 Opportunistic accruals could occur when managers have to determine fair value based on internal models in the absence of
observable trading prices as was vivid in the case of Enron. This could occur with over the counter derivatives instruments.. Earning
smoothing can occur when managers manipulate the timing and amount of recognized cash flow hedges. They can manipulate the
deferral of cash flow hedges gains and losses through the Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income (AOCI) and the subsequent
recycling of these gains and losses from the AOCI to the Income statement.
198
cash flow hedge accounting reduces earnings volatility. This finding differs from Park (2004)
who finds that SFAS 133 adoption does not have an effect on equity82 volatility.
5.3.4.2 Impact of derivatives use on accruals (substitution relationship)
The impact of discretionary accruals on derivatives use (i.e. derivatives dependent variable) is
discussed in section 5.3.2.2. This section reviews the reverse impact and shows that there is
evidence of significant negative association in five of seven models. There is weaker evidence
when the sample consists of only derivatives users. This is the case in two of the seven models
where derivatives use is not a significant independent variable. This finding would appear to
indicate that the substitution relationship is more pronounced when considering both the decision
to use derivatives and extent of derivatives use. Overall, the results support the substitution
hypothesis and are consistent with the finding of Barton (2001), Singh (2004) and Huang et al
(2009). As discussed on derivatives determinants, Singh (2004) does not find that accruals affect
derivatives use, but that derivatives use affects accruals. He therefore concludes that there is a
partial substitution relationship.
I include an interaction variable of the SFAS 133 dummy variable and derivatives use in the some
of the models. This is to assess whether the impact of derivatives use on accruals changes after
SFAS 133 adoption. Thereafter I run the chow test of joint significance of the SFAS 133 dummy
and the interaction variable. The interaction variable is not significant and I conclude that SFAS
133 does not affect how derivatives influence the use of accruals.
5.3.4.3 Other determinants of discretionary accruals
Information asymmetry and other capital markets incentives
The logarithm of trading volume has a positive significant association. This variable is a proxy
for information asymmetry, as stocks that have low information asymmetry between investors
tend to be more widely traded and thus more liquid (see 2.4.3.1. and 4.3.2.2 for further
discussion). Smooth earnings, which can be realised through accruals, contribute to reduced
information asymmetry. Therefore the positive association can be explained. However, logarithm
of trading volume is also a proxy for firm size and the positive association could be explained by
larger firms have higher level of accruals.
82 Cash flow hedge accounting results in derivatives gains and losses being posted to other comprehensive income and this in turn
influences the equity account directly.
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Managerial risk preferences
The vega has a significant negative association (eight of the ten regression models at a 1%
significance level) as expected. However the delta coefficient is not significant. As discussed in
the theoretical framework, vega of the executive compensation package embody their sensitivity
to firm performance volatility. A higher vega will imply managers would find firm performance
including earnings volatility to be desirable and therefore lower the likelihood of income
smoothing; in other words a negative association is expected. The percentage of cash pay is an
additional proxy for managerial risk preference. It captures managers capacity to diversify their
wealth from their employers and thus not to be concerned about the impact that their employer
firm performance volatility will have on their personal wealth (i.e. an expected negative
association). The results show a significant negative association in eight of the ten regression
models, at 5 and 10% significance. This is consistent with the theoretical expectation.
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Table 5.17 Multivariate Regressions on Discretionary Accrual Determinants
DAC= α +  1 133DUM +  2 CHDUM +  3 DRNV +  4 133*DRNV +  5 ABINV +  6 R&D +  7TAXLOSS +
 8 LEV +  9 LN_TRADVOL+  10 DIV_POUT +  11OPCSHFLOW +  12 VEGA +  13 DELTA +  14 CSHPAY
+  15 BONUS_PERC+  16 INSTOWN +  17 MGR SHROWN +  18 AUDEXP +  19 INTERLOCK +  20-
INDDUM +  YRDUM
Panel A: Determinants based on full sample (pooled OLS)
Pooled OLS regression of DAC as the dependent variable is based on 685 observations of both derivatives and non derivatives users.
Model 2 includes the interaction variable of discretionary accruals. T-stats are based on robust standard errors. VIF factor is less than
10 for all variables and hence no concern on multi-collinearity. Year and industry dummies are not significant. For comparative
purposes, Model 1 excludes but Model 2 includes an interaction variable. I conduct the Chow test on joint significance of the
interaction term (133DUM* DRNV) and 133DUM. The Chow test, F- value of 2.04 (p-value of 0.1309), shows that the null
hypothesis that  1 and  4 are both zero, in Model 2, cannot be rejected.
Variable Definition- DRNV-Notional amount of derivatives/Total asset, 133DUM- SFAS 133 dummy variable, DAC- Absolute
Discretionary accruals/Total assets, ABINV- (Capital expenditure/Sales)-Over/under investment based on predicted capital
expenditure/sales, R&D-Research and development expense/Total assets, PTOB- Price per share/Book value per share as at fiscal
year end, TAXLOSS-Tax loss carry forward/Total assets, LEV- Debt/Total assets, QUICKRATIO-(Current Assets-
Inventory)/Current Liabilities, LNTASSETS- Log (Total assets), FSALES-Foreign sales/Sales, VEGA- ($change in stock and stock
options value for 0.01 change in stock price volatility)/Cash Pay, DELTA- ($ change in stock and stock options value for 0.01 change
in stock price)/Cash Pay , PERC CASHPAY-Cash Pay/Total compensation, FSALES- Foreign sales/sales, GEOG_DIV-
Geographical diversification, number of key regions with foreign operations, INST OWN-Institutional ownership percentage, MGR
SHROWN- Manager shareholding/Total stock holding, AUDEXP-Dummy for auditor with industry expertise, INTERLOCK-
Dummy variable for Executives with interlocking relationships, INDDUM-Industry dummy, YRDUM-Year dummy.
Model1 T-stat Model 2 T-stat
INTERCEPT -0.006 (-0.36) -0.007 (-0.38)
FOCAL VARIABLES 133DUM 0.011** (2.02) 0.011* (1.88)
DRNV -0.033*** (-2.92) -0.032** (-2.27)
133*DRNV -0.003 (-0.12)
CFHEGDE -0.013*** (-3.22) -0.013*** (-3.13)
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTIC&CAPITAL ABINV 0.036 (0.89) 0.036 (0.89)
MARKET INCENTIVE VARIABLES R&D -0.551 (-1.63) -0.552 (-1.63)
TAXLOSS 0.039 (1.35) 0.039 (1.35)
LNTRADVOL 0.007*** (4.07) 0.007*** (4.07)
LEV 0.002 (0.16) 0.003 (0.17)
DIVPOUT 0.002 (0.29) 0.002 (0.28)
OPCSHFLOW 0.105*** (3.13) 0.105*** (3.14)
MANAGERIAL RISK INCENTIVES VEGA -0.004 (-1.51) -0.005 (-1.51)
&CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES DELTA -0.026** (-2.04) -0.026** (-2.03)
BONUS PERC -0.001 (-0.11) -0.001 (-0.11)
INST OWN -0.006 (-0.34) -0.006 (-0.33)
PERC CASHPAY -0.024 (-1.61) -0.024 (-1.59)
MGR SHROWN 0.040 (0.70) 0.040 (0.70)
AUDEXP 0.002 (0.70) 0.002 (0.70)
INTERLOCK 0.022 (1.54) 0.022 (1.53)
OTHER INDUSTRY DUMMY Yes Yes
YEAR DUMMY Yes Yes
NUMBER OF
OBSERVATIONS 685 685
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 15% 15%
F-value*** 3.96*** 3.80***
*** Significance at 1%, **Significance at 5%, * Significance at 10%
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Panel B- Random effect GLS regressions
This is based same sample and variables defined in the pooled OLS model reported in Panel A. For comparative purposes, Model 1
excludes but Model 2 includes an interaction variable. I conduct the Chow test on joint significance of the interaction term
(133DUM* DRNV) and 133DUM. The Chow test, F- value of 3.77 (p-value of 0.1519), shows that the null hypothesis that  1 and
 4 are both zero, in Model 2, cannot be rejected.
Model 1 T-stat Model 2 T-stat
INTERCEPT -0.006 (-0.31) -0.006 (-0.33)
FOCAL VARIABLES 133DUM 0.010* (1.94) 0.010* (1.80)
DRNV -0.029*** (-2.66) -0.028** (-2.18)
133*DRNV -0.003 (-0.16)
CFHEGDE -0.012*** (-2.97) -0.012*** (-2.91)
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTIC&CAPITAL ABINV 0.034 (1.04) 0.034 (1.04)
MARKET INCENTIVE VARIABLES R&D -0.550*** (-4.40) -0.552*** (-4.39)
TAXLOSS 0.042 (1.44) 0.042 (1.44)
LNTRADVOL 0.007*** (3.53) 0.007*** (3.53)
LEV 0.001 (0.04) 0.001 (0.05)
DIVPOUT 0.002 (0.33) 0.002 (0.32)
OPCSHFLOW 0.109*** (3.16) 0.109*** (3.16)
MANAGERIAL RISK INCENTIVES VEGA -0.004* (-1.67) -0.004* (-1.66)
&CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES DELTA -0.026** (-2.11) -0.026** (-2.10)
BONUS PERC 0.002 (0.15) 0.002 (0.15)
INST OWN -0.006 (-0.38) -0.006 (-0.38)
PERC CASHPAY -0.025* (-1.69) -0.025* (-1.67)
MGR SHROWN 0.040 (1.06) 0.040 (1.06)
AUDEXP 0.003 (0.71) 0.003 (0.71)
INTERLOCK 0.021 (1.42) 0.021 (1.41)
OTHER INDUSTRY DUMMY Yes Yes
YEAR DUMMY Yes Yes
NUMBER OF
OBSERVATIONS 685 685
WALD STATISTIC*** 109.14*** 109.07***
R-SQUARED 18.13% 18.13%
*** Significance at 1%, **Significance at 5%, * Significance at 10%
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Panel C: Discretionary accrual determinants (Sample of only derivatives user observations)
These results are based on derivatives users (i.e. 527 firm year observations). The variables are as defined in Panel A. Model 1 and 2
are pooled OLS regression models, while Model 3 is a random effect regression model. T-stats are based on robust standard errors.
VIF factor is less than 10 for all variables and hence no concern on multi-collinearity. Year and industry dummies are not significant.
. For comparative purposes, Model 1 excludes but Model 2 and 3 include an interaction variable. I conduct the Chow test on joint
significance of the interaction term (133DUM* DRNV) and 133DUM. The Chow test, F- value of 3.06 (p-value of 0.0479), shows
that the null hypothesis that  1 and  4 are both zero, in Model 2, is rejected. Similarly, the F- value of 6.61 (p-value of 0.0367),
shows that the null hypothesis that  1 and  4 are both zero, in Model 2, is rejected.
Model 1 T-stat Model 2 T-stat Model 3 T-stat
INTERCEPT -0.022 (-1.08) -0.024 (-1.18) -0.023 (-1.11)
FOCAL VARIABLES 133DUM 0.014** (2.40) 0.016** (2.46) 0.015** (2.56)
DRNV -0.025** (-2.21) -0.019 (-1.48) -0.017 (-1.52)
133*DRNV -0.017 (-0.75) -0.017 (-0.79)
CFHEGDE -0.012*** (-2.65) -0.011*** (-2.59) -0.011** (-2.55)
ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTIC&CAPITAL ABINV 0.097 (1.29) 0.096 (1.29) 0.094 (1.34)
MARKET INCENTIVE VARIABLES R&D -0.536 (-1.12) -0.544 (-1.12) -0.543*** (-3.86)
TAXLOSS 0.038 (1.20) 0.037 (1.17) 0.039 (1.26)
LNTRADVOL 0.008*** (3.72) 0.008*** (3.73) 0.007*** (3.51)
LEV 0.028* (1.65) 0.029* (1.70) 0.028 (1.62)
DIVPOUT 0.004 (0.58) 0.003 (0.56) 0.003 (0.55)
OPCSHFLOW 0.119*** (3.20) 0.120*** (3.24) 0.124*** (3.35)
MANAGERIAL RISK INCENTIVES VEGA -0.003 (-1.18) -0.004 (-1.26) -0.003 (-1.44)
&CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
VARIABLES DELTA -0.023* (-1.69) -0.023* (-1.68) -0.022* (-1.69)
BONUS PERC -0.003 (-0.23) -0.002 (-0.20) -0.002 (-0.13)
INST OWN 0.003 (0.18) 0.004 (0.22) 0.005 (0.27)
PERC CASHPAY -0.019 (-1.22) -0.018 (-1.15) -0.020 (-1.35)
MGR SHROWN 0.012 (0.24) 0.011 (0.23) 0.015 (0.47)
AUDEXP -0.001 (-0.37) -0.001 (-0.37) -0.001 (-0.27)
INTERLOCK 0.014 (1.13) 0.014 (1.15) 0.014 (1.23)
OTHER INDUSTRY DUMMY Yes Yes Yes
YEAR DUMMY Yes Yes Yes
NUMBER OF
OBSERVATIONS 527 527 527
ADJUSTED R-
SQUARED 17.8% 17.7%
F-TEST*** 2.74*** 2.67***
R SQUARED 21.6%
WALD STATISTIC*** 89.27***
*** Significance at 1%, **Significance at 5%, * Significance at 10%
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5.3.5 Robustness tests
Alternative models and samples
5.3.5.1 Derivatives use
There is already an element of robustness checking in the initial regressions as they are based on
multiple models and samples. These include 10 regressions for derivatives determinants (OLS,
random effect, censored regression and the 2SLS models and logistic model).
In the above regressions, different samples are applied, including the combined sample of
derivatives and non derivatives users, and a sample of only derivatives users. As discussed in
section 5.3.2, these models and samples, show the significant negative association of
discretionary accruals and evidence of substitution between derivatives and discretionary
accruals.
Self-Selection bias
Errors associated with unobservable heterogeneity have been discussed. I further control for such
errors due to self selection bias. Self selection could arise in relation to the 80% observations
reporting derivatives use. There could be unobservable factors influencing the use of derivatives.
Self selection can lead to biased estimates and misleading inferences. Heckman’s (1976) two
stage procedure is used to correct for self selection. In the first stage, the probability of hedging
with derivatives is determined and from it the inverse mills ratio is derived. The probability is
derived based on the predicted value of a probit regression, based on a binary variable for the
decision to hedge as the dependent variable. The Mills ratio83 is the ratio of the probability
density function over the cumulative density function of the predicted probability of hedging
from the probit regression. The inverse mills ratio is then used as an independent variable in the
derivatives model specification based on the sample of derivatives users. In robustness testing, I
control for self selection bias by including the inverse mills ratio (results not reported) and still
come to the same reported conclusions.
83
Inverse Mills ratio
 zit (the prediction of each firm-year’s logistic regression index function)
 Standard normal density of zit - (zit)
 The normal cumulative probability of zit -  (zit)
 Inverse Mills ratio -  (zit)/ (zit)
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Logistic regression
Further to the above, I run a logistic regression based on a dummy variable for derivatives use.
The limited dependent variable regressions primarily test the determinants of the decision to
hedge, as this could differ from the extent of hedging. The results of the logistic regression are
reported in Table 5.16. From the results there is no evidence that SFAS 133 influenced the
decision on whether to hedge or not. I also find that discretionary accruals do not have a
significant association with the decision to hedge. However, using a dummy variable as a proxy
for derivatives use is a lot less reliable as a proxy for extent of derivatives use, than using the
notional amount and these results are less reliable than those from the censored regression
models.
Endogeneity
I primarily used the limited information model, 2SLS separate equation model with instrument
variables, to cater for the endogenous relationship of discretionary accruals and derivatives use.
As a robustness test, I run the full information models (i.e. 2SLS and 3SLS simultaneous equation
models) for the sample of derivatives users. The results (not reported) are consistent with the
reported 2SLS findings.
5.3.5.2 Discretionary accruals
The tests consist of seven regression models for discretionary accrual determinants (OLS and
random effect models). In the above regressions different samples are applied, including the
combined sample of derivatives and non derivatives users, and a sample of only derivatives users.
As discussed in section 5.3.2, across these models and samples, the key results on the tests of a)
impact of SFAS 133 on discretionary accruals and b) substitution with derivatives, are robust.
Alternative variables
For discretionary accruals, I use observed total accruals as an alternative. I also use an estimate of
abnormal accruals based on the median of industry, based on a 4 digit SIC code, as the normal
accrual for each firm. The results (not reported) are consistent with the main models. The results
in relation to other determinants of derivatives and discretionary accruals are also fairly
consistent. As discussed earlier these results conform to theoretical expectations.
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5.4 Conclusion
This chapter has tested the hypotheses of the first question. The primary findings are that there is
supporting univariate but limited multivariate evidence in relation to the first hypothesis of the
adoption of SFAS 133 leading to reduced derivatives use. There is both supporting univariate and
multivariate evidence of the adoption of SFAS 133 leading to an increased use of discretionary
accruals. There is supporting evidence that the application of cash flow hedge accounting reduces
the extent of use of discretionary accruals and that there is a substitution relationship between
discretionary accruals and derivatives use. Finally that the adoption of SFAS 133 leads to the
reduced impact of accruals on derivatives use but not vice versa. A further analysis of the
implication of these findings is provided in chapter 8.
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PART 3 -RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL
FINDINGS: SFAS 133 AND DERIVATIVES RELATED
DISCLOSURE
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6 RESEARCH DESIGN
This chapter describes the research design related to the second thesis question. It principally
includes the high level model specification and definition of variables. The data
considerations are similar to that of the first question, outlined in chapter 4 (sections 4.2 and
4.4). Regarding the multivariate models, an evaluation of the individual effects associated
with panel data is the primary consideration. From the theoretical framework, there is no
basis of assuming problems of endogeneity. The rest of the chapter is as follows:
 High level model specification in section 6.1,
 Detailed variable definition in section 6.2; and
 Detailed empirical model specification in section 6.3.
6.1 High Level Model specification
In theoretical framework in chapter 3, the following hypotheses were developed:
Hypothesis 3.1: SFAS 133 leads to an increase in the level of disclosure of related
derivatives information provided by reporting managers.
Hypothesis 3.2a: Capital markets incentives influences disclosure
Hypothesis 3.2b: Capital markets incentives are more significant after the introduction of
SFAS 133
Hypothesis 3.3a: Proprietary cost concerns influences the level of disclosure
Hypothesis 3.3b: Proprietary cost concerns are lower after the adoption of SFAS 133
These hypotheses are tested using a combination of multivariate and univariate tests.
Univariate testing
The testing comprises the following:
 Disclosure index: Difference in proportions of individual component of disclosure
that are included in the index, in the pre- and post -SFAS 133 observations;
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 Disclosure index: Difference in means and medians stratified by pre- and post -SFAS
133 observations;
 Mean and median values of control variables for derivatives user observations; and
 Mean and median values of control variables, stratified by low and high disclosure
observations.
Multivariate testing
 Disclosure index= f (SFAS 133 variable, Capital markets incentive proxy,
Proprietary cost proxy, Other Control variables)
6.2 Variable specification
6.2.1 Dependent variable: Disclosure Index
The disclosure of related derivatives information is primarily measured using a self
constructed index comprising eight factors. The approach of using a self-constructed index,
as a proxy for disclosure quality, is common in empirical disclosure literature. For example,
the AIMR index has been applied in a stream of studies including the Lobo and Zhou (2001)
studies on the relationship between earnings management and corporate disclosure. Self
constructed indices have been extensively used across a range of accounting and risk
disclosure studies (Berretta and Bozzolan, 2006; Linsley and Shrieves, 2006; Chalmers and
Godfrey, 2004; and Aggarwal and Simkins, 2004).
Index construction
The components selected for inclusion in the index represent a subset of the overall
prescribed disclosure requirements through US GAAP and SEC requirements. The
constructed index effectively measures compliance with the collective body of disclosure
requirements (i.e. Pre-SFAS 133, SFAS 133 and SEC requirements). Included in the
derivatives information disclosure index are factors where there is supporting empirical
evidence on their information content as discussed in section 3.4.1.3. These include notional
amounts (Wong, 2000 and Venkatachalam, 1996), sensitivity analysis and value at risk
(Jorion, 2002; Rajgopal, 1999). I also make reference to the factors included in similar
studies (Darus and Taylor, 2006; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004 and Aggarwal and Simkins,
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2004) and the disclosure elements contained in the 2004 Fitch Ratings report84 on derivatives
disclosure. The index consists of 8 quantitative factors.
The focus on quantitative information is consistent with the risk disclosure improvements
highlighted by the SEC’s FRR48. As stated in sections 2.6.1and 3.2, FRR48 requires the
disclosure of sensitivity and value at risk analysis information. The disclosure components
included in the index are assumed to be representative of overall US GAAP and SEC
quantitative disclosure requirements at the time of reporting (i.e. 1999-2003).
Table 6.1: Components of derivatives disclosure compliance index (DDI)
Disclosure measure (Disc
component) 1 if reported, 0
otherwise
Reason for inclusion Supporting empirical
studies ( see
Section 3.4.1)
Gross notional amount Measures risk exposure Wong (2000), Venkatachalam
(1996)
Currencies being hedged
(€,$,£)
Measures risk exposure
Amount designated for hedge
accounting
Is a proxy for risk
management effectiveness
Disaggregated and tabular
presentation format
Represents understandability
of risk related information
Linsmeier et al (2002) and
Rajgopal (1999)
Sources of risk exposure (e.g.
foreign debt, assets)
Measures risk exposure
Sensitivity analysis or value
at risk disclosure
Measures risk exposure and
risk management
effectiveness
Jorion (2000), Linsmeier et al
(2002) and Rajgopal (1999)
Income effects (i.e. realised
and unrealised gains and
losses)
Is a proxy for risk
management effectiveness
Disclose derivatives fair
value in note
A proxy for risk exposure Barth, Beaver and Landsman
(1996), Venkatachalam
(1996) and Ahmed et al
(2006)
For each of the components in Table 6.1, 1 is assigned if a firm discloses and 0 if it does not.
The disclosure index (Disc Index) is computed as shown in Equation 6.1
Equation 6.1
Disc Index= (∑ (Disclosure components)) / 8
Quality versus Quantity measurement
84 Fitch Rating Credit Policy Special Report: November 9th, 2004, Hedge Accounting and Derivatives Study for Corporates:
Disclosure, Hedge Accounting and Restatement Risk.
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As Berretta and Bozzolan (2004) point out, the use of indices as a proxy for disclosure
quality could be potentially flawed if the quantity of disclosure items is taken to be
necessarily synonymous with quality of disclosure. However, as Botosan (2004) and
Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) point out, determining the quality of information is very
difficult, especially given that any meaningful quality judgement, would have to factor in the
utility of information to users. Information quality assessment can be complicated by users
having differing preferences due to the diversity in application of information as well as their
sophistication. Any index that weights components, so as to reflect quality, would ideally
have to do so from a relative ranking of usefulness of different components of information.
This ranking should be provided by a representative sample of financial reporting expert
users e.g. buy or sell side analysts. Given the difficulties in constructing a quality weighted
index, within the time and financial constraints of this research, I use an unweighted index.
For the same reasons, many studies opt to focus on unweighted indices (Aggarwal and
Simkins, 2004; Chalmers et al (2004); and Berretta and Bozzolan, 2006).
Index construction in comparative studies and limitations of index
By definition, self constructed indices tend to differ across studies and it is useful to have a
sense of the basis of construction of disclosure indices across similar studies. In this regards,
I primarily elaborate on the indices constructed by Aggarwal and Simkins (2004) and
Chalmers and Godfrey (2004). Table 6.2 outlines the components of the index of
comparative studies. Abraham and Cox, 2007, Linsley and Shrives, 2006 and Darus and
Taylor, 2006 also construct risk disclosure indices, but they include risk dimensions that are
beyond the scope of this study.
Aggarwal and Simkins (2004) include 5 quantitative factors and 1 qualitative factor (i.e.
explanation of why they hedge risk). However, unlike in this study, they do not include
sensitivity analysis and the sources of risk exposure. Instead they include maturity
description, which is a source of risk exposure. Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) do not include
sensitivity analysis, but include the disclosure of counterparty details, maturity and credit risk
exposure. The requirements for the disclosure of counterparty details and credit risk
exposure have only been recently required85 under US GAAP and therefore are not included
in this study.
85 SFAS 161, issued in 2008
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Table 6.2: Index components of Comparative studies
Aggarwal and Simkins (2004) Chalmers and Godfrey (2004)
 Reason for the qualitative use of
derivatives
 Notional amount
 Type of instruments used for hedging
 Disaggregated information on
contracts
 Individual currencies hedged
 Maturity of contracts
 Various components of qualitative
description of hedging policy
o Description of hedging
policy
o Objectives for holding or
issuing derivatives financial
statements
o Accounting policies and
methods adopted for
derivatives instruments other
than foreign currency hedges
o Policy in giving collateral,
security and credit
arrangements
o How they monitor and
control risk associated with
derivatives
o Financial controls in place to
monitor risk
 Notional amount
 Disaggregated presentation
 Counterparty details
 Credit risk exposure
 Maturity of contracts
Both these comparative studies do not weight the components of the index. In other words,
each component of the index is assigned a value of 1 if disclosed and 0 if not. Aggarwal and
Simkins (2004) further divide the index into five subcategories, ranging from ‘poor’ (i.e.
only 1 component is disclosed) to ‘excellent’ (i.e. at least 5 components are disclosed) and
use a five level dummy variable, as the dependent variable in an ordered logistic regression
model. On the other hand, Chalmers and Godfrey sum the components available and divide
this by the number of possible disclosure categories (i.e. 14 (6 qualitative, 8 quantitative)) to
come up with a disclosure index. This study’s approach to disclosure variable definition is
similar to Chalmers et al’s. However, for robustness testing, I construct a 3 level categorical
dummy variable to be used as a dependent variable in an ordered logistic regression.
The use of a self constructed disclosure index has inherent limitations. These could include
the omission of disclosures made outside the annual reports. Managers have the option of
disclosing risk exposures through press releases and analyst conference calls. In the
construction of the index, this study does not take into account any such disclosures that have
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been made. Another limitation is that a self constructed index, may be difficult for other
researchers to easily replicate.
6.2.2 Focal Independent variables
6.2.2.1 Pre- and Post- SFAS 133 period
To test the above mentioned hypotheses a dummy variable is used. The dummy variable is
specified as 1 for the post 2000 (after adoption of SFAS 133) period and 0 for the period
before. Based on Hypothesis 3.1 (see section 3.3), SFAS 133 is expected to increase the level
of disclosure of derivatives related information, hence the relationship between the SFAS
133 dummy and derivatives disclosure is expected to be positive and significant.
6.2.2.2 Capital markets Incentives
Information asymmetry/Trading volume
This study includes the logarithm of trading volume as a proxy for the liquidity of a firm’s
stock. Improved disclosure increases the liquidity of the firm stock and there is an
assumption that a more liquid stock is likely to have lower information asymmetry between
informed and uninformed investors (Bamber and Cheon, 1995 and Linsmeier et al, 2002). I
therefore assume a positive association between trading volume and liquidity.
Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) also propose the use of analyst coverage as a proxy for
determining the information asymmetry but due to lack of access to I/B/E/S they apply a
press coverage construct as an alternative for information asymmetry. For the same reason of
lack of data access, I do not use consensus and level of analyst coverage as an alternative
variable.
Leverage
As noted by Chalmers and Godfrey (2004), leverage (debt/total assets) can capture the
incentive to disclose information to reduce costs associated with debt financing86. Therefore
it is included as an additional capital markets proxy. Guo (2004) provides evidence showing
that disclosure influences the perceived riskiness in a fashion that impacts on the cost of debt
and the expected risk of default. The author finds that after controlling for other market risk
86 However, the empirical test of Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) does not find a significant association between leverage and
disclosure.
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factors, disclosure increases the cost of debt for firms that are either using derivatives
speculatively or having ineffective hedges. However, it decreases these for effective hedging
firms. Hence one can infer that firms that are using derivatives for risk management purposes
would be likely to provide more derivatives disclosure corresponding to increasing levels of
debt. On the other hand, firms that use derivatives for speculation would disclose less. Given
the difficulties in differentiating between speculators and hedgers, in any precise fashion due
to data quality, the direction of impact of leverage is indeterminate.
Although leverage is applied as an incentive to disclose for capital markets purposes, it can
also be a proxy for other motives e.g. political costs (Aggarwal and Simkins, 2004) and
therefore necessitates the careful interpretation of results. It nevertheless is commonly used
an independent variable in disclosure research (Leuz, 2004).
6.2.2.3 Proprietary cost incentives
To measure proprietary cost incentives, I use variables that have been applied in previous
empirical studies as well as selecting new variables. I use percentage of industry sales or
market share as a proxy variable for industry leadership. Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) note
that industry leadership could influence disclosure as firms in such a position would be
aiming to maintain their competitive and strategic advantage.
As an additional proxy, I construct a dummy variable based on whether a firm is a top 10
industry leader87, within the two-digit SIC industry category, and its net profit margin is
greater than 10%. This is an improvement on Aggarwal and Simkins (2004), who use a
competitiveness indicator based on low mark up factors identified by Campa and Godfrey
(1995). It is an improvement because it allows a firm specific evaluation rather than
assuming all firms within a particular industry have proprietary costs. Overall, this study
effectively applies more variables for proprietary cost ` than did either Chalmers et al or
Aggarwal et al.
87
I construct a proxy based on industry leadership ranking (Top 10 in sales and total assets within the two-digit SIC code
industry) and apply a dummy variable differentiating the industry leaders (i.e. Top 10 or not). Top 10 due to the large number of
firms falling within two-digit SIC codes considering the coverage of NYSE and NASDAQ. This is similar to Aggarwal and
Simkins (2004) who assess whether firms are in the top 3 fortune 500 classification categories. I do not use the fortune 500
ranking, due to data access constraints, I determine the industry leaders based on the computation of sales and total assets ranking
in the Compustat database.
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I expect proprietary costs to be negatively associated. However, for the constructed proxy
that includes the element of industry leadership, the impact on disclosure could be
ambiguous. Industry leaders may have proprietary concerns and lower their levels of
disclosure so as to protect their competitive advantage (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2000). But
this could be offset by them also having concerns about their reputation, relative to their
peers, and therefore proactively providing more risk disclosures.
6.2.3 Other Independent control variables
6.2.3.1 Managerial reputation
Managerial talent and reputation is an intangible asset that is very difficult to directly
measure. Managerial talent is often anecdotally inferred based on an ex post valuation of firm
performance. Even then such an approach is subject to erroneous attribution, because
managers can get either credit or blame for factors that they did not control and which
influence firm performance. In the Australian context, Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) used
membership of G100 (Largest, affiliation to the treasury management industry body (ASCT)
and whether auditors are represented in standard setting bodies (i.e. then Big 6 or not), to
represent reputation and legitimacy motives.
Due to difficulties in observing and measuring managerial talent and reputation, I make the
assumption that their compensation level reflects the labour market’s pricing of their abilities
and that this must include and be based on their reputation. Their compensation is based on
their perceived talent. Therefore, a ranking88 of compensation of top management should
reflect their relative reputation. I use the annual salary ranking from the Execucomp
database89 to be a proxy for managerial talent. I then construct a talent dummy variable, if
executives are in the top 100, then talent dummy is equals to 1, otherwise it is equals to 0.
88 Compustat/Execucomp gives ranking of top 5 managers
89 The number of firms is based on a sample of large firms that reported compensation in the Execucomp database (1999- 1954
firms, 2000- 1846 firms, 2001-1799 firms, 2002-1830 firms, and 2003-1856 firms).
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6.2.3.2 Managerial Compensation
Managerial risk incentives are measured based on vega and delta of stock compensation.
These variables are described in and defined in sections 2.3.3 and 4.6.1.
6.2.3.3 Litigation risk
Verecchia (2004) is sceptical about this particular hypothesis on the basis of its low
testability. Nevertheless, I use a dummy variable that differentiates high from low litigation
risk industries. This variable is also applied by Jiang, Lee and Anandarajan (2008) in the
context of an earnings management study. I am not aware of any derivatives disclosure
studies that have employed a similar dummy variable and therefore this is another
contribution.
6.2.3.4 Firm Performance
Similar to Miller (2002) and Leuz (2004), I use the return on assets (ROA) during each fiscal
year as a proxy for firm performance. While there are other measures of firm performance
such as stock price, the focus on return on assets is appropriate as it is a performance metric
that is more directly controllable by management, as is derivatives disclosure. Hence there is
likely to be greater interaction between choices that are more readily influenced by
management. ROA can be directly influenced through earnings management, operating and
investment choices. As stated in section 3.5.5, it is unclear whether firm performance will be
positively or negatively associated with derivatives disclosure.
As an additional proxy, I also include sales and earnings growth as a measure of
performance. These variables are also applied by Aggarwal and Simkins (2004).
6.2.3.5 Foreign operations-Geographic diversification
Multinational firms may face greater disclosure pressures compared to domestic firms. For
some jurisdictions, this could be so as to adhere to internationally accepted disclosure
practices (Leuz, 2004). But this line of argument probably does not hold for US companies
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reporting on US GAAP. The number of geographic segments is a proxy for the multinational
scale of the model business and is a proxy for exposure.
6.2.3.6 Risk exposure
Dobbler (2008) and Jung and Kwon (1998) state that the disclosure level is influenced by the
information endowment on risk management that corporate managers possess. It can be
inferred that the information endowment depends on risk exposure. I use the percentage of
foreign sales/sales as the proxy for the underlying risk exposure. As an additional proxy, I
use the notional amount of derivatives for risk exposures. To do so I use the sample of firms
that report notional derivatives use and exclude the notional amount indicator as one of the
components of the index as they will be no difference in this component across any of the
applied observations.
6.2.3.7 Firm Size
As discussed in the research design for the first question (4.6.1), the logarithm of total assets
is an appropriate proxy for firm size.
6.2.3.8 Discretionary accruals
Lobo and Zhou (2001) find evidence of a negative association between earnings management
and voluntary disclosure of information. Firms that are engaging is smoothing of earnings are
unlikely to concurrently be very transparent (Hunton, Libby and Mazza, 2006) and vice
versa. I apply the refined modified Jones (1991) (described in detail in sections 4.3 and
4.6.1).
To summarise, Table 6.3 contains all the variables and their definitions.
Table 6.3 Summary of variables
Variable Definition and construct measured
Focal variables
DISC INDEX Self constructed index determined based on 8 components as
described in section 6.2.1
133DUM SFAS 133 dummy variable equals 1 for Post-SFAS 133
data and 0 for Pre-SFAS 133 data (i.e. 1999 and 2000(0),
2001,2002, 2003 (1))
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Capital markets
Incentives and firm
characteristics
LN_TRADVOL Logarithm of trading volume. Trading volume
133 TRADVOL Interaction variable between trading volume and the
introduction of SFAS 133
PTOB Price to Book ratio is a capital markets incentive. Firm’s
price per share divided by book value per share, as at
fiscal year-end (i.e. compustat data item#60/(#199*#25))
LEV Long term debt (compustat item #9)/Total assets
(compustat item #6) – Leverage is a proxy for firm’s
incentives to reduce probability and expected costs
financial distress and the likelihood to need to smooth
earnings to do so. Leverage also proxies for interest rate
exposure that can lead to using derivatives for hedging
purposes and the incentive to manage earnings to avoid
covenant violations. The leverage is scaled by total assets
DRNV Notional amount/Total assets- Measures extent of
derivatives use. The notional amount is a proxy for risk
exposure and is hand collected from Form 10-K
statements downloaded from the SEC Edgar’s database.
The notional amount is scaled by total assets.
DAC The proxy for discretionary accruals is derived. It is based on
determining what should be a normal level of accrual use based
on the revenue generated, asset intensity as defined in the Jones
(1991) estimate modified by Phillips and Rego (2003) factors
(i.e. sales growth rate and normal credit sales levels). A
detailed description of the formulation is in section. The
measure is unsigned and scaled by total assets.
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The inputs into the determination are sales (data item #12),
property plant and equipment (data item #7), total assets (data
item #6), net income (data item #18) and operating cash flow
(data item #308). The Compustat unit of measure for these
variables is $millions.
GEOG_DIV Number of geographically spread business units. This is
extracted from Compustat Geographic Segments File.
LNASSETS Logarithm of total assets (Compustat #6) is a proxy for
size effect
FSALES Percentage of foreign sales (Foreign sales/Total sales) for
each firm-year is a proxy for financial price exposure and
is extracted from Compustat Geographic Segments File.
ROA Return on assets during fiscal year. Measured as net
income (data item #18)/total assets (data item#6)
GROWTH Sales annual growth (data item #12)
Proprietary cost
measures
MKT SHARE Market share (Sales/Industry Sales)
Industry sales = Sum of sales of all firms within four digit SIC
code category
PROP COST
DUMMY
Constructed based on industry leadership and profit
margin. If a firm is ranked in the top 10, within the two
digit SIC code industry classification, based on sales and
total assets, and has a profit margin (net income-data
item #8/sales-data item #13) of greater than 10%, then
prop cost dummy is equals to 1, otherwise it is equals to
zero
TALENT DUMMY Talent dummy is determined based on the ranking of
compensation paid to a reporting firm’s executives. If a
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firm’s executives are in the top 100 in the annual ranking
of total compensation paid out to executives as recorded
in the Execucomp database, then talent dummy = 1
otherwise talent dummy=0
Managerial Risk
Incentives and
corporate
governance
VEGA Vega/Cash Pay- Vega is a proxy for sensitivity to
volatility and is a measure of managerial risk aversion. It
is measured as the average dollar change in value of the
top management stock and option portfolio for a dollar
1% change in standard deviation of stock returns. Vega is
scaled by cash pay. This data is obtained from
Execucomp.
Vega = Vega of new options granted during year+ vega
of all exercisable options held+ vega of all unexercisable
options held
DELTA Delta/Cash Pay- Delta is a proxy for sensitivity to
changes in stock price and is a measure of managerial
risk aversion. It is measured as the average dollar change
in value of the top management stock and option
portfolio for a dollar 1% change in stock price. Delta is
scaled by cash pay. This data is obtained from
Execucomp.
Delta = Delta of new options granted during year+ delta
of all exercisable options held+ delta of all unexercisable
options held
CSHPAY PER Cash Pay/Total compensation- controls for managerial
risk aversion due to personal wealth diversification. This
is based on total compensation (Cash+Bonus+ share
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based compensation granted during a fiscal year). This
data is obtained from Execucomp.
LIT RISK Dummy variable for litigation risk. A value of 1 if the firm
operates in a high litigation industry and 0 otherwise (high
litigation industries are industries with SIC codes of 2833–
2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370–7374).
This approach is taken by Jiang, Lee and Anandarajan (2008)
INST_OWN Percentage of institutional ownership- Proxy for
corporate governance
MGR_SHRS Managerial ownership as a percentage of stock holdings
as at year end. This data is obtained from Execucomp.
INTERLOCK
Dummy variable for where executives are subject to
interlocking relationship. Variable is equal to one when
interlocking relationship exists (1), otherwise it is equals
to zero. This data is obtained from Execucomp.
AUDEXP Sorted all firms by two digit SIC codes and set the
dummy to one (zero) if the audit firm for a particular
company audits more than 15% (<15%) of firms in two
digit SIC code. Bowen, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam
(2008) applied this variable in similar fashion.
INDDUM Industry dummy- Across 6 key broad industry categories
namely mining, manufacturing, transaction, trading,
services and other. This is based on aggregation of SIC
codes recorded in Compustat. This caters for
unobservable variation.
YRDUM Year dummy. This caters for impact of any unobservable
macroeconomic factors that could have influenced
disclosure. For example, the introduction of Sarbanes
Oxley is controlled for by having a 2002 year dummy
variable.
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6.3 Detailed model specification
The testing comprises of panel regression, based on the specification in Equation 6.2 below,
using 1999-2003 data.
Equation 6.2
DISC_INDEX= α +  1 133DUM +  2 LN TRADVOL + +  3 133DUM*LN TRADVOL+  4 LEV +  5 FSALES +  6
DAC +  7 ROA + 8 GEOG_DIV +  9 LNTASSETS+  10GROWTH+  11 MKT SHARE +  12 PROP COST
DUMMY +  13TALENT DUMMY +  14 VEGA +  15 DELTA +  16CSHPAY PER +  17 LIT RISK +  18 MGR
SHROWN +  19INSTOWN +  20 AUD EXP +  21 INTERLOCK +  22- INDDUM +  YRDUM.
Robustness tests
I estimate the above model using alternative variables for the dependent and independent
variables. This study includes 21 variables as well as industry and time dummy variables to
capture industry and time fixed effects. It effectively includes more variables than most
similar studies. Only, Aggarwal and Simkins (2004) apply a broad set of variables (i.e.14)
comparable to those applied for this study.
Hamlen and Largay (2005) studying DJIA disclosure before and after SFAS 133, do not
study incentives at all. Most UK studies of risk disclosure do not even include incentives of
disclosure. The studies that do so by focusing on only a subset of the disclosure determinants
included in this study. Abraham and Cox (2007) mainly focus on corporate governance
variables plus size, leverage and risk (measured by variance). Chalmers and Godfrey (2004)
focus on reputation and legitimacy (ASCT affiliation, Big 6 auditor and G100), in addition to
size and dummy variables on membership of mining industry, having reported news item,
whether a new share issue was made in proceeding year and leverage. Hence, the overall
approach of this study is robust in number of variables and this limits the likelihood of
flawed inference due to omitted variables.
For alternative model testing, I apply the approach taken by Aggarwal and Simkins (2004)
who define disclosure based on 5 scale categories and thereafter perform ordered logistic
regressions. I divide the disclosure into 3 categories and conduct ordered logistic tests.
222
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the research design to test the impact of SFAS 133 on derivatives
related disclosure. The chapter lays out the methodology and variable definitions. The
primary empirical contribution will be the application of a self constructed disclosure index
that includes SFAS 133 data. To my knowledge there is no similar large sample study based
on SFAS 133. However, there is a limitation of the index as it is based on a subset of selected
prescribed requirements and this selection introduces an element of subjectivity. It also may
be difficult to replicate this study due to the index being self-constructed. The index also
bears the limitation of being a purely quantity index as it not weighted for the quality or
impact of specific disclosed information components.
In addition to predominantly using proxies applied by other empirical studies, the study
includes a number of novel proxies for the managerial talent, proprietary cost and litigation
cost incentives. The empirical findings are described in chapter 7.
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7 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS-SFAS 133 AND DISCLOSURE
This chapter reviews the univariate and multivariate empirical findings, in relation to the impact
of SFAS 133 adoption and related incentives on disclosure. It is based on the methodology
described in chapter 6.
7.1 Univariate tests and descriptive statistics
The reported univariate results consist of:
 Disclosure index: Difference in proportions of disclosure index constituents between
pre- and post- SFAS 133 observations;
 Disclosure index: Difference in means and medians between the pre-and post-SFAS
133 observations;
 Control variables: Difference in Means and medians between observations stratified
by low and high disclosure categories.
These tests reflect the impact of SFAS 133 on the disclosure of derivatives related
information, as well as how disclosure may be influenced by the explanatory control
variables.
7.1.1 Difference of proportion of index constituents
Table 7.1 contains a comparison of frequency of key disclosure components across the pre-
and post-SFAS 133 periods. The results show variation in disclosure levels across multiple
categories before and after the adoption of SFAS 133. It shows an improvement in certain
categories but this is offset by decline across other categories. In others words, there is partial
improvement and partial deterioration of derivatives disclosures. These findings resonate
with those of Hamlen and Largay90 (2005). A similar trend of partial improvement/partial
deterioration is reported in a Fitch ratings’ (2004) study of the disclosure practices of 57
companies.
90 Their study is on derivatives footnote disclosure by the 30 DJIA companies before and after SFAS 133.
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The disaggregated analysis of disclosure index constituents shows a statistically significant
decline in the disclosure of notional derivatives amounts. 93% of pre-SFAS 133 versus 81%
of post-SFAS 133 observations disclosed this amount. These results are consistent with
Hamlen and Largay (2005). They find that 18 of the 30 DJIA companies stop reporting
notional derivatives amounts. The decline in reported notional amounts could be simply due
to notional amounts not being mandatory disclosure after SFAS 133. However, most
companies still opt to report notional amounts (i.e. 81%) after SFAS 133 adoption. This
indicates that they deemed such information to be still useful for disclosure purposes.
There is statistically significant increase in the reporting of impact of derivatives use, on
income and balance sheet. 40% of pre-SFAS 133 firms do so, in contrast to 61% of Post-
SFAS 133 firms. There is also a significant increase in proportions of firms disclosing their
derivatives fair value amount in the footnotes. There is increase from 74% (pre-SFAS 133) to
81% thereafter. Similarly, there is increased disclosure of amounts designated for cash flow
hedge accounting purposes as well (i.e. from 4% pre-SFAS 133 to 31% post-SFAS 133).
These findings are consistent with Hamlen and Largay (2005). They find that only 3 out of
the 30 firms reported income effects in the pre-SFAS 133 period, while 25 did so after. The
observed increase in disclosure of fair value and income effects support Hypothesis 3.1 of
SFAS 133 increasing note disclosure. However, as noted, there are offsetting declines in
other aspects of disclosure (e.g. notional amounts).
There are no statistically significant differences in proportion of disclosure of respective
currencies hedged, sources of risk exposure and firms providing disaggregated tabular
presentation is easy for users to comprehend. At the same time, there is poor disclosure both
before and after SFAS 133 of the sensitivity analysis and value at risk analysis information.
9% of pre-SFAS 133 sample firms versus 8% of post-SFAS 133 sample firms provided the
required data, showing low compliance with the SEC requirements under FR48.
Overall, there is some improvement in 4 out of the 8 components of the disclosure index,
after SFAS 133. There is improvement in disclosure of amounts treated as cash flow hedges,
sources of risk exposure (50% Post-SFAS 133 versus 46% Pre-SFAS 133), impact of
derivatives on reported financial results (61% versus 40%) and fair value in notes (81%
versus 74%). There is a significant decline in proportions of notional amounts and
insignificant decline in proportions of currencies hedged, disaggregated and tabular
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presentation and sensitivity analysis/value at risk disclosure. Unlike this study, Hamlen and
Largay (2005) find that no significant change in the proportion of firms reporting fair value.
Of the 30 DJIA firms that they study, 14 report fair values before and after SFAS 133, 6
report them for the first time after SFAS 133, while 4 stop reporting them after SFAS 133.
They also consider other components of disclosure that I do not, namely that the disclosure
of hedges of net investment in foreign operations increased. On the other hand, as described
in section 6.2.1, I primarily focus on elements where there is empirical evidence of value
relevance such as the notional amount, sensitivity analysis and fair values.
Table 7.1 Disclosure index-Difference of proportions of constituents
The frequency and proportion of components is based on 681 firm-year observations (1999-2003). The difference
of proportion is between the pre-SFAS 133 period (up to year 1999 and 2000) and the Post-SFAS 133 period (i.e.
2001-2003).
Disclosure Component
Pre-SFAS
133
Post-
SFAS 133
Pre-SFAS
133
Post-
SFAS 133Significance
Disclose currencies being hedged (€,$,£ etc) 152 262 62% 60%
Disclose amount treated designated as cash flow hedges*** 11 136 4% 31% ***
Presents disaggregated/tabular presentation (Easy to identify
derivatives value) 162 272 66% 62%
Disclose sources of risk exposure (e.g. foreign debt or foreign
assets, liabilities) 113 218 46% 50%
Disclose sensitivity analysis or value at risk disclosure 21 36 9% 8%
Disclose impact on reported financial results (realised and
unrealised gain/loss)*** 97 264 40% 61% ***
Disclose notional amount in notes*** 229 354 93% 81% ***
Disclose fair value in notes*** 182 354 74% 81% **
Number of observations 245 436
*(10% significance), ** (5% significance), *** (1% significance)
7.1.2 Alternative proxy
As an alternative dependent variable for disclosure, I construct a categorical disclosure level
variable, dividing the disclosure into three categories, low, moderate and high. This approach
is similar to that taken by Aggarwal and Simkins (2004). For pre-SFAS 133, low (1) = 0 to 2
factors, moderate (2) 3 factors, high (3) = 4 or more factors. For post-SFAS 133 period,
SFAS 133, low (1) = 0 to 2 factors, moderate (2) 3 to 4 factors, high (3) = 5 or more factors.
Table 7.2 shows the results of components of disclosure across firms. Based on these
categorisation 15% of sample observations are low disclosure, 26% are high disclosure and
the rest (59%) are moderate disclosure.
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Table 7.2: Quality of disclosure breakdown
Category Factors
Firm-year
observations Percentage
Low 0 to 2 105 15%
Moderate 3 to 5 401 59%
High 6 to 8 175 26%
Total 681
7.1.3 Difference in means and medians of disclosure index across the pre and Post-
SFAS 133 observations
Table 7.3 show the difference in means and medians of the disclosure index across the pre-
and post- SFAS 133 observations. In this table, I show the results of two constructions of the
disclosure index (Disc index). Disc index includes all the 8 factors identified in the variable
definition discussion of the index. Disc index 2 excludes91 the notional amount.
Table 7.3-Disclosure index univariate and descriptive statistics
Panel A: Difference in means and medians of disclosure indices.
Disc index 1 includes all the 8 components identified in the variable definition. Disc index 2
excludes the notional amount but includes the other 7 components of Disc index 1. The mean and
median values are based on the 681, 1999-2003 firm-year observations of derivatives users.
Observations DISCINDEX1 DISCINDEX1 DISCINDEX2 DISCINDEX2
Mean Median Mean Median
All 681 0.53 0.50 0.48 0.43
Pre-SFAS 133 245 0.49 0.50 0.43 0.43
Post-SFAS 133 436 0.54 0.50 0.51 0.57
T-test 3.39 4.51
Wilcoxon z-test 3.17 4.14
Panel B: Disclosure index per year
Year Disc index 1 Disc index 2 Frequency
1999 0.50 0.43 112
2000 0.49 0.43 133
2001 0.54 0.49 132
2002 0.55 0.51 153
2003 0.54 0.51 151
91
I exclude the notional amount in order to include the level of derivatives use as an independent variable in some of the
testing models. The notional amount of derivatives use is a proxy for underlying risk exposure as discussed in sections 6.2.2 and
4.3.1.
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Disc index 1 and Disc index 2 have statistically significant increases after SFAS 133 and
this supports Hypothesis 3.1of SFAS 133 increasing disclosure. The increase in the index
that excludes notional amount is understandable, as notional amount is one component where
there is significant decline as shown in Table 7.1
In addition to differentiating the pre- and post- SFAS 133 impact on disclosure index
components, I analyse whether there is an upward trending or steadily increasing pattern of
disclosure levels. I find that while there is a discrete increase in Disc index 1 and Disc Index
2 after SFAS 133 adoption, there is no observable upward trend in the period preceding and
after SFAS 133 (see Figure 7.1 below). This differs from the finding of Darus and Taylor
(2006), who in a study of Australian companies’ financial instruments disclosure levels, find
an upward drift of disclosure. This they propose that this is in the anticipation and enactment
of mandatory disclosure requirements.
Figure 7.1: Chart of disclosure index across reporting periods
7.1.4 Difference in means and medians of disclosure index across industry
Table 7.4 shows that there are differences in disclosure quality across industries. There are
high levels of disclosure in the mining, manufacturing and services industries. The lowest
disclosure index value is in the trading industry. The variation of disclosure across industries
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support’s Nain’s (2004) postulation that companies tend to be influenced by the hedging
practices of peers in their respective industries. Hence, if industry is a factor on the hedging
decision and there is variation of hedging practices across industry, it can be inferred that
disclosure of hedging will also vary by industry. The high level of disclosure of mining
industry firms could be explained by there being more derivatives related information (e.g.
risk exposure) in this industry. Chalmers and Godfrey (2004), contend that managers of firms
operating in markets subject to volatile commodity prices (e.g. oil and mining industries)
have greater incentives to protect themselves from unfavourable price movements by
engaging in hedging activities.
Table 7.4-Disclosure by key industry categories
Disc index 1 includes all the 8 components identified in the variable definition. Disc index 2
excludes the notional amount but includes the other 7 components of Disc index 1. The mean
and median values are based on the 681, 1999-2003 firm-year observations of derivatives
users. Industry categories on based on broad SIC categories.
Industry category Observations Disc index 1 Disc index 2
Mean Median Mean Median
Mining 38 0.56 0.63 0.53 0.64
Manufacturing 533 0.53 0.50 0.48 0.43
Transactions 6 0.46 0.50 0.40 0.43
Trading 28 0.37 0.38 0.31 0.29
Services 69 0.54 0.50 0.49 0.57
Other 7 0.41 0.50 0.39 0.43
7.1.5 Difference in means and medians of independent control variables
Stratified by low/high disclosure
Table 7.6 shows that relative to low disclosure firms, high disclosure firms have the
following significant differences:
 Higher stock trading volume (logarithm of trading volume). This is consistent with
higher levels of disclosure, reducing the information asymmetry between informed
and uninformed investors on reporting firms. This in turn leads to higher levels of
trading (Bamber and Cheon, 1995).
 Higher market share, as measured by percentage of industry sales by the reporting
firm. Indicating that industry leaders tend to disclose more than their smaller
counterparts. This is backed by the finding that they also have a higher proportion of
firms with an indicator of high proprietary costs (i.e. industry leader and high net
income margin).
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 Higher total assets. This could be due to larger firms enjoying economies of scale in
incurring information processing costs associated with disclosure, as discussed in
section 3.5.6.
 Higher proportion of managers characterized as highly talented, based on being in
the top 100 annual compensation ranking of approximately 2000 Execucomp firms.
This is consistent with the theoretical expectations that more talented managers
disclose more, as discussed in section 3.5.1.
 Higher Vega- Managerial risk incentive is measured by vega (i.e. the sensitivity to
volatility). The expectation is that higher sensitivity to volatility should result in
lower disclosures, given that disclosure should lower the uncertainty. However, as
discussed in section 3.5.2, the impact of compensation is ambiguous as disclosure
may simply result in increased risk perception, especially if it reveals unhedged
exposures or confirms the use of derivatives for speculative purposes.
 Higher proportion of experienced auditors. As described in the variable definition,
expert auditors are those that cover at least 15% of firms within the SIC industry
category. This is consistent with the expectation that expert auditors are better
equipped to enforce higher level of corporate disclosure.
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Table 7.5 Control variable univariate statistics
Panel A -Continuous variables
Variable definition-LN (TRADVOL) - Logarithm (Annual average stock
trading volume), LEV- Debt/Total assets, PtoB- Price to Book ratio as at fiscal
year end, MKT SHARE- Sales/Industry sales (4 digit SIC code), COMPRK-
Annual compensation ranking/ Number of Firms used in annual ranking, ROA-
return on assets (Net Income/Total assets), FSALES- Foreign sales/sales,
LNTASSETS- Log (Total assets), DAC- Absolute value of discretionary
accruals/Total assets, GEOG_DIV- Number of key regions with operations,
DERIV-Notional amount of derivatives/Total assets, VEGA- change in stock and
stock options value for 0.01 change in stock price volatility, DELTA- change in
stock and stock options value for 0.01 change in stock price , CSH-PAY- Cash pay
/Total Compensation , INST OWN-Institutional ownership, MGR SHROWN-
Manager share holding/Market value of shares as at fiscal year end.. This is based
on the 681 firm-year observations (1999-2003) that report derivatives use.
Mean Median
CAPITAL MARKETS AND FIRM LN(TRAD VOL) 5.93 5.84
ECONOMIC ATTRIBUTES LEV 0.20 0.20
PTOB 4.74 3.07
MKT SHARE 0.06 0.04
INVESTMENT 0.07 0.05
ASSET INTENSITY 0.28 0.24
COMP RANK 0.30 0.26
ROA 0.05 0.05
FSALES 0.50 0.47
LN(TASSETS) 8.55 8.41
DAC 0.04 0.03
GEOG DIV 5.45 5.00
COMPENSATION AND VEGA 0.37 0.21
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DELTA 0.43 0.40
BONUS PERC 0.14 0.12
CASH PAY PERC 0.24 0.22
INST OWN 0.77 0.81
MGR SHROWN 0.01 -
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Panel B - Categorical variables
Variables- INDLEADER- Industry leadership indicator (i.e. top
5 by assets size and sales in two digit SIC code classification),
Prop cost dummy (equals to 1 if ranked as top 10 in average
sales and total within two digit SIC industry category and with
margin (net income/sales)>10%, 0 otherwise), Talent dummy-
(equals to 1, if average executive compensation is among top
100 of entire Execucomp database), Litrisk- equals 1 if in
industry that is categorized as having high litigation risk,
Interlock dummy- equals to 1 if executives have interlocking
relationships, Audexp- equals to 1 if auditor has expertise,
measured as auditing >15% of firms within two digit SIC code
industry category.
Industry leadership 167 25%
Prop cost dummy 85 12%
Talent dummy 103 15%
Lit risk dummy 48 7%
Interlock dummy 20 3%
Aud exp dummy 288 42%
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Table 7.6 -Difference in mean and median between low and high disclosure firms
Panel A Continuous variables
Variable definition-LN (TRADVOL) - Logarithm (Annual average stock trading volume), LEV- Debt/Total assets,
PtoB- Price to Book ratio as at fiscal year end, MKT SHARE- Sales/Industry sales (4 digit SIC code), COMPRK- Annual
compensation ranking/ Number of Firms used in annual ranking, ROA-return on assets (Net Income/Total assets), FSALES-
Foreign sales/sales, LNTASSETS- Log (Total assets), DAC- Absolute value of discretionary accruals/Total assets,
GEOG_DIV- Number of key regions with operations, DERIV-Notional amount of derivatives/Total assets, VEGA- change in
stock and stock options value for 0.01 change in stock price volatility, DELTA- change in stock and stock options value for
0.01 change in stock price , CSH-PAY- Cash pay /Total Compensation , INST OWN-Institutional ownership, MGR
SHROWN-Manager share holding/Market value of shares as at fiscal year end. This is based on the 681 firm-year observations
(1999-2003) that report derivatives use.
Low High
386 295 T-stat Z-stat
CAPITAL MARKETS AND FIRM Mean Median Mean Median Significance
ECONOMIC ATTRIBUTES LN(TRAD VOL) 5.76 5.62 6.17 6.13 *** ***
LEV 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19
PTOB 4.87 3.20 4.56 2.95
MKT SHARE 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.05 **
COMP RANK 0.32 0.29 0.26 0.22 *** ***
ROA 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05
FSALES 0.49 0.46 0.51 0.47
LN(TASSETS) 8.42 8.20 8.73 8.64 *** ***
DAC 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03
COMPENSATION AND GEOG DIV 5.46 5.00 5.45 5.00
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VEGA 0.31 0.19 0.45 0.23 *** ***
DELTA 0.44 0.40 0.42 0.40
CASH PAY PERC 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.21
INST OWN 0.78 0.80 0.77 0.81
MGR SHROWN 0.01 - 0.01 - **
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Panel B- Categorical variables
INDLEADER- Industry leadership indicator (i.e. top 5 by assets size and
sales in two digit SIC code classification), Prop cost dummy (equals to 1 if
ranked as top 10 in average sales and total within two digit SIC industry
category and with margin (net income/sales)>10%, 0 otherwise), Talent
dummy- (equals to 1, if average executive compensation is among top 100
of entire Execucomp database), Litrisk- equals 1 if in industry that is
categorized as having high litigation risk, Interlock dummy- equals to 1 if
executives have interlocking relationships, Audexp- equals to 1 if auditor
has expertise, measured as auditing >15% of firms within two digit SIC
code industry category.
Low disclosure High disclosure
386 295 T-stat Z-stat
Industry leadership 20.5% 29.8% *** ***
Prop cost dummy 10.6% 14.9% * *
Talent dummy 11.1% 20.3% *** ***
Lit risk dummy 7.3% 6.8%
Interlock dummy 3.1% 2.7%
Aud exp dummy 38.1% 47.8% *** ***
7.2 Multivariate Testing
In the multivariate testing, the main consideration is the individual effects in determining the
appropriate regression for the data. The testing of the impact of SFAS 133 on income
smoothing, focused on the problem of endogeneity. However, for this question, there is no
theoretical basis of assuming endogeneity, between the constructed disclosure index and the
primary control variables of SFAS 133 dummy and the incentive variables. Lobo and Zhou
(2001) suggest that the inclusion of discretionary accruals as an independent variable when
determining disclosure can result in endogeneity. However, discretionary accruals’ is not
considered to be a primary variable for this question. This model tested is as below in
Equation 7.1
Equation 7.1
DISC_INDEX= α +  1 133DUM +  2 LN TRADVOL +  3 133DUM*LN TRADVOL+  4 LEV +  5 FSALES +  6
DAC +  7 ROA +  8 GEOG_DIV +  9 LNTASSETS+  10GROWTH+  11 MKT SHARE +  12 PROP COST DUMMY
+  13TALENT DUMMY +  14 VEGA +  15 DELTA +  16CSHPAY PER +  17 LIT RISK +  18 MGR SHROWN +
 19INSTOWN +  20 AUD EXP +  21 INTERLOCK +  22- INDDUM +  YRDUM.
7.2.1 Model Selection
To determine the appropriate regression model, I focus on minimising errors that could arise
due to omitted variables and due to unobservable heterogeneity from the panel data. The
problem of omitted variables is to some measure already minimised as I have included 21
234
variables including those that capture firm specific attributes such as firm size. In addition,
the model includes industry and time dummy variables to control for industry and time fixed
effects. From an econometric perspective, I conduct the F-test, Breusch Lagrange and
Hausman tests, to further ascertain the most appropriate model. The F-test of differences in
intercepts, the Breusch Lagrange test of differences in error term and the Hausman test of
whether there are differences in coefficient of the random effect and fixed effect, leads me to
choosing the pooled OLS and random effect regressions. The Hausman test has a chi-squared
value-14.50 (p value of 0.56), hence I cannot reject null hypothesis of there being no
systematic difference of coefficients of the fixed and random effect models. Therefore, the
reported multivariate results are based on the pooled OLS and random effect. I test but do not
report the panel fixed effect models.
7.2.2 Multivariate empirical findings
7.2.2.1 Impact of SFAS 133 adoption on disclosure
Hypothesis 3.1 states that the disclosure of related derivatives information should increase
after the adoption of SFAS 133. I therefore would expect a positive association and find
significant evidence of this in all the reported models. As argued in the hypothesis
development, SFAS 133 adoption should incentivise managers to disclose complementary
derivatives information. SFAS 133 makes more visible derivatives gains and losses, and
increases earnings volatility. Part of this volatility could be artificial due to hedges and
hedging instruments that do not qualify for hedge accounting treatments. Hence managers
would be expected to disclose more information so as to avoid investors misinterpreting the
true risk. The results in Table 7.7 show a significant positive association between the SFAS
133 dummy and the disclosure index and this is consistent with Hypothesis 3.1. This finding
is consistent with the descriptive studies of Hamlen and Largay (2005) who found that DJIA-
30 companies generally increased their disclosures after adopting SFAS 133.
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7.2.2.2 Other determinants of derivatives related disclosure
Capitals markets incentives
According to Hypothesis 3.2, capital markets incentives ought to influence the level of
derivatives footnote disclosure and SFAS 133’s adoption ought to have increased the capital
markets incentives to disclose. The proxies used for capital markets incentives are trading
volume, price to book and leverage. It is expected that these capital markets proxies have a
positive association with observed derivatives related disclosure levels.
From the results, there is evidence of a significant positive association between trading
volume and derivatives disclosure. However, the other capital markets proxies, including
leverage and price to book ratio (unreported), do not yield significant evidence of
association. The findings on Price to Book ratio differs from those of Aggarwal and Simkins
(2004), who found that market to book value, had a positive association with disclosure.
I also include an interaction term to test Hypothesis 3.2b that capital incentives lead to higher
levels of derivatives related disclosure after SFAS 133 adoption. This interaction has a
significant negative association (see Table 7.7-Panel B). In addition the chow test for joint
significance of both the SFAS 133 dummy (i.e. intercept) and interaction term (i.e. impact on
slope), leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis of both terms being equal to zero. The
finding shows that after SFAS 133, the coefficient of the logarithm of trading volume is
0.011 (i.e.  2 +  3). This is in contrast to 0.030 before SFAS 133 (i.e.  2 ), implying capital
market incentives weaken after the adoption of SFAS 133. However, this finding is contrary
to the hypothesis’ expectation but I consider it to be inconclusive as it is weak evidence. It is
only significant at a 10% confidence level.
Proprietary cost incentives
According to Hypothesis 3.3; proprietary costs influence derivatives footnote disclosure
levels, and proprietary costs concerns are lower after the adoption of SFAS 133. The
multivariate regression model tests apply different proxies; including market share (firm
sales/industry sales) and a self constructed proxy92 for proprietary costs. The results do not
92
(i.e. Top 5 in asset sales and revenue within two digit SIC code industry classification, plus having a profit margin of greater
than 10%).
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show any significant association with the disclosure, from either the proprietary cost proxy
coefficients or their interaction terms with the SFAS 133 dummy variable.
Managerial risk incentives
There is some limited evidence of a positive association of vega and negative association of
delta. As discussed in section 3.5.2, the impact of managerial risk incentives is ambiguous, as
it is difficult to know whether derivatives are used for hedging or speculative purposes and
this determines whether disclosure increases the perceived riskiness of the reporting firms.
Managerial reputation
As discussed, providing a high level of disclosure could be a way to convey sophistication to
investors and thus more talented managers are expected to be inclined to disclose more
information (Trueman, 1986). I expected managerial talent signalling incentives to influence
the level of derivatives footnote disclosure before and after the introduction of SFAS 133.
Using a talent dummy variable (where I identify if a firm is in the top 100 of annual
compensation rankings), I find no evidence of association with disclosure93.
Litigation risk
There is some evidence that litigation is negatively associated with disclosure. There is a
significant negative association in three of the six models. This can be explained by the
forward looking nature of derivatives related information and the fear of lawsuits in relation
to such type of information.
Discretionary accruals
There is evidence of a significant negative association between discretionary accruals and the
level of disclosure. Unlike the first key question in this thesis, the primary focus of the
second question was not on the impact of discretionary accrual. However, Lobo and Zhou
(2001), establish that there is a negative association based on the notion that firms that
engage in discretionary accruals are likely to be less transparent.
93
An alternative variable to talent dummy (i.e. salary ranking/Number of firms). The number of firms is based a sample of
large firms that reported compensation in Execucomp (1999- 1954 firms, 2000- 1846 firms, 2001-1799 firms, 2002-1830
firms, 2003-1856 firms). This ranking ratio means that higher paid managers will have a lower ratio. Hence a negative
association is expected between this ratio and the disclosure index. There is strong evidence across the multivariate models of a
negative significant association between managerial talent and the disclosure levels. This finding conforms to the theoretical
expectation.
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Notional derivatives amount
The notional amount is included as a proxy for risk exposure. There is a positive association
between the notional amount and the disclosure index. The notional amount is a proxy for
underlying derivatives related risk exposure and the implication is that firms with higher
exposure are inclined to disclose more.
Corporate governance
There is a positive association of percentage of institutional ownership. This conforms to the
expectation that higher level of corporate governance encourages higher levels of disclosure.
Aggarwal and Simkins (2004) controlled for institutional ownership, but did not find it to be
significant. Auditor expertise is positively associated in five of the six models and this
suggests that expert auditors are better equipped to enforce disclosures.
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Table 7.7 Multivariate regression- Determinants of disclosure
DISC_INDEX= α +  1 133DUM +  2 LN TRADVOL +  3 133DUM*LN TRADVOL+  4 LEV +  5 FSALES +  6
DAC +  7 ROA +  8 GEOG_DIV +  9 LNTASSETS+  10GROWTH+  11 MKT SHARE +  12 PROP COST DUMMY
+  13TALENT DUMMY +  14 VEGA +  15 DELTA +  16CSHPAY PER +  17 LIT RISK +  18 MGR SHROWN +
 19INSTOWN +  20 AUD EXP +  21 INTERLOCK +  22- INDDUM +  YRDUM.
Panel A- Regression without interaction terms
Model 1 is a pooled OLS regressions and model 2 is the random effect GLS panel regression. The pooled OLS is based on
robust standard errors. VIF factor is less than 10 for all variables indicating no problem with multicollinearity. the analysis
is based on 681 observations of derivatives users
Variable definition- 133DUMMY- SFAS 133 dummy (1 after year 2000, 0 otherwise), LN (TRADVOL) - Logarithm
(Annual average stock trading volume), LEV- Debt/Total assets, FSALES- Foreign sales/sales, DAC- Absolute value of
discretionary accruals/Total assets, ROA-return on assets (Net Income/Total assets), GEOG_DIV- Number of key regions
with operations, LNTASSETS- Log (Total assets), DERIV-Notional amount of derivatives/Total assets, MKT SHARE-
Sales/Industry sales (4 digit SIC code), PROP COST DUMMY (equals to 1 if ranked as top 10 in average sales and total
within two digit SIC industry category and with margin (net income/sales)>10%, 0 otherwise), TALENT DUMMY-
(equals to 1, if average executive compensation is among top 100 of entire Execucomp database), VEGA- $change in
stock and stock options value for 0.01 change in stock price volatility/$ Cash Pay, DELTA- $change in stock and stock
options value for 0.01 change in stock price /$Cash Pay, CSH-PAY- Cash pay /Total Compensation , INST OWN-
Institutional ownership, MGR SHROWN-Manager share holding/Market value of shares as at fiscal year end. LITRISK-
equals 1 if in industry that is categorized as having high litigation risk, INTERLOCK dummy- equals to 1 if executives
have interlocking relationships, AUD EXP- equals to 1 if auditor has expertise, measured as auditing >15% of firms within
two digit SIC code industry category. Detailed variable definition is provided in section 6.2 .
Model 1 T-stat Model 3 T-stat
INTERCEPT 0.354*** (4.23) 0.289*** (2.63)
SFAS 133 IMPACT 133DUMMY 0.056** (2.35) 0.049*** (3.26)
CAPITAL MARKETS INCENTIVES LN(TRAD VOL) 0.017** (1.99) 0.018* (1.75)
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS LEV 0.090 (1.34) 0.079 (1.17)
FSALES -0.021 (-0.39) 0.061 (0.96)
DAC -0.437** (-2.15) 0.057 (0.41)
ROA -0.010 (-0.10) 0.125* (1.84)
GEOG DIV -0.005 (-0.67) -0.005 (-0.51)
LNTASSETS 0.009 (0.88) 0.012 (0.88)
GROWTH -0.040 (-1.17) -0.007 (-0.31)
PROPRIETARY COST AND REPUTATION MKT SHARE 0.053 (0.38) 0.066 (0.38)
&REPUTATION PROP COST DUMMY 0.017 (0.65) -0.016 (-0.58)
TALENT DUMMY 0.029 (1.14) 0.006 (0.32)
MANAGERIAL RISK INCENTIVES VEGA 0.021** (2.18) 0.011* (1.69)
DELTA -0.081* (-1.78) -0.037 (-1.05)
CSH_PAY PER -0.100 (-1.41) -0.023 (-0.53)
LITIGATION RISK LIT RISK -0.111** (-2.29) -0.094 (-1.02)
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MGR SHROWN 0.205 (0.76) -0.098 (-1.07)
INST OWN 0.117** (1.98) 0.070 (0.85)
AUD EXP 0.034** (2.11) 0.044** (2.01)
INTERLOCK -0.034 (-0.64) -0.040 (-0.85)
Industry dummy Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes
N 669 669
Adjusted R-squared 8.1%
R-squared 9.2%
F 3.64***
Wald 69.64***
*** Significance at 1% ** Significance at 5%*Significance at 10%
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Panel B- Pooled OLS Regressions with interaction terms
This is based on same sample as Panel A. Model 1 includes only the capital market interaction term (133DUM*TRADVOL).
Model 2 also includes interaction terms for proprietary cost (133DUM*MKT SHARE). The same set of variables defined in Panel
A. In addition, I include INV (Capital expenditure/Sales) and an interaction term 133DUM*INV, as a proxy for proprietary costs.
Only capital market interaction term is significant. The chow test for joint significance-resulted in a F-statistic of 4.05 (p-value of
0.0178). This leads to rejection of null hypothesis of both the slope and intercept being zero. The pooled OLS is based on robust
standard errors. VIF factor is less than 10 for all variables indicating no problem with multicollinearity.
Model 1 T-stat Model 2 T-stat
INTERCEPT 0.217* (1.83) 0.215* (1.80)
SFAS 133 IMPACT 133DUMMY 0.168** (2.44) 0.163** (2.25)
CAPITAL MARKET INCENTIVES LN(TRAD VOL) 0.030*** (2.74) 0.031*** (2.80)
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 133*TRADVOL -0.019* (-1.78) -0.019* (-1.74)
LEV 0.095 (1.42) 0.102 (1.53)
FSALES -0.021 (-0.39) -0.022 (-0.42)
DAC -0.436** (-2.14) -0.391* (-1.90)
ROA -0.027 (-0.28) -0.030 (-0.31)
GEOG DIV -0.005 (-0.73) -0.005 (-0.71)
LNTASSETS 0.009 (0.81) 0.009 (0.81)
GROWTH -0.043 (-1.25) -0.041 (-1.17)
PROPRIETARY COST AND REPUTATION MKT SHARE 0.050 (0.36) -0.024 (-0.11)
&REPUTATION 133DUM*MKT SHARE 0.035 (0.14)
PROP COST DUMMY 0.020 (0.78) 0.027 (1.04)
INV -0.201 (-1.09)
133DUM*INV -0.041 (-0.19)
MANAGERIAL RISK INCENTIVES TALENT DUMMY 0.030 (1.19) 0.031 (1.27)
VEGA 0.021** (2.31) 0.020** (2.28)
DELTA -0.082* (-1.78) -0.080* (-1.74)
CSH_PAY -0.097 (-1.35) -0.088 (-1.21)
LITIGATION RISK LIT RISK -0.110** (-2.30) -0.108** (-2.26)
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MGR SHROWN 0.212 (0.74) 0.217 (0.73)
INST OWN 0.122** (2.03) 0.127** (2.09)
AUD EXP 0.033** (2.07) 0.034** (2.13)
INTERLOCK -0.035 (-0.67) -0.033 (-0.64)
Industry dummy Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes
Observations 669 669
Adjusted R-squared 8.6% 8.7%
F-test 3.621*** 3.273***
*** Significance at 1% ** Significance at 5%*Significance at 10%
240
7.2.3 Robustness Testing
Alternative model
For robustness testing purposes, I construct another index that excludes a measure for
whether firms disclose the notional amount as the dependent variable, and includes the
notional amount as one of the explanatory variables. Notional amount in this case is a proxy
for risk exposure. The results reported in Table 7.8 and Table 7.9, support only the
hypothesis of SFAS 133 adoption influencing disclosure. The other consistent result is that
discretionary accruals are negatively associated and audit expertise has a positive association.
In addition to applying the disclosure index as the dependent variable, I categorise
disclosures into a 3 level ordinal variable (i.e. low, moderate and high), and thereafter
conduct an ordered logistic regression. The ordered logistic regression is an extension of the
logistic regression that is applied to dependent binary variables. This approach is applied by
Aggarwal and Simkins (2004) and I primarily use it as an additional test as I assume it to be
less precise than applying a continuous variable for disclosure. The results of the impact of
SFAS 133 on disclosure are consistent with those in the main model. Other consistent
findings are that litigation risk has a negative association, discretionary accruals’ has a
significant negative association and the level of institutional ownership has a significant
positive association.
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Table 7.8- Regression- Based on alternative disclosure index
Model 1 is a pooled OLS regression while model 2 is the random effect GLS panel regression. The pooled OLS is based on robust
standard errors. VIF factor is less than 10 for all variables indicating no problem with multicollinearity. The analysis is based on
541 observations of derivatives users with reported notional amounts and without missing control variables data. Regression is
based on Disc Index 2 that excludes the notional amount from the index.
Variable definition- 133DUMMY- SFAS 133 dummy (1 after year 2000, 0 otherwise), LN (TRADVOL) - Logarithm
(Annual average stock trading volume), LEV- Debt/Total assets, FSALES- Foreign sales/sales, DAC- Absolute value of
discretionary accruals/Total assets, ROA-return on assets (Net Income/Total assets), GEOG_DIV- Number of key regions with
operations, LNTASSETS- Log (Total assets), DERIV-Notional amount of derivatives/Total assets, MKT SHARE-
Sales/Industry sales (4 digit SIC code), PROP COST DUMMY (equals to 1 if ranked as top 10 in average sales and total within
two digit SIC industry category and with margin (net income/sales)>10%, 0 otherwise), TALENT DUMMY- (equals to 1, if
average executive compensation is among top 100 of entire Execucomp database), VEGA- $change in stock and stock options
value for 0.01 change in stock price volatility/$ Cash Pay, DELTA- $change in stock and stock options value for 0.01 change in
stock price /$Cash Pay, CSH-PAY- Cash pay /Total Compensation , INST OWN-Institutional ownership, MGR SHROWN-
Manager share holding/Market value of shares as at fiscal year end. LITRISK- equals 1 if in industry that is categorized as having
high litigation risk, INTERLOCK dummy- equals to 1 if executives have interlocking relationships, AUD EXP- equals to 1 if
auditor has expertise, measured as auditing >15% of firms within two digit SIC code industry category. Detailed variable
definition is provided in section 6.2.
Model 1 T-stat Model 2 T-stat
INTERCEPT 0.354*** (4.23) 0.278*** (3.02)
SFAS 133 IMPACT 133DUMMY 0.097*** (3.22) 0.096*** (5.27)
CAPITAL MARKETS INCENTIVES LN(TRAD VOL) 0.013 (1.32) 0.011 (0.93)
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS LEV 0.031 (0.35) 0.019 (0.23)
FSALES 0.041 (0.64) 0.116 (1.48)
DAC -0.498* (-1.83) 0.109 (0.61)
ROA 0.009 (0.07) 0.165** (2.08)
GEOG DIV -0.010 (-1.18) -0.008 (-0.68)
LNTASSETS 0.023* (1.77) 0.028 (1.60)
GROWTH -0.034 (-0.83) -0.015 (-0.52)
DRNV 0.208*** (2.67) 0.172** (2.03)
PROPRIETARY COST AND REPUTATION MKT SHARE 0.057 (0.34) 0.038 (0.18)
&REPUTATION PROP COST DUMMY 0.036 (1.05) -0.032 (-0.89)
TALENT DUMMY 0.041 (1.34) 0.011 (0.48)
VEGA 0.018 (1.61) 0.011* (1.90)
MANAGERIAL RISK INCENTIVES DELTA -0.138** (-2.56) -0.040 (-0.95)
CSH_PAY -0.103 (-1.08) -0.000 (-0.00)
LITIGATION RISK LIT RISK -0.052 (-0.83) -0.045 (-0.35)
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MGR SHROWN 0.089 (0.34) -0.152* (-1.72)
INST OWN 0.105 (1.56) 0.082 (0.85)
AUD EXP 0.042** (2.16) 0.051* (1.92)
INTERLOCK -0.004 (-0.07) -0.010 (-0.23)
Industry dummy Yes Yes
Year Dummy Yes Yes
N 541 541
Adjusted R-squared 10.6%
R-squared 11.94%
F 3.85***
Wald 115.86***
*** Significance at 1% ** Significance at 5%*Significance at 10%
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Table 7.9 Regression- Alternative model (Ordered logistic regression)
The regression is based on 669 observations from the derivatives users that have all the control variables data.
Variable definition- DISCDUMMY- 3 level categorical variable as defined in 6.2.1, 133DUMMY- SFAS
133 dummy (1 after year 2000, 0 otherwise), LN (TRADVOL) - Logarithm (Annual average stock trading
volume), LEV- Debt/Total assets, FSALES- Foreign sales/sales, DAC- Absolute value of discretionary
accruals/Total assets, ROA-return on assets (Net Income/Total assets), GEOG_DIV- Number of key regions with
operations, LNTASSETS- Log (Total assets), DERIV-Notional amount of derivatives/Total assets, MKT
SHARE- Sales/Industry sales (4 digit SIC code), PROP COST DUMMY (equals to 1 if ranked as top 10 in
average sales and total within two digit SIC industry category and with margin (net income/sales)>10%, 0
otherwise), TALENT DUMMY- (equals to 1, if average executive compensation is among top 100 of entire
Execucomp database), VEGA- $change in stock and stock options value for 0.01 change in stock price volatility/$
Cash Pay, DELTA- $change in stock and stock options value for 0.01 change in stock price /$Cash Pay, CSH-
PAY- Cash pay /Total Compensation , INST OWN-Institutional ownership, MGR SHROWN-Manager share
holding/Market value of shares as at fiscal year end. LITRISK- equals 1 if in industry that is categorized as having
high litigation risk, INTERLOCK dummy- equals to 1 if executives have interlocking relationships, AUD EXP-
equals to 1 if auditor has expertise, measured as auditing >15% of firms within two digit SIC code industry
category. Detailed variable definition is provided in section 6.2
DISCDUMMY T-Stat
INTERCEPT 0.883 (0.67)
SFAS 133 IMPACT 133DUMMY 0.656** (2.45)
CAPITAL MARKETS INCENTIVES LN(TRAD VOL) 0.117 (1.24)
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS LEV 1.158* (1.65)
FSALES -0.764 (-1.36)
DAC -4.676** (-2.04)
ROA 1.170 (1.12)
GEOG DIV -0.020 (-0.28)
LNTASSETS 0.139 (1.14)
GROWTH -0.567 (-1.47)
PROPRIETARY COST AND REPUTATION MKT SHARE -1.922 (-1.22)
&REPUTATION PROP COST DUMMY 0.053 (0.17)
TALENT DUMMY 0.230 (0.83)
MANAGERIAL RISK INCENTIVES VEGA 0.135 (1.11)
DELTA -0.012 (-0.02)
CSH_PAY -0.473 (-0.59)
LITIGATION RISK LIT RISK -1.008* (-1.88)
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MGR SHROWN 2.217 (0.96)
INST OWN 1.419** (2.10)
AUD EXP 0.222 (1.26)
INTERLOCK 0.082 (0.13)
Industry dummy Yes
Year Dummy Yes
N 669
Wald 68.9***
Log pseudo-likelihood 564.95
*** Significance at 1% ** Significance at 5%*Significance at 10%
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7.3 Conclusion
The primary findings of the empirical testing is that there is univariate and multivariate evidence
supporting the hypothesis of SFAS 133 recognition and measurement requirements leading to an
increased disclosure of derivatives related information. There is also supporting evidence of
capital market incentives influencing derivatives disclosure and very limited evidence of SFAS
133 influencing the impact of capital market incentives on disclosure. However, there is no
evidence of the impact of proprietary cost incentives on disclosure. The conclusions are further
discussed in chapter 8.
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8 CONCLUSION
8.1 Thesis Objective
This thesis studies the impact of the controversial and complex derivatives accounting policy
SFAS 133 on income smoothing and disclosure of derivatives related information through
the footnotes. The two primary research questions posed and investigated are:
 What is the impact of SFAS 133 on income smoothing using derivatives and
discretionary accruals?
 What is the impact of SFAS 133 and related incentives on disclosure of derivatives
related information?
The study has been structured as follows. Firstly, the study develops a theoretical framework
based on extant empirical and analytical studies. This is a precursor to the univariate and
multivariate empirical testing of 1999 to 2003 data from 253 US firms. In the theoretical
framework development (chapter 2), I discuss the genesis and key features of SFAS 133 in
addition to the determinants of the two key income smoothing choices of derivatives use and
discretionary accruals. These include capital markets, managerial risk and corporate
governance determinants. Chapter 3 further outlines a theoretical framework of how SFAS
133 fair value recognition requirements can influence disclosure of related information
through the footnotes. It lays out the argument that the extent to which notes are
complementary to recognition and measurement requirements should outweigh the extent to
which they may be considered substitutes. It further describes the literature on disclosure
incentives, including capital markets, proprietary, managerial talent, compensation and
litigation cost. Chapter 4 describes the data and research design for the question of the impact
of SFAS 133 on income smoothing choices. It especially highlights the approaches taken to
mitigate the panel data individual effects and the problems associated with model
endogeneity. Chapter 5 contains the univariate and multivariate results tables and the analysis
of these results. Chapter 6 describes the data and research design for the question of the
impact of SFAS 133 on disclosure of derivatives related information. Chapter 7 contains the
univariate and multivariate results tables and the analysis of these results. The rest of this
chapter describes the key findings, contribution, limitations of the study and areas for further
research.
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8.2 Summary of Findings
The empirical findings shed light on the impact of SFAS 133 on derivatives use,
discretionary accruals, and the extent to which they are substitutes.
8.2.1 SFAS 133 and income smoothing
The key empirical findings are that there is a substitution relationship between derivatives
use and discretionary accruals as income smoothing mechanisms. The findings also show
that after SFAS 133, discretionary accruals increase and the substitution relationship with
derivatives use weakens. An elaboration of these is provided below.
8.2.1.1 Derivatives use
As discussed in section 2.7.1, the analytical models primarily form the basis of expecting
SFAS 133 adoption to lead to reduce derivatives use. Barnes (2002), Shin (2004) and Nan
(2007), analytical models posit that firms will lower the prudent use of derivatives for risk
management purposes. In contrast to the analytical models, there is scanty and ambiguous
empirical evidence on the impact of SFAS 133 on derivatives use.
The univariate evidence in 5.2.1 supports the hypothesized relationship. However, there is
only some partial multivariate evidence supporting the hypothesized impact. This evidence
does not appear to be robust across models and hence is considered inconclusive. The weak
empirical evidence in part arises due to poor and inconsistent derivatives data quality as this
makes it difficult to differentiate between derivatives used for either speculative or hedging
purposes. In this and other studies that have investigated the same aspect, there is a risk of
misclassification of derivatives use, where what is considered to be hedging derivatives could
in fact be speculative derivatives.
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8.2.1.2 Discretionary Accruals
On the other hand, there is robust multivariate evidence of SFAS 133 leading to the increase
of discretionary accruals. This is backed by the univariate evidence reported in 5.2.2. These
findings are consistent with the expectation that SFAS 133 leads to increased earnings
volatility. In this study, supplemental tests of quarterly earnings volatility shows that it
increases after SFAS 133 is adopted. An increase in earnings volatility occurs due to a)
hedges that do not qualify for hedge accounting b) interim hedge ineffectiveness of hedge
accounting items and c) gains and losses from discontinued hedges that have to be
recognized in the income statement (Park, 2004 and Trombley, 2003). In addition, the fair
value application requirement increases the probability of the opportunistic94 application of
accruals. A further factor that could contribute to higher levels of discretionary accruals,
post-SFAS 133, could be that managers increased the use of derivatives for speculative
purposes as postulated in the analytical model by Barnes (2002) and Nan (2007). However,
such an increase has not been conclusively verified in this and other empirical studies. As
noted the impact of SFAS 133 on derivatives is inconclusive, which in part due to the
difficulty in accurately differentiating speculative from prudent derivatives application.
8.2.1.3 Impact of Cash flow hedge accounting on discretionary accruals
Cash flow hedge accounting defers the recognition of derivatives instrument gains or losses
through the income statement and reduces the net income volatility. This in turn reduces the
need to use accruals and therefore a negative association is to be expected. I control for the
application of cash flow hedge accounting, using a dummy variable. I find consistent and
robust evidence of cash flow hedge accounting reducing discretionary accruals. This is a
conceptual contribution as there is hardly95 any empirical evidence on the impact of cash
flow hedge accounting on earnings volatility and earnings management. The only two
studies, I am aware of are; Park (2004) who finds that cash flow hedges do not affect equity
volatility and Zhou (2009) who finds that cash flow hedge accounting leads to an increase in
94 Opportunistic accruals could occur when managers have to determine fair value based on internal models in the absence of
observable trading prices as was vivid in the case of Enron. This could occur with over the counter derivatives instruments.. Earning
smoothing can also occur when managers manipulate the timing and amount of recognized cash flow hedges. They can manipulate the
deferral of cash flow hedges gains and losses through the Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income (AOCI) and the subsequent
recycling of these gains and losses from the AOCI to the Income statement.
95
This could be due to the poor disclosure of cash flow hedge accounting data e.g. the notional amounts associated with cash flow
hedge accounting.
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opportunistic accruals. Hence this study provides indirect evidence that cash flow hedge
accounting reduces earnings volatility and the finding differs from Park (2004).
8.2.1.4 Impact of SFAS 133 on the substitution of derivatives and discretionary
accruals
I hypothesize that derivatives use and discretionary accruals are substitutes. As expected
there is evidence that derivatives use influences discretionary accruals. The univariate
findings, discussed in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, support the substitution hypothesis. However,
the multivariate empirical findings show evidence, which is not robust across all models, of a
negative association of discretionary accruals as an explanatory variable for derivatives use.
Nevertheless, the finding of a negative association in some of the models such as the pooled
OLS exogenous models is similar to Barton’s (2001) finding. However, it differs from
Singh’s (2004) and Huang et al’s (2009) findings. The latter authors found that whereas
derivatives had a significant negative association with discretionary accruals as the
dependent variable, there was no evidence that discretionary accruals had a similar
association with derivatives use as the dependent variable.
The inclusion of an interaction variable between the SFAS 133 dummy variable and
discretionary accrual proxy, when testing the determinants of derivatives use, and the
conducting of the chow test for the joint significance, shows that the interaction variable has
a positive significant relationship. While the SFAS 133 dummy and the discretionary
accrual coefficients are negative and significant, the interaction term is positive and
significant. This finding suggests a reduced impact of accruals on derivatives use after
SFAS 133 adoption, which could also be interpreted as a weakening substitution
relationship. This weakened substitution relationship could be due to accruals being used as
complements to derivatives use after SFAS 133 adoption.
I similarly tested the impact of derivatives use on discretionary accruals (i.e. discretionary
accrual is dependent variable and derivatives use is independent variable). There is evidence
of significant negative association in five of seven models. There is weaker evidence when
the sample consists of only derivatives users. This is the case in two of the seven models
where derivatives use is not a significant independent variable. This finding would appear to
indicate that the substitution relationship is more pronounced when considering both the
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decision to use derivatives and the extent of derivatives use. When an interaction of SFAS
133 and derivatives use is included in the model, it is found not to be significant.
Combining these findings, I conclude that SFAS 133 adoption weakens the extent to which
accruals influence derivatives use, but not the other way round. This latter finding suggests a
partial substitution relationship exists after SFAS 133 and lends itself to a number of plausible
explanations. These include accruals being complements rather than substitutes to derivatives
use, after SFAS 133. SFAS 133 could trigger either increased earnings volatility or the greater
use of speculative derivatives. Either of these could then induce the increased use of accruals in
a manner that confounds the income smoothing substitution relationship.
Despite the substitution relationship, the use of derivatives to smooth income is more akin to
economic reality, as derivatives use also influence cash flow and fundamental economic
volatility. Thus the finding that managers increase their use of accruals in general, after
SFAS 133, suggests that SFAS 133 adoption results in choices that are less beneficial to
shareholders. I come to this conclusion based on the empirical evidence of Huang, Deis,
Zhang and Moffit (2009). Their study shows that for income smoothing purposes,
derivatives enhance shareholder value to a greater extent than the use of accruals. Hence I
infer from the results that the higher level of accruals after SFAS 133 is likely to be less to
the benefit of shareholders.
Overall, these findings are supportive of Hypothesis 2.3, namely:
 The substitution relationship between derivatives use and discretionary accruals; and
 SFAS 133 adoption influences the substitution relationship.
8.2.2 Summary of empirical findings (SFAS 133 on disclosure of derivatives related
information)
Hypothesis 3.1 states that the disclosure of related derivatives information should increase
after the adoption of SFAS 133. I therefore expected and find a significant positive
association in all the models. As argued during the hypothesis development, SFAS 133
adoption should provide incentives for managers to disclose complementary derivatives
information. SFAS 133 makes more visible derivatives gains and losses, as well as increasing
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earnings volatility. Part of this volatility could be artificial due to hedges and hedging
instruments that do not qualify for hedge accounting treatments. Hence managers would be
expected to disclose more information so as to avoid investors misinterpreting reported fair
value gains or losses. The result shows a significant positive association between SFAS 133
dummy and the disclosure index, which is consistent with hypothesis 1. This finding is also
consistent with that of Hamlen and Largay (2005) who found that DJIA-30 companies
generally increased their disclosures after adopting SFAS 133. Similarly, using UK data,
Dunne et al (2004) found that the introduction of FRS 13 led to increased derivatives
disclosure. Though, unlike SFAS 133, FRS 13 is primarily a derivatives disclosure rather
than recognition and measurement standard. At the same time, Darus and Taylor (2006) find
an upward drift of voluntary disclosure levels both on the anticipation and introduction of
mandatory derivatives disclosure requirements using Australian data.
The results also show a significant positive association of capital markets incentives when
these are measured by the logarithm of share trading volume. However, there is no evidence
of association of proprietary costs. The results further show that auditor expertise and the
level of derivatives use have a positive association with the derivatives disclosure index. On
the other hand, litigation risk and discretionary accrual levels have a negative association.
8.2.3 Contribution- Conceptual
The questions addressed in this research enrich different strands of extant accounting and
corporate finance literature. Hence, the study has a cross disciplinary character as it covers
the domains of risk management, which falls under corporate finance, and earnings
management and disclosure, which falls under external financial accounting theory. An
integrated empirical investigation of SFAS 133 is expected to be useful to both the academic
community and accounting policy makers, especially given its complexity alongside its
anticipated consequences on risk management choices. SFAS 133 recognition and
measurement requirements necessitate the fair value reporting of all derivatives instruments
and this confers a higher level of transparency of firm risk exposures. This also impacts on
earnings volatility and is also more likely to yield managerial behavioural consequences.
By undertaking a study on the impact of SFAS 133 on income smoothing, there is scope to
extend the empirical evidence related to SFAS 133 on various fronts. First, there is scope for
a conceptual contribution through looking at two different determinants of income smoothing
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that are potentially impacted on by the derivatives accounting policy. Hentschel and Kothari
(2001), note that derivatives use is just one aspect of overall corporate risk management.
However, the literature on income smoothing tends to focus on single mechanisms of doing
so. For example, they have tended to separately focus on derivatives use and discretionary
accruals. Barton (2001), Rajgopal and Pincus (2002) and Singh (2004) depart from this trend,
through their study of derivatives use and earnings management as jointly determined risk
management choices. This study builds on their work. In addition it builds on the very few
risk management empirical studies that are actually based on post-SFAS 133 data. This study
achieves this by using 1999 to 2003 data and extends the work of Singh (2004) who
considered the impact of SFAS 133 on earnings management, earnings volatility and
derivatives use but only covered the 2000-2001 periods. I also am not aware of any empirical
evidence on the impact of SFAS 133 on the income smoothing substitution or on the
conditional impact of cash flow hedge accounting on discretionary accruals. This study fills
that gap.
Further to income smoothing, the study of SFAS 133 on disclosure, builds a collective
picture of how different reporting practices can be influenced by accounting policy. Due to
the focus on disclosure, a key contribution of this study is to evaluate whether improvement
in recognition and measurement through the main financial statements can encourage or
deter the provision of supplementary disclosure information. I propose a framework of how
SFAS 133 can influence disclosure. In particular the study aims to understand whether
footnote disclosure is a complement or a substitute to recognised derivatives fair value gains
and losses. The study also evaluates the different determinants of disclosure and how these
interact with SFAS 133. The primary incentives investigated are capital markets and
proprietary cost incentives as it is possible based on the literature, to postulate how SFAS
133 can alter these particular incentives. The inclusion of disclosure incentives in the context
of SFAS 133 is a conceptual contribution as it extends the work of Aggarwal and Simkins
(2004) who conducted a similar study with a focus on the predecessor standard SFAS 107.
However, SFAS 107 does not cover recognition and measurement requirements of
derivatives.
In sum, this study shows that SFAS 133 adoption has potentially adverse consequences on
income smoothing choices, but at the same time has positive consequences through
encouraging disclosures that lower the information asymmetry on underlying risk exposures.
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8.2.4 Contribution- methodological
8.2.4.1 Model specification
This study analyses and aims to mitigate individual effects that arise due to panel data. In
my results, I report random effect generalized least square model tests in addition to the
pooled OLS. I also test but do not report the panel regression fixed effects model. The only
other related studies that appear to cater for panel data individual effects are Singh (2004)
and Supanvanij and Strauss (2006), which both report fixed effects panel regression results in
addition to the pooled OLS.
I further consider the problem of endogeneity and apply a qualifying test procedure prior to
applying the 2SLS, which is one of the principal methods of resolving endogeneity. In the
spirit of Larcker and Rusticus (2008), this study aims to always ensure that the cure is not
worse than the disease. Specifically, I only apply the 2SLS to the derivatives determinants
model because I was able to establish the instrument variable strength and validity for this
model. For the stated reason I do not report the 2SLS of the discretionary accrual determinant
model.
8.2.4.2 Variable enhancement
Bartram (2009) asserts that the inconclusiveness of the literature on the determinants of
derivatives use could be due to flawed models, inappropriate proxies and inadequate
resolution of endogeneity related issues. There is scope to use better proxies, including those
used as proxies for discretionary accruals and derivatives use, as well as proxies for their
determinants. There is also scope to include variables omitted from similar research. For
example Barton (2001) does not include corporate governance effects. Based on a
comprehensive and integrated review of the literature on determinants of derivatives and
discretionary accrual use, I endeavour to build a model based on a more complete and
updated set of variables. This includes corporate governance, abnormal investments and a
variable for the conditional impact of SFAS 133 cash flow hedge accounting requirements on
discretionary accruals. The determination of abnormal investments (i.e. capital
expenditure/sales) is based on a model that is similar to that applied to determining abnormal
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discretionary accruals and cash flow from operations. It predicts the normal investment based
on the revenue, tangible assets and sales growth characteristics of firms within a two digit
SIC code category. I consider the difference between the predicted and actual investment to
be the abnormal investment. In the context of extant literature, the determination of abnormal
investments, as described, is a novel approach. The inclusion of this proxy has further merit
of taking into consideration multiple mechanisms of smoothing earnings (i.e. derivatives use,
discretionary accruals and investment levels).
On the disclosure question, I have a self constructed disclosure index, which is based on
components that are prescribed by existing regulation (e.g. SEC FRR48 and US GAAP).
Similarly, I introduce new proxies for proprietary cost measurement, managerial talent and
litigation cost.
8.2.5 Contribution to practice
Implication for Policy Makers
The empirical findings on the impact of SFAS 133 on income smoothing would suggest to
policy makers that SFAS 133 leads to less prudent and value enhancing risk management
activities. However, the results also indicate that disclosure of derivatives related information
is likely to have increased after SFAS 133 and this could be lowering the risk perception of
reporting firms. The disclosure investigation is a step forward in enhancing the understanding
of factors that influence derivatives and general risk disclosure. The shortfalls96 of
derivatives disclosure are recognised in the financial accounting literature (Dobler, 2008;
Berretta and Bozzolan, 2006) and by the accounting standard setters (i.e. FASB and IASB).
Furthermore, there will always be useful information that managers can disclose, beyond
what is mandated. Understanding and where possible managing the incentives shaping
disclosure choices is an important aspect to encouraging full corporate disclosure.
While this study focuses on SFAS 133, the findings and insights on its consequences are
relevant for IFRS standards. IAS 39 is to a large extent based on similar ideas to SFAS 133
(Hague, 2004). Its corresponding complexity and the unintended consequences of such
complexity have been the subject of regulatory scrutiny. It is also a source of ongoing
concern for different financial reporting stakeholders. Hence a study that provides evidence
96 The realisation of the disclosure shortfalls by the FASB has led to the promulgation of a new standard, SFAS 161 in the US that
aims to improve the disclosure dimension of derivatives accounting.
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of either positive or negative consequences of SFAS 133 can enhance the evaluation and
subsequently form a basis of amending both US and IFRS financial instrument accounting.
8.3 Limitations of study
8.3.1 SFAS 133 on income smoothing- Limitations
In this study, I have modelled derivatives and discretionary accrual use as the principal
income smoothing choices. I have factored in abnormal investments and investment in
foreign operations as other means of smoothing income. However, due to data access
limitations, I have excluded other mechanisms of hedging, such as securitisation and product
diversification. Nevertheless, my overall approach is an improvement from other earnings
management studies as it factors in abnormal investment and looks at two key decisions on
an interchangeable basis. There remains scope to extend the family of studies of joint risk
management determination beyond derivatives use and accruals.
Measurement error could arise due to the discretionary accrual proxy. Despite the
refinements made to the modified Jones (1991) in this study, there remains a significant risk
of abnormal accruals being misclassified. In addition, the data on derivatives use was hand
collected and given the volume and inconsistent pattern of disclosures, there could be capture
error in relation to amount of derivatives used. However, the univariate descriptive statistics
of the focal variables and comparison to similar studies, as discussed in sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2,
7.1, show that the data is consistent with and of the same order of magnitude as other studies.
Another factor that could contribute to measurement error is the miss-classification of
speculative derivatives as risk management or income smoothing derivatives. Similar to Lins
et al, 2007 and many authors, I face the empirical difficulty of differentiating between
speculative and risk management derivatives use. Therefore I could have failed to identify
situations of speculative derivatives use where derivatives use and accruals should be
complements and not substitutes.
Other sources of measurement error could arise due to the estimates of abnormal investments
and managerial risk incentives of delta and vega. The risk incentives of delta and vega could
be overstated when they are calculated using the partial derivatives from the Black Scholes
model (Triki, 2005; and Rajgopal and Shelvin, 2002). Executive stock options are not
frequently traded and hence do not fulfil one of the key conditions for the Black and Scholes
option valuation methods. Another factor that could be leading to the over-statement of risk
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incentives, arise due to the limited disclosure on type of exercisable and non-exercisable
options. The calculation of risk incentives is done using the total sum of exercisable and non-
exercisable options. The approach of using all disclosed options approach may not be
appropriate. In addition, the exercise price and time to maturity of exercisable and non-
exercisable options are not disclosed and some simplifying assumptions proposed by Core
and Guay (2002) are used to proxy for these key option valuation parameters. Measurement
error could also arise from some of the independent control variables that lack sufficient and
high quality data. The corporate governance and earnings volatility data in particular has this
problem.
While I controlled for corporate governance using institutional ownership, managerial share
ownership, quality of auditors and year as a proxy for SOX, I have concerns about the quality
of data. This could be a source of measurement error and could result in a situation where
there is still un-modelled, unobservable heterogeneity despite the inclusion of corporate
governance variables in the multivariate specification. The ideal approach is to model
corporate governance using a composite index such as the Gov-Index or Gov-Score (Jiang,
Lee and Anandarajan, 2008). Gov-score data is not readily available for the sample horizon
of this research. Although, this is not a primary variable, future studies could be refined by
the use of better corporate governance proxies.
As Bartram and Aretz (2009) note the problem of endogeneity and inappropriate proxies’
plagues derivatives and risk management empirical literature. While I have catered for
endogeneity related to simultaneity of derivatives use and discretionary accruals, there are
other sources of endogeneity such as leverage and executive compensation in relation to
derivatives use. There is scope for the investigation and application of models that can
appropriately and parsimoniously deal with multiple endogeneity, possibly the use of
structural equation modelling. Bartram et al (2009) also pinpoints the non linearity of some
control variables such as the proxy for growth opportunities. Growth opportunities create
incentives to hedge as discussed in section 2.3.1.4. At the same time firms with more assets
in place or lower growth opportunities, face bigger free cash flow problems and face stronger
incentives to hedge (Morellec and Smith, 2007).
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8.3.2 SFAS 133 on disclosure- Limitations
The study design, which is based on a self constructed index, has several limitations.
Namely:
 The disclosure index may exclude information content on firm risk exposure and risk
management that has been disclosed outside the financial statements.
 The index value is highly sensitive to the addition or deletion of components. This
could be a source of measurement error. However, the number of factors included in
the index compares well with the construction of a similar disclosure index by
Aggarwal and Simkins (2004). For further empirical studies, it may be useful to
extend the number of factors in the index so as to minimise the likelihood of
measurement errors.
 Replicability: given that the index is subjectively constructed, in terms of index
constituents, it may be difficult for other studies to replicate the findings.
In testing the impact of SFAS 133 on disclosure, I assumed that there was no endogeneity.
However, this is likely only true in relation to the focal variables. For example, Lobo and
Zhou (2001) assert that disclosure and earnings management are endogenous, but
discretionary accruals is not a focal variable for the second question.
8.4 Areas for Further Research
The study has highlighted potential areas for further research. These include:
Extend and refine derivatives usage measurement
There is an opportunity to further extend the sample beyond the year 2003, as this study is
based on early stage SFAS 133 data. There is also an opportunity to extend the study to
incorporate non US and international data. Under IFRS, financial instrument recognition and
measurement requirements are specified in IAS 39 (recently changed to IFRS9). The
financial instrument risk disclosure requirements are specified under IFRS 7. IFRS 7 was
enacted with effect from 1st January 2007. IFRS7 is a principle based standard that in essence
provides more managerial discretion on the level of disclosure. This makes it all the more
likely that there will be lower compliance with prescribed risk disclosures and it makes it all
the more interesting to understand the incentives that shape disclosure for such standards.
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Throughout this thesis, I have highlighted the difficulties in distinguishing between
speculative and hedging derivatives. In addition, I have used a dummy variable to model the
use of cash flow hedge accounting. There is scope for further studies that use more refined
and continuous variable data of derivatives use and cash flow hedge accounting. The quality
of derivatives data could have been poor due to the early stages of adoption, but with
increased familiarity and better enforcement it is likely to have improved in the post 2003
period.
Multiple determinants of income smoothing
Consistent with the direction of this study, there is scope to concurrently evaluate multiple
mechanisms of smoothing income and their interaction. Modelling economic operating and
investment decisions, alongside operational hedging, and using derivatives and discretionary
accruals, will be a more complete study. Risk management literature has tended to focus
exclusively on derivatives use. However, as Hentschel and Kothari (2001) found, derivatives
use is just one part of the arsenal of risk management tools, available to corporate managers.
Improved econometric modelling
As discussed in the limitations and highlighted by Bartram and Aretz (2009), there is scope
to improve models so as to cater for the multiple endogeneity of the determinants of
derivatives use. Investment, risk management and financing determinants are most likely
endogenous. Improved modelling approaches could include the application of structural
equation modelling and approaches that cater for the non linearity of some of the
determinants of derivatives use.
Investigate Impact of Industry
The univariate results (see Table 5.7 and Table 7.4), point to industry being an important
factor in disclosure choice. However, more work could be done to identify and incorporate
the specific industry structural factors that influence disclosure and derivatives use. Such
studies will be building on the work of Nain (2004) that focused on derivatives use at
industry levels. Different studies, such as Chalmers and Godfrey (2004), do factor in
industry, using a dummy variable, but dummy variables do not sufficiently illuminate on the
causality of industry structure and observed disclosure or derivatives use.
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Assess Impact of derivatives types
The univariate results (Table 5.6) point to there being variation in derivatives types. Further
studies can be taken to further understand the factors that influence derivatives types.
Refine Derivatives information disclosure index
The disclosure index could be enhanced to include information that would be useful yet was
not prescribed at the time by either of these standard setting authorities. Despite the overall
recognition and measurement improvements entailed in the recognition of derivatives fair
value under SFAS 133, the prescribed literature does not make mandatory all disclosure of
items. Such types of disclosure would be helpful in understanding both the risk exposure and
risk management effectiveness (Kawaller, 2004; Hamlen and Largay, 2005; Ryan, 2007 and
Gastineau, Smith and Todd, 2001). Ryan (2007) proposes a yardstick reference when
evaluating derivatives disclosures. This is based on the below stated four questions that users
of financial reports are trying to answer, when looking at a reporting entity:
1. What are the aggregate exposures?
 What are the magnitude and nature (including sensitivity) of its aggregate
exposure to changes in market prices?
 What are the remaining lives of these exposures?
2. What derivatives does a company use to modify the risk of its aggregate exposures?
 Is it economically hedging or speculating?
 Is any hedge or speculation one sided or two sided?
 Is it attempting to modify fair value or cash flow variability? If cash flow
variability, does this make sense?
 Are the amounts, sensitivities and maturities of its derivatives reasonable given
its risk exposure?
3. What are the threats to hedge effectiveness?
 Non linearity?
 Basis risk?
 Unknown Exposure
4. How does the entity account for its derivatives and hedging?
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 Do its derivatives qualify as accounting hedges?
 If so, are they fair value hedges or cash flow hedges?
 What are the limitations of the accounting?
Based on the usefulness framework of Ryan (2007), the following would be useful additional
disclosures as proposed by Gastineau et al (2001)
 Underlying risk exposure reflected in the derivatives notional amounts.
 Unhedged exposures
 Details of the type of instruments, their maturity, linearity
 Counterparty risk exposure
 Criteria of election of hedge accounting
 Level of application of hedge accounting
Similarly, Wong (2000) while studying the question of whether the disclosure of notional
amounts of derivatives contracts had information content for equity investors put forward
proposals to increase the usefulness of disclosures including
 Improving disclosures about firm inherent business risk that is matched by
derivatives use
 Disaggregation of notional and fair value amount by long/short positions taken,
major currency, class of instrument, time to maturity and leverage
 Separate disclosure of derivatives gains and losses.
The prescribed disclosure and recognition measurement standards answer some of the
questions posed by Ryan (2007) but they do not answer the questions pertaining to risk
exposures, threats to hedge effectiveness and counterparty risk. Therein lays the opportunity
for enhancement of disclosures. Concurrently there will be scope for studies that focus on the
incentives underpinning the disclosure of these additional useful components.
Extend studies on interaction between derivatives disclosure and earnings management
For the second question, I controlled for discretionary accruals, albeit not as a focal variable.
The results show a significant negative association. However, as Lobo and Zhou note this
relationship could be endogenous. Hence, this is another issue for further empirical
investigation.
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